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Foreword 
The Environment Program is devoted to investigating the interaction of human 
development activities and the environment. Its research is policy-oriented, inter- 
disciplinary, international in scope, and heavily dependent upon collaboration with an 
external network of research scientists/institutes. The Program encompasses long time- 
horizons and large space-scales, and assumes that environmental discontinuities and 
surprises will happen. 
An increasing number of international efforts explore various aspects of 
development-environment interactions under the common theme "Global Change." Some 
of the organizations involved in this research are: the International Geosphere-Biosphere 
Programme (IGBP), whose objective is to  describe and understand the interacting physi- 
cal, chemical, and biological processes that regulate the total Earth system; the Interge 
vernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is responsible for organizing interna- 
tionally agreed assessments of climatic change and the range of policy responses for limit- 
ing and adapting to  climatic change; the World Climate Conference (WCC), which is 
aimed at  providing a comprehensive account of the present state of knowledge (1990) on 
climatic change and variability and their impacts on natural and human ecosystems. 
All these activities need scenarios of long-term, large-scale socioeconomic develop 
ment as inputs to drive their environmental impact studies. I believe this document is a 
valuable compilation of analyses and source material that should serve as useful input to  
those studies. 
BO R. DOOS 
Leader 
Environment Program 
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Preface 
The problem of long-term, large-scale interactions between human activities and 
the environment have received increasing attention in recent years. The underlying na- 
tural science is being explored by the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme and 
related national efforts (e.g., ICSU, 1988). Scholarship on the question of environmentally 
sustainable human development is advancing on many fronts (e.g . , Clark and Munn, 
1986). The policy debate is becoming more serious and significant (e.g., WCED, 1987). 
Common to all these efforts is a need for ecenarioe of human development to  use as 
reference cases in exploring the possible environmental implications of alternative pat- 
terns of future socioeconomic activity. Many modeling exercises and scenario-building 
efforts have been conducted that are of some use in meeting this need. Three difficulties 
nonetheless persist: 
(1) Many existing efforts focus on single sectors (e.g., the UN Population projections) or 
single environmental variables (e.g . , scenarios of chlorofluorocarbon production). 
Combining such sectoral studies for more broadly based scenarios of global change 
can easily lead to  internal inconsistencies. 
(2) Virtually all existing efforts are "surprise-free," devoid of the wars, depressions, 
plagues, and other "breakpoints" that have so influenced history. 
(3) Despite the large amount of criticism that has been leveled at  existing global 
scenarios of human development no critical literature has developed to  help potential 
users apply these inevitably imperfect tools with a sophisticated awareness of their 
comparative advantages and pitfalls. 
This study is an initial attempt to begin addressing some of these shortcomings. In brief, 
it: 
(1) Critically review8 existing studies of global trends in population, agriculture, and en- 
ergy with a view toward showing which studies are most useful for which sorts of 
studies of global environmental change and sustainable development. 
(2) Synthesize8 a single, internally consistent scenario of global changes in population, 
agriculture, and energy over the next century for use as a "conventional wisdom" 
reference case for such studies. 
(3) Create8 a number of "surprise-rich" scenarios of world development for use in explor- 
ing unconventional, but not impossible, patterns of human activities that might be 
useful for exploring the outer limits of global environmental change. 
The work reported here was carried out as part of the project on Sustainable 
Development of the Biosphere at  the International Institute for Applied Sys tem Analysis. 
The critical review of existing studiea waa begun aa a study involving 18 visiting graduate 
students and project staff in the summer of 1985. Separate study t e a m  reviewed the ma- 
jor modeling and forecasting studies available a t  the time, and sought to  characterize 
their relative strengths and weaknesses for use in research and policy analyses of global 
environmental change. The synthetic effort was led by S. Anderberg of University of Lund 
and involved a number of other project collaborators. A condensed version of the results 
reported here has appeared in Darmstadter et al. (1987). Finally, the surprise-rich 
scenarios summarized here were initiated as part of a major study conducted with the 
Swedish Council for Planning and Coordiation of Research. An extended account of that 
study has been published as Svedin and Aniansson (1987). Since our original selection of 
models for review in 1985, several additional studies of global trends in population, agri- 
culture, and energy have appeared.* By and large, however, these are merely updates of 
the studies reviewed here; their inclusion would not significantly alter our conclusions. 
The results of IIASA's preliminary review of global change scenarios are presented 
here in some detail, in the hope that they may provide useful source material for the 
many groups around the world now formulating their own research and policy assess- 
ments of global change. 
WILLIAM C. CLARK 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 
Cambridge, MA, USA 
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Chapter I 
Scenarios of Socioeconomic Development for 
Environmental Studies: An Overview 
Fetenc L. Toth 
In recent years we have witnessed increasing concern over the nature and conse- 
quences of long-term, large-scale interactions between socioeconomic development and the 
natural environment. The long history of human development has from time to time prc+ 
duced collisions with the natural environment. In most cases these collisions resulted in at 
least temporary degradation in the quality and services of local ecosystems. Environmen- 
tal degradations in the past, however, tended to be limited in space (to a single watershed 
or bounded air basin), in time (days to a few years), and in the complexity of cause-effect 
linkages (single cause - apparent effects). 
Over the past two decades the scales and character of development-environment 
interactions have changed drastically. There is an increasing concern over larger scale 
problems that affect multiple nations, continents, or the globe (e.g. acid deposition in 
Europe and North-America, accumulation of radiatively active gases in the atmosphere); 
longer term problems that persist multiple decades to centuries (contamination of ground 
water, disposal of radioactive wastes), and complex linkages that involve a number of sec- 
tors of the economic activity at various geographical locations and produce complex syn- 
dromes of environmental change throughout the globe. 
There are now a number of studies underway to understand and manage these 
development-environment interactions. We have identified four major elements that we 
believe are necessary to address these issues in a policy-oriented context. These elements 
are outlined in the next section. 
1. Elements of policy oriented studies of environment-development interac- 
t ions 
Synoptic perrrpective 
Environmental scientists study and report numerous threats to the environment that 
may considerably degrade the environmental potentials for development in large regions 
for relatively long periods of time. Examples include the increasing atmospheric concen- 
tration of carbon dioxide, depletion of the ozone layer, and toxic contamination of water 
supplies. Most studies have concentrated on the individual environmental problems. Most 
human activities, however, simultaneously affect many environmental problems (eg. 
energy production). Conversely, many of the individual environmental problems simul- 
taneously impact the same basic ecological and economic functions (eg. forest growth). 
Studies of individual causes and effects are increasingly inadequate for policy makers who 
confront not discrete instances of pollution, but rather extremely complex and threatening 
"syndromes" of environmental and economic interdependence. 
To illustrate this difference in the scientific and management perspective, Figure 1 
presents a synoptic assessment of the impacts of various human activities and natural 
changes on the atmospheric environment. Scientists tend to look at the problems 
Many of the ideas in this section are adapted from Toth and Clark (1987). 
"columnwise", that is, a research project on acidification would normally look at  "vegeta- 
tions and soils", "petroleum combustion", "coal combustion", and selected industries as 
potential sources and contributors to the problem. Policy makers, however, look at  the 
problems "row-wise", that is they are more likely to be interested in the environmental 
impacts and consequences of changes in specific development activities. Policy analysis 
thus needs to  pay much more attention than is currently the case to responding to  the 
"row-wise" interest of the policy and management community. 
Bounding the problem in space and time 
In order to provide useful policy analyses for the issues addressed by specific studies 
of environment-development interactions and to make full use of synoptic frameworks like 
the one presented above, great care must be taken to  select the appropriate temporal and 
spatial scales. 
Choosing the appropriate temporal scale means covering time horizons back in the 
past and out into the future sufficient to  include at  least one complete cycle of each 
important development action - environmental impact - social response loop of concern to 
a specific study. This requires studies of the time necessary for environmental effects to be 
realized on the natural science side, and for technological innovations, institutional res- 
tructuring, and other social responses to  be implemented on the socioeconomic side. Criti- 
cal attention must be paid to activity sectors with long lead-times, like forestry and elec- 
tric utilities. 
Choosing the appropriate spatial scale means covering regions big enough to  include 
both causes of changes in different components of the atmospheric environment and 
effects of human activities for each source - valued component relationship incorporated in 
the overall framework. This requires analysis of the spatial dispersion of specific environ- 
mental impacts on the natural science side, and the economic, jurisdictional, and legisla- 
tive boundaries of possible social responses on the socioeconomic side. 
The linkages between the spatial and temporal aspects for atmospheric constituents 
are illustrated by Figure 2. The residence times of the gases represented in the upper- 
right corner are decades to centuries, long enough to get evenly spread throughout the 
global atmosphere. This gives the "greenhouse" syndrome its long-term, largescale char- 
acter. At the other extreme, the heavy hydrocarbons represented at  the lower left corner 
drop out of the atmosphere in a matter of hours, normally traveling a few hundred kilom- 
eters or less from their sources. Thus visibility reduction and other environmental com- 
ponents associated with these chemicals tend to be acute, local problems. 
Coping with surprise 
The surveys of a set of long-term, largescale projections (presented in this volume) 
in the areas of human population (Chapter 2), energy use (Chapter 3), and agricultural 
production (Chapter 4) show that most "future" studies postulate smooth trends or equili- 
brium conditions in interactions between development and environment and then seek to  
identify likely, possible, or even optimal ways to alter them. But history shows that 
discontinuities, thresholds, and - more generally - surprises are more the rule than the 
exception in such interactions, exerting a major influence on their outcomes. 
The key to  understanding the surprise issue is related to  the problems of uncertain- 
ties and ignorance. For most environmental questions where scientific uncertainty is 
important, the policy analysis community has come to view its task as one of risk assess- 
ment and management. This approach has been highly successful for studies of local or 
relatively small regional problems. For the carbon dioxide - climate change issue and for 
other long-term largescale environmental syndromes, the policy analysis community has, 
almost without exception, ignored the uncertainties and their implications altogether. 
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Figure 1 A synoptic assessment of impacts on the atmosphere, from Crutzen and 
Graedel (1986). Cell entries assess the relative impact of each source on each 
valued atmospheric component, and the relative scientific certainty of the as- 
sessment. Column totals would, in principle, represent the net effect all 
sources on each valued atmospheric component. Row totals would indicate the 
net effect of each source on all valued atmospheric components. These totals 
are envisioned as judgemental qualitative assessments rather than as literal 
quantitative summations. 
Day Year 10,000 years 
Figure 2 Characteristic scales of atmospheric determinants. The figure applies to the 
clean troposphere above the boundary layer. The abscissa indicates the 
amount of time required for the concentration of the listed chemicals to be re- 
duced to 30% of their initial values through chemical reactions. The ordinate 
indicates the mean horizontal displacement likely to occur over that lifetime. 
Data are from Crutzen (1983). 
Superimposed are characteristic scales of perturbations of the valued atmos- 
pheric components - thermal radiation budget alteration, precipitation acidity, 
and visibility degradation. These superpositions are plotted on the basis of 
known effects of atmospheric constituents on valued atmospheric components. 
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A crucial element of any meaningful effort to address these syndromes is to develop 
approaches to impact assessments that are able to manage uncertainties and surprises of 
three different kinds: 
surprises resulting from environmental properties that are likely to change discon- 
tinuously due to known thresholds, saturation or depletion phenomena, or other non- 
linearities; 
uncertainties in assessments caused by "parametric ignorance" or lack of precise 
information; 
uncertainties in assessments because whole pathways and linkages of interaction 
were ignored in the analysis. 
In each case, there are two sides of the surprise problem. First, there is a need to  
understand the sources of possible discontinuities in the investigated system on the 
natural science side. Second, studies also should account for the factors that might limit 
social response to  the unexpected. 
Management orientation 
There are various angles from which the policy making community is interested in 
studies of the long-term, large-scale environmental syndromes. They include managers in 
sectors of the economy whose resource base or activity is affected by these syndromes, 
officials of international development agencies whose investments are threatened by future 
environmental changes, and planners of international organizations whose strategic plan- 
ning choices must include environmental components. This requires a cross-fertilization 
between research and policy making, an effort both sides can gain from. Current channels 
of communication between the scientific and policy making communities are becoming 
increasingly inadequate. Decision makers cannot make full use of all the relevant scientific 
knowledge, while scientist are unable to determine which new knowledge would be of 
most value to the decision maker. 
The synoptic perspective proposed earlier for studies of environmental syndromes 
requires methods capable of synthesizing large bodies of scientific knowledge already accu- 
mulated in studies of specific environment - development interactions. In recent years, 
two approaches have been used widely to carry out this kind of synthesis work: one 
involves building large computer models, while the other involves committees of experts. 
Both approaches have their own merits and shortcomings. There is a need to develop new 
tools that complement these existing synthesis methods. 
One possible answer to this need is a structured effort that brings together policy 
people, scientists, and technologists to write and analyze scenarios via interactive formu- 
lation of and testing of alternative policies. The approach is called a Policy Exercise (see 
Brewer, 1986; Toth, 1986, 1988)) being developed and tested in the program on "Sustain- 
able Development of the Biosphere" of IIASA, the International Institute for Applied Sys- 
tems Analysis. 
A Policy Exercise is a structured process designed as an interface between academics 
and policymakers. Its function is to synthesize and assess knowledge accumulated in 
several relevant fields of science for policy purposes in the light of complex practical 
management problems. It is carried out in one or more periods of joint work involving 
scientists, policymakers, and a support staff. A period consists of three phases (prepara- 
tions, workshop, evaluation) and can be repeated several times. The process includes 
scenario writing ("future histories", emphasizing non-conventional, surprise rich but still 
plausible futures) and scenario analyses via the interactive formulation and testing of 
alternative policies that respond to challenges in the scenario. These scenario-based 
activities take place in an organizational setting reflecting the institutional features of the 
addressed issues. Throughout the exercise, a wide variety of hard (mathematical and com- 
puter models) and soft methods are used. 
2. Scenarios of socioeconomic development 
In order to carry out assessments of possible future long-term, large-scale environ- 
mental problems, we need a set of plausible scenarios characterizing key components of 
socioeconomic development. Four such components have been identified as major sources 
of development-environment interactions: population growth, and associated increases in 
energy, agricultural and industrial production. The first three components are given pri- 
mary attention in this study. We have not created scenarios for industry because, except 
for a few chemicals, there are no models or projections available a t  the spatial and tem- 
poral scales and appropriate resolutions requested for our study. The models and projec- 
tions included in the assessments are summarized in Table 1. 
Growing demand for goods and services by an increasing global population is the pri- 
mary driving factor in the development-environment interaction. Thus, the number, g e e  
graphical distribution and density, age structure, rural-urban distribution, level of educa- 
tion, and migration patterns of future population will indirectly affect what long-term and 
large-scale environmental stresses will arise in various parts of the world. Many environ- 
mental impacts, however, result not from people per se but from what people do. Of par- 
ticular importance are the impacts of energy and agricultural production. The key 
difference between these two sectors is that, with a few exceptions, environmental impacts 
resulting from various forms and technologies of energy production do not directly effect 
the future of use and production by the same technology, whereas agriculture may suffer 
from detrimental impacts originated both inside and outside the sector. 
There are profoundly different environmental impacts associated with various types 
of energy production and energy use. Therefore, we need for our development scenarios 
not only total energy projections but fractions of each major fuel types as well. The fuel 
types considered in scenarios reviewed here include oil and coal, gas, synfuels, biomass, 
hydro and solar energy, and nuclear energy. 
Various types of agricultural activities and their resource base are affected by 
environmental impacts from other sectors and by their own management practices in 
different ways. The contribution by specific land-use types to present and future environ- 
mental stresses is also different. Besides total agricultural production, the following land 
use types and intensity indices are treated in the studies reviewed here: total cropland, 
dry cropland, irrigated cropland, grazing land, forests, other land, total fertilizer use, fer- 
tilizer per unit of cropland. 
Instead of developing a set of new projections characterizing possible paths of 
socioeconomic development, we decided to  undertake an assessment of already existing, 
recent, widely circulated, heavily referenced and used models and projections in the above 
three key areas. Major objectives for these assessments were: 
to provide a critical appraisal of how existing projections can be used methodologi- 
cally; 
to explore what are these projections good for; 
to evaluate which study provides the best available tool for specific types of environ- 
mental studies. 
The objective clearly was not to evaluate how good or bad the selected models and 
projections are per se but rather to assess how they can be used to characterize 
socioeconomic development as a driving force in studies of development-environment 
interactions. 
The central criterion in the assessment was the ability of a study to describe rela- 
tions between alternative development strategies, specific policies and actions, and charac- 
teristic paths of future development and indicators of environment in terms of possible or 
estimated impacts on a set of key valued environmental components (VECs). One such 
attempt to create an action-VEC matrix for energy production is presented in Chapter 3. 
The aim for the assessment was to construct a summary and "user's guide" to direct 
potential users interested in environment related issues and to identify appropriate tools 
for specific questions. This includes an assessment of which model or projection can or 
cannot be used for particular questions as well as identifying structural constraints of 
these studies for dealing with some questions and not others. The key question in this 
respect is: How can one use these global studies/models as inputs to  various environmen- 
tal studies (e.g. long-term atmospheric studies) in a way that the user does not have to 
become an expert in modeling the related fields (e.g. in energy modeling in the case of cli- 
mate and atmospheric impact studies). In general, what are the relevant inputs from 
population, energy, and agricultural models for a specific environmental study? 
T i m e  boundaries and temporal  resolution 
The long-term, large-scale nature of the environmental problems we are interested in 
here requires driving scenarios of socioeconomic development a t  the same scales. The time 
horizon of the models and projections considered in the assessment ranges from 2000 to  
2150. Not surprisingly, population projections tend to  cover the longest time into the 
future (at least 50 but typically 75 to 100 years), and agricultural models provide the 
shortest outlook in the future (no agricultural model extends beyond 2010). Accordingly, 
the temporal resolution of the long-term models is usually 25 years while that of the 
medium-term models is 5 years. 
Our assessments show that only some of the population forecasts (Keyfitz, Frejka, 
WB) and two of the energy models (E&R, N&Y) cover the necessary time horizon to  
carry out long-term, large-scale environmental impact studies. It would be difficult to 
extend any of the agricultural studies to cover at  least twice the length of their present 
time horizon because the assumptions underlying these models represent short-term con- 
cerns. The 25 year resolution of the longer-term projections seems to be appropriate for 
illustrating the broad patterns of change essential for these environmental studies. 
Geographical  scale and  spatial  resolution 
All the models included in the assessment provide the required global coverage. 
Three agricultural studies, however, have special focus: AEZ and AT2000 on developing 
countries and RFF on the United States. Most population projections are broken down 
into countries and geopolitical regions and are aggregated into major geographical 
regions. Energy studies do not consider country-level disaggregation. Except for N&Y 
(treating the world as a single region), they provide projections for at  least four major 
geopolitical regions. Criteria for grouping countries into regions and thus the composition 
of those regions are different for each study as they represent specific geographical, 
economic development, resource endowment, and political considerations. 
Spatial resolution in the agricultural studies depends on the specific focus of the indi- 
vidual models. Those primarily concerned with agro-ecological issues (AEZ, AT2000) are 
broken down into hundreds to  tens of thousands of smaller regions based on soil charac- 
teristics and climatic conditions. These small units are then aggregated into countries and 
larger regions. Agricultural studies focusing on economic aspects of agricultural develop 
ment (MOIRA, FAP) provide less detailed ecological inventory of the resource base and 
their principal spatial units are countries, country groups based on political and economic 
integrations, or regional groups based on geographical location. 
For studies of large-scale environmental changes, studies by Keyfitz, UN, and WB 
provide the best sources of information on population. Considering the level of spatial 
disaggregation, E&R, IIASA, and WEC are the most appropriate among the energy 
models (but the last two do not stretch long enough to  cover the required time scale). 
An appropriate combination of agricultural models that would provide both the 
necessary agro-ecological assessment and incorporate the most important underlying 
economic processes as well as cover an 80-100 year time horizon is yet to be developed. 
Table 1. Overview of t h e  models and project ions  included in t h e  assessment 
Short  name Title and referenoe  Temporal scale Spatial scale and resolution 
-- 
Populat t o n  I 
Keyfitz Global population (1975-2075) and labor 2075 Global, 150 national t e r r i t o r i e s ,  
foroe  (1975-2050) (Keyfitz et al., 1983) 9 regions 
UN World population prospeots 2025 Global, 210 countr ies  and areas ,  
(United Nations, 1985) 8 regions, 24 subregions 
Frejka Long-term prospects f o r  world population 2150 Global, 8 regions 
growth (Frejka, 1981) 
WB World population projeotions 2050 (2155) Global, 185 countr ies  and 
(World Bank, 1984) geopolitical regions 
G2000 Global 2000 Report t o  t h e  President 2000 (2100) Global, 5 major regions, also 
(CEQ, 1980) 12 developing oountries and 
5 developed oountries & minor regions 
en erg^ 
IIASA Energy in a f ini te  world 2030 Global, 7 regions; 7 fuels 
(Haefele et al., 1981) 
E & R Global Energy 2050 (2100) Global, 9 regions; 6 primary, 
(Edmonds and Reilly, 1985) 4 secondary + biomass, synfuels 
N & Y  Paths of energy and carbon dioxide emis- 2100 Global, 1 region; 
sions (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983) 2 aggregated: fossil, nonfossil 
WEC Energy 2000-2020 2020 Global, 10 regions; 8 fuel types 
(Frisoh, 1983) 
IE A World energy outlook 1990 Global, 4 regions; 5 fuel types 
(IEA. 1982) 
G2000 Global 2000 Report t o  the  President 2000 Global, U.S. and 4 regions; 5 fuel types 
(CEQ, 1980) ! 
Table 1. (continued) 
Short  name Tltle and referenoe  Temporal soale Spatlal soale and resolutlon 
Ag~icuLture  
AEZ Agro-eoologloal zones projeot  - Developing, 117 countries, 
(PAO, 1978-1961) 50,000 land unlts 
AlZOaQ Agriculture toward 2000 2000 Global, 90 developlng In detall, 
(FAO, 1981) 34 developed aggregated 
MOIRA Model of international relat ions in agrloul- 2010 Global, 222 soil regions, 106 geographioal 
t u r e  (Llnnemann, 1979) units, 6 geographical regions 
G2000 Global 2000 Report t o  t h e  President 2000 Global. 3 major regions, also 
( cm,  imo) 7 countr ies  and minor regions 
FAP IIASA Food and Agrloultural Program 2000 Global, 18 oountry, 2 oountry-groups, 
(Parlkh, 1901) 14 reglonal groups 
RPP Resouroes and environmental effeots  of U.S. 2010 US and rest of t h e  world 
agrloulture (Crosson and Brubaker, 1902) 
Internal resolution 
In order to carry out appropriate environmental assessments, the sectoral studies 
used as inputs should provide details on the composition and structure of each sector. As 
a rule-of-thumb, short-term models tend to  be more detailed and, thus, contain more 
complex internal feedbacks within the sector they consider. 
Each population forecast included in the assessment elaborates some details of future 
populations. Keyfitz focuses on labor force (based on labor force ages and participation 
ratios). The UN report contains information about birth rates and death rates, reproduc- 
tion rates, and life expectancies. The WB report includes individual country data on fer- 
tility, three major age-groups (0-14, 15-64, 65 and over), and dependency ratios. 
Region-specific data on possible development of the main energy sources is necessary 
to  assess future environmental stresses arising from the energy sector. The internal resolu- 
tion of the energy models included in the assessment covers 5-8 fuel types except for NkY 
that considers only two aggregated fuels: fossil and non-fossil. 
The agricultural models considered show a diverse picture with respect to their 
internal resolution. The studies focusing on agro-ecological conditions are primarily con- 
cerned with land-use types, major cropping systems (dry crops, irrigated crops), and 
major crop classes (cereals, seeds, etc.). The agro-economic models provide a higher level 
of disaggregation in agricultural commodities, and they also shed light on international 
trade of those commodities. 
3. Conclusions 
Results of the assessments show that individual sectoral models provide a better 
description of the internal dynamics and development patterns of these sectors than 
highly aggregated "world models". There is a considerable degree of freedom in the ways 
and directions each sector may develop relatively independently of what happens in other 
sectors, especially on the long-term. Constructing endogenous feedback loops describing 
linkages among variables of different economic sectors often result in obscure relation- 
ships. 
This approach, however, raises the problem of constructing consistent summary 
scenarios. The proposed solution is to start with a collection of models and projections 
whose initial assumptions are well understood and documented. The next step is to com- 
bine results or versions of those projections that share a consistent set of assumptions. 
One such attempt to generate a comprehensive long-term, global development scenario 
based on "conventional wisdom" versions of the sectoral projections is presented in 
Chapter 5. 
The assessments of sectoral models show that the models and projections describe a 
smooth transition between their starting values (today) and projected values (at the end 
of their projection horizon), and that the projected values of key variables in each sector 
fall into a well-bounded range. The environmental assessments and the analyses of possi- 
ble human responses to the environmental impacts would offer little useful, if only these 
highly conventional, surprise-free socioeconomic development paths were used as inputs to 
them. Therefore, as a first step, a summary "conventional wisdom" reference scenario was 
developed based on the future sectoral developments as suggested by the studies included 
in the assessment (Chapter 5). 
One of the objectives of the sectoral assessments was to identify possible sources of 
surprises in the future developments of each sector. The term "surprise" is used in a broad 
sense here. Events or future development patterns are considered to be surprising if they 
are profoundly diverted from the generally projected trends based on past histories and 
some widely accepted convenient assumptions and lie far beyond the high-low boundaries 
of conventional projections or they are qualitatively different. Thus, as a second step a 
selection of surprising development patterns identified as plausible surprises in the assess- 
ment work were used to  define three different and highly surprising states of the world for 
2075. A multinational interdisciplinary group of dedicated experts developed alternative 
"historical" paths to  reach each specified future state over a hundred-year period mainly 
in forms of qualitative future histories (see Svedin and Aniansson, 1987). 
The final step was to  create a quantitative and consistent development path for each 
surprise-rich future history. The objectives of this effort were (i) to  check the plausibility 
of the scenarios; (ii) to  improve the internal consistency of the scenarios; and (iii) to  p r e  
vide an improved material for use in environmental assessments (Chapter 6). The specific 
social and political events in these future histories are not very important. It is rather the 
patterns of population development, energy and agricultural production, their structure 
and geographical distribution that might provide useful information for studies of global 
environmental change. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Objectives and Goals 
IIASA's Project on Sustainable Development of the Biosphere is designed to serve 
the needs of policy-makers and planners in government and industry who confront long- 
run trade-offs between development objectives and possible environmental constraints, in 
the face of significant scientific uncertainty and minimal social consensus. The goal of the 
Project is to develop a strategic perspective on the interactions of development and 
environment that will help to clarify key issues, to order the knowns and unknowns, and 
to illuminate possible "future histories" for sustainable development of the biosphere. 
The project's plan of work is to assess the major published forecasts and future- 
oriented studies regarding long-term, global-scale human development; to use the infor- 
mation from those studies to construct a matrix of valued environmental components 
(VECs) and human actions affecting those components; and to use the matrix and our 
assessments of the major scenarios in Policy Exercises that will examine -- and perhaps 
try to construct a new - plausible scenarios of future "collisions" between environment 
and development. 
The studies selected for assessment were those we felt to be the most widely known, 
and the most widely used. In this paper we focus on major population forecasts. We seek 
to show where they agree and disagree, where they have uncertainties, what their assump 
tions are, and where discontinuities or surprises could make a difference in the outcomes 
they project. 
Population is presumed to be the driving force in long-term, large-scale interactions 
between socioeconomic development and the natural environment, both in modifying the 
environment through energy use, agriculture, industrialization (in a word, development), 
and in terms of using the environment to meet human needs. We attempted to develop a 
VECs/actions matrix of population-environment interactions, but discovered that the 
approach we used inevitably led to population having mostly indirect environmental 
effects, the direct linkages occurring through agricultural and energy activities. Therefore 
no discussion of VECs/actions is presented here. Appendix 1 displays a partial catalogue 
of population-environment effects gleaned from papers presented a t  the Symposium on 
Population, Resources, and the Environment (Stockholm, 26 September - 3 October, 
1973). This conference was held in preparation for the 1974 World Population Conference 
held in Bucharest, Rumania. 
Table 1.1 presents a list of the five major studies containing six projections of global 
population which were reviewed. These studies were selected because (1) they are used as 
inputs to  global energy and agriculture models, or (2) they are judged by the demographic 
community to  be major projections, or (3) both. The six projections vary in their time 
horizons from 2000 to  2155. 
The projections were evaluated using the following criteria to  assess their usefulness 
for long-term, large-scale environmental studies. We do not expect any single projection 
to  meet all the criteria but expect this critical appraisal to illuminate where individual 
demographic studies can make important contributions to  these kinds of environmental 
studies. The criteria are that the projections (should) 
(1) be at  an appropriate level of disaggregation so as not to  obscure important 
differences between countries and regions of the world; 
(2) have an appropriate time horizon to  provide the long-term (100 year) informa- 
tion on population growth required by long-term environmental studies; 
(3) be accepted by the demographic community as being a reasonable assessment of 
the future possibilities of world population; 
(4) specify the rates and assumptions for each of the key parameters of fertility, mor- 
tality, and migration; 
(5) possess error bands around the projections or a t  least provide variant projec- 
tions; and 
(6) be understandable to the policy maker who will ultimately be the user of the out- 
put of the projections (i.e., if a simple model of geometric increase provides information 
about the future to the same level of accuracy as a more highly specified model then this 
might be selected for use). 
Section 2 presents a detailed description and evaluation of each of the projections 
which were examined, with accompanying summary tables and graphs. Wherever possi- 
ble, the data have been re-aggregated into a scheme of eight regions developed for global 
environmental studies. (A list of the countries in each region is exhibited in Appendix 2.) 
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION 
2.1. Introduction 
Accurate projections of future population growth require a valid theory of demo- 
graphic change. This implies a theoretical understanding of the determinants of fertility, 
mortality, and migration. Keyfitz (1983) has reviewed the rich literature on theoretical 
explanations for changes in fertility, mortality, and migration. He points out that most 
theories have been developed by observing the past and concludes that one is left with no 
clear theoretical explanation on which to  build a behavioral model to predict future popu- 
lations. He states that this is primarily due to  "[Tlhe recalcitrance of the data, and their 
unwillingness to  distinguish between theories ..." (Keyfitz, 1983:744). 
In the absence of a causal theory, then, how are population projections made? 
Keyfitz (1983) provides a catalog of the techniques available for making population pro- 
jections. These can be classified as (1) statistical methods, (2) mathematical methods, 
and (3) behavioral models based on causal theory. All have certain disadvantages and 
limitations for use in projecting future population size. 
T a b l e  1.1 Summary I n f o r m a t i o n  on F o r e c a s t s  E v a l u a t e d  in t h i s  study 
Tlme Per lod of Projection & 
Title, Author, Citatlon Spat ia l  Sca le  of Resolution Comments, Assumptions, Key Variables 
Global Population (1975-2075) and a population t o  2075 
Labor Foroe  (1975-2050) labor force t o  2050 
revision of Littman k Keyfitz, 1977 
predicts changes in fer t i l i ty  ra tes  by assuming 
Keyfltz, et 1983, Oak ~~d~~ Assool- done for 150 main natlonal terr i tor ies  dates for achieving replacement level fe r t i l i ty  
and the world and applying a linear interpolation back t o  a t e d  Universit ies,  Ins t i tu te  f o r  starting point 
Energy Analysis, ORAU/IEA-83-6(M) 
used a s  input t o  Edmonds k Reilly (1985) and 
I IIASA energy models (Haefele e t  bl.. 1981) 1 
World Population Prospec t s  Estl- population t o  2025 - most widely cited source I and PTD(eotiOns ln done for 210 countrles. t e r r i t o r i n  and 1 1982 revised regularly areas and the world oroduces three variant orolections with the 
United Natlons, 1985, ST/ESA/SER.A/86 medium variant assumed t o k e  the most "likely" I 
high and low variants should not be assumed t o  
represent upper and lower bounds of uncer- 
tainty 
1 Long-Term Prospeo ts  f o r  World Popu- . population to 2150 revision of Frelka. 1973, where he f i r s t  intro- 1 
. . 
lation Growth done for 4 developed and 4 developing duced notion of-ast&mini future date for achiev- 
regions of the world ing replacement level fer t i l i ty  and linearly 
FreJka,  Tomas, 1981, Population and interpolating back t o  starting date t o  get fer t .  
Development Review 7, No.3 (Sep- 
tember)  pp  489-511 
! 
ra tes  I 
presents 4 trajectories intended t o  represent 
uooer and lower boundaries of ~ o ~ u l a t i o n  nrowth 1 
- - - - - - - - 
World Development Report  1984, 
World Population ProJect lons  1984 
World Bank, 1984. N.Y.:Oxford Univer- 
s l t y  Press ;  Vu, M.T. 1984. 
Washington,D.C.:The World Bank 
- 
Global 2000 Report  to t h e  President: 
Enter ing t h e  21st  Century 
Vo1.2, Technical Report  and  Vo1.3, 
Documentation on t h e  Government's 
Global S e c t o r a l  Models (Washlngton, 
- - - - - - - -  
3 proJections t o  2050; 1 t o  2155 
done for 185 countries with reglonal and 
world totals . 
population t o  2000 . 
single trajectory to  2100 
done for 12 developing countries, 5 
major regions, 4 minor reglons and the . 
world 
- - 
not very user accessible 
makes projections t o  stationarity 
emphasizes LDCs 
contains 2 projections, one prepared by the U.S. 
Census Bureau and one by the Community and 
Famlly Study Center of the Univ. of Chicago 
assumes continued decline in fer t i l i ty  
uses WB rescheduled U N  mortality estimates 
1 D.C. GPO) 
2.1.1. The component  me thod  of projection 
The models reviewed in this section all use the component projection method. A 
summary of this method, paraphrased from World Population Prospects (United Nations, 
1985) is presented below. 
First, age-sex-specific survival rates are successively applied to  the base-year popula- 
tion in order to  determine the number of survivors in each age at  the end of each five-year 
period. These survival rates are based on national life tables, when applicable, or on 
model life tables. 
Second, the number of births expected to  take place during each five-year period is 
estimated. The expected age-specific fertility rate, which is derived from the assumed 
gross reproduction rate, is multiplied by the corresponding number of females in the 
reproductive age groups to  yield the total number of births. Next, these births are distri- 
buted on the basis of an assumed sex ratio a t  birth. Finally, the numbers of survivors 
from these births at the end of each five-year period are calculated by applying the 
appropriate survival probabilities. 
The third, and final, major step is to  determine the net number of migrants that are 
to be added to or subtracted from the projected survivors. The assumed net numbers of 
migrants during the five-year period, classified by age and sex, are combined with the pro- 
jected age and sex structure to  produce the projected population at  the end of the five- 
year period. 
2.1.2. Sources of e r ro r  a n d  bias 
Key assumptions for population projections using the component method, which can 
contribute sources of error to  the projection, involve the four key parameters: (1) initial 
population size and age-sex structure; (2) fertility estimates; (3) mortality estimates; and 
(4) migration estimates. 
Keyfitz et al. (1983) consider the uncertainty in the assumptions made for these 
different variables greatest in the fertility estimates. Hence, this is likely to  contribute 
the largest source of error to  projections of future population size. 
Growth rates can also be calculated by assuming that growth will slow to replace- 
ment (net reproductive rate = 1) by a certain time. This has the advantage that one can 
easily assess the reasonableness of this assumption and its effect on future population size. 
In the developing countries, starting with estimates of 1975 population, postponement by 
one year of the time of replacement adds, on the average, 160 million people to the world 
population. For the developed countries, a similar postponement of time of replacement 
adds, on the average, 4.5 million people to the world population (Keyfitz et al., 1983:24). 
A second source of error, sometimes called "jumping off" error, involves variability 
in initial estimates of population parameters for key developing countries. Ten countries 
designated as key include: China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Mexico, Philip 
pines, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Thailand. These accounted for 52 percent of the world's 
population in 1975, and are projected to  account for 54 percent in the year 2000. Errors 
in selecting the initial estimates for these key developing countries will contribute a small 
amount t o  the uncertainty of the final population projections. In the year 2000, a 
difference of 360 million people exists between the highest and lowest estimates prepared. 
All the studies assume that its mortality rates make a small contribution to the 
uncertainty of the population projections. Mortality rates are determined essentially by 
extrapolating the consensus which exists in the demographic community, that present 
trends in decreasing rates of mortality will continue. The downtrends are forecast a t  a 
slightly faster rate for the developing countries than the developed countries. 
All the studies assume that net migration is zero. On a global scale migration must 
of course net to zero; but because world population is often derived additively, it is possi- 
ble for migration to affect world totals as well. Assumptions concerning migration are 
more important for assessing population growth in individual nations and regions than 
the world, but even here zero net is assumed because available data are usually so few and 
unreliable that accurate estimates cannot be made. Total population for the world can be 
obtained by adding estimates for individual countries or by a simple direct calculation for 
the total. An additive total will always be greater than a simple total because an arith- 
metic average is always greater than a geometric average. The additive procedure is supe- 
rior to  the simple procedure since it allows the relative numbers to  shift toward the high 
end of the projection, as they do in the real world. 
Looking at  global figures often obscures the diversity of the world demographic 
situation. There is a large disparity in all demographic indicators between the developed 
and developing regions of the world. Considerable diversity also exists within developing 
regions of the world. The proportional contribution of the developing countries to  world 
population growth is increasing. 
A few developing countries have a large effect on the demographic indicators when 
viewed as an aggregate grouping. For example, the observed decline in the growth rate 
for developing countries from 2.6 percent to 2.0 percent during the period from 1965 - 
1985 is reduced to  a decline to  2.5 percent if China is excluded from the calculations. 
Differences in the population trends in individual countries and the eight major regions of 
the world (as defined by the United Nations) point to  the need to  examine future popula- 
tion on a national or a t  most regional scale of aggregation. 
The component method cannot discriminate between inaccurate and accurate data; 
only the demographic analyst is in a position to determine whether the initial data are of 
suitable quality. The extent and accuracy of the initial population data are of primary 
importance in the production of accurate projections, especially for the short-term. 
The knowledge gained from attempts to develop a causal theory of demographic 
change is incorporated into the models implicitly as casual theorizing and expert opinion 
concerning rates of change in the key parameters of fertility, mortality, and migration. In 
general, rates of change in these parameters are established in one of two ways: (1) extra- 
polation of past trends modified by judgement into the future, or (2) assuming a point in 
the future when replacement level fertility will be reached and deriving subsequent fertil- 
ity rates via linear interpolation between that point in time back to the initial period or 
base year. 
2.2. Keyfitz, et al.: Global Population (1975-2075) and 
Labor Force (1975-2050) 
2.2.1. Introduction 
This projection, developed by Nathan Keyfitz, Edward Allen, James Edmonds, Ray- 
ola Dougher, and Barbara Wright, was prepared in 1983 as a revision to  estimates 
developed by Littman and Keyfitz (1977). It was published as a report from the Institute 
for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, ORAU/IEA-83-6(m), Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee. 
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2.2.2. Scale and resolution 
Projections are made for 150 main national territories and the world. The 150 
national territories have been aggregated into nine regions: the United States; Western 
Europe and Canada; Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; centrally planned Europe; cen- 
trally planned Asia; the Middle East; Africa; Latin America; and non-communist South, 
East, and Southeast Asia. 
The baseline year, 1975, was derived from actual counts and published surveys 
where available. The numbers produced by Littman and Keyfitz (1977) "were regarded as 
low" (Keyfitz et al., 1983:l); this more recent work attempts to improve the usefulness of 
the projections. 
2.2.3. Method 
The population projections were developed using the component method. Growth 
rates were estimated by assuming that population growth would slow to replacement (net 
reproductive rate = 1) by either 2000-05 or 2015-20. A straight line interpolation of the 
net reproductive rate (NRR) was then made between 1975 and the time a t  which replace- 
ment was assumed to be reached. These expectations of NRR were translated into 
country-sex-age specific rates using regional model life tables developed by Coale and 
Demeny (1966). We have treated the Littman and Keyfitz (1977) estimate as a low vari- 
ant projection and the 2000-05 and 2015-20 projections as medium and high variants 
respectively. 
2.2.4. Conclusions 
Table 2.1 and Figures 2.1 through 2.3 present projections for the world and eight 
regions. These will be used for comparison with the other major population forecasts and 
for integration with the reports on the energy (Chapter 3) and agriculture (Chapter 4) 
projections. 
In the more developed world, population to  the year 2000 and beyond is seen t o  be 
leveling off and approaching stationarity. In 1975 the more developed countries 
accounted for approximately 28 percent of the world total; by 2025 this is expected t o  fall 
t o  17-19 percent of the world total. In this part of the world the interesting demographic 
issue is the changing age structure of populations associated with stationarity. Assump 
tions concerning mortality and migration may hold surprises for the future. 
In 1975 the less developed countries accounted for 72 percent of the world popula- 
tion; by 2025 this is expected t o  increase t o  81-83 percent. For the developing world, there 
is greater uncertainty in both current estimates of populations and the time t o  achieving 
replacement level net reproductive rates. The difficulty in making accurate estimates for 
a few key developing countries has a large effect on the accuracy of world projections. 
Additionally, many African countries have not been judged t o  have entered the "demo- 
graphic transition" (defined by falling death rates, followed by falling fertility) and so 
their actual totals may come out higher than projected. One cannot predict when or if 
they will enter the demographic transition, but it seems impossible, on economic and eco- 
logical grounds, for Africa's population to  continue growing at  its present rate. 
Keyfitz et al. (1983) conclude that  their projected population for 2075, ranging 
between 8.4 - 11.3 billion with a most likely projection of 8.9 billion persons may well 
approximate the ultimate stationary level of world population. 
2.3. United Nations: World Population Prospects, Estimates and Projections 
as Assessed in 1985 
2.3.1. Introduction 
The projections presented in this report represent the ninth round of global demo- 
graphic assessments by the United Nations. The report was published in 1985 by the 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, ST1ESAISER.A 186, and is 
available from the United Nations publications office, Sales No. E. 82 XIII.5. A magnetic 
tape containing the major results of the present estimates and projections can be obtained 
from the Director of the Population Division, Department of International Economic and 
Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017. 
2.3.2. Scale and resolution 
Projections are made for 210 countries and areas, and are combined for the world; 
more developed and less developed regions; eight major geographical regions (Africa, 
Latin America, Northern America, East Asia, South Asia, Europe, Oceania, and USSR); 
and 24 subregions. The projections are presented for the 75 year period from 1950 - 2025. 
The various figures used as baseline are derived from data  available generally by the 
beginning of 1983. National data, whenever available, have been used, adjusted for 
deficiencies and inconsistencies if necessary. For those countries where the data were una- 
vailable or insufficient, the demographic indicators were determined according to  reason- 
able assumptions for the population in question and in agreement with any existing reli- 
able information. The base year is taken t o  be 1980. 
Table 2.2 United Naticins (19851, Sumwy Population Data 
Area Population (10e6) Factor Increase Density 1 
1Oe6 kmZ Vwiants 1975 2000 2025 1975 2000 2025 1975 20(30 202'5 
.................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................. 
ftfr ica 37 High 509 1093 2230 1 2.1 4.4 14 30 60 
Hed i um 509 1070 1949 1 2.1 3.8 14 29 53 
Lou 509 1034 1632 1 2.0 3.2 14 28 44 
Fkia 16 High 1432 
Hed i un 1432 
Lou 1432 
------------------------------------ 
Europe 5 High 474 
Hediun 474 
Lou 474 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Indian sh-cont 5 High 829 1416 1980 1 1.7 2.4 166 283 3% 
Hed i un 829 1351 1766 1 1.6 2.1 166 270 353 
Lou 829 1297 1604 1 1.6 1.9 166 259 321 
............................................................................................... 
Latin Fkerica 20 High 322 572 898 1 1.8 2.8 16 29 45 
Hed i urn 322 550 787 1 1.7 2.4 16 28 39 
Lou 322 521 686 1 1.6 2.1 16 26 34 
.................................................................................................. 
North Fkerica 18 High 239 31 1 390 1 1.3 1.6 13 17 22 
Med i um 239 298 347 1 1.2 1.5 13 17 19 
Low 239 283 300 1 1.2 1.3 13 16 17 
Oceania 8 High 18 27 36 1 1.5 2.0 2 3 5 
Hedium 18 25 32 1 1.4 1.8 2 3 4 
Lou 18 24 27 1 1.3 1.5 2 3 3 
USSR 22 High 253 322 394 1 1.3 1.6 12 15 18 
Hedium 253 315 367 1 1.2 1.5 12 14 17 
Lou 253 307 344 1 1.2 1.4 12 14 16 
........................................................................................................ 
Uorld 131 High 4076 6367 9185 1 1.6 2.3 31 49 70 
Medium 4076 6127 8177 1 1.5 2.0 31 47 62 
Lou 4076 5899 7278 1 1.4 1.8 31 45 56 
2000 
Year 
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+ High 
-6- Rlediurr-I 
+ Africa 
-3 + ,A,yio 
1-. 
A' - Europe 
* Indian s 
20b0 
Year 
Low 
Latin Am 
North Am 
Oceania 
USSR 
World 
Figure 2.5 Factor increase (medium) - United Nations 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
Indian s 
Latin Am 
North Am 
Oceania 
USSR 
Year 
Figure 2.6 Density (medium) - United Nations 
2.3.3. Method 
The 1982 estimates were developed using the component projection method for all 
countries with a population generally of about 300,000 or more as of 1980. For smaller 
countries, the projections were prepared for the total population only, by applying 
assumed growth rates. 
The age-sex structure of each country, for the base year 1980, was estimated as the 
first step in making population projections, where accurate demographic data were 
insufficient. 
2.3.4. Assumptions 
Assumptions concerning fertility, mortality, and migration are made for each coun- 
try, determined by the specific circumstance and conditions of each country and the 
region in general. All projections assume no surprises or discontinuities in the projected 
trends. 
For mortality, the trends assume a gain in each five-year period of a 2.5 year 
increase in life expectancy at  birth, with a slowdown in the gain after reaching an expec- 
tancy of 62.5 years. Adjustments up or down are made as needed for developing countries. 
For developed countries where life expectancy is already high, maximum life expectancy 
at  birth is assumed to  be 70 years for males and 82.5 years for females. Life expectancy 
at  the global level is expected to increase from 57.3 years in 1975-80 to  63.5 years in 
1995-2000 to  70.0 years in 2020-25 for the medium variant projection. 
Fertility assumptions are developed based on anticipated changes in the 
socioeconomic structure and cultural values of the society as well as the expected impacts 
of family planning programs. 
The current projections (medium variant) assume a continued decline in fertility for 
the world (measured as the gross reproductive rate) from 1.91 in 1975-80 to  1.44 in 1995- 
2000 to  1.13 in 2020-25. In 1975-80, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America had gross 
reproductive rates of 3.18, 2.55, and 2.20, respectively. Rates for Africa and Latin Arner- 
ica are assumed to decline to  1.57 and 1.18 respectively by 2025 with South Asia being 
approximately at  replacement level. 
The projections assume that net migration will slowly move towards zero, except for 
countries where present evidence suggests continuation of a current trend (e.g., Mexico 
and the United States). 
Four variant projections -- high, medium, low and constant -- were developed. These 
were made by combining the key variables as follows: 
In 1975-80, the annual rate of growth of total world population was estimated to  be 
1.80 percent, down from the middle of the 1960s when the annual rate of growth was 
estimated to  be 2.0 percent annually. The medium variant assumes that the growth rate 
will be 1.5 percent by 1995-2000 and less than 1.0 percent by 2020-25. The rates for the 
high and low variants are assumed to  be 1.74 percent and 1.29 percent in 1995-2000 and 
1.33 percent and 0.59 percent in 2020-25, respectively. For the less developed regions the 
1975-80 growth rate of 2.14 percent (it was 2.14 percent in 1950-55) is expected to decline 
to  1.8 percent by 1995-2000 and to  1.1 percent by 2020-25. 
Variant 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Constant 
2.3.5. Conclusions 
Table 2.2 presents projections for the world and eight regions. These data are 
graphed in Figures 2.4 through 2.6. Low, medium, and high variant projections are 
presented. 
In 1980 the more developed regions of the world accounted for 1.16 billion people, 
approximately 25 percent of the world total; by 2025 this is expected to reach 1.4 billion 
people, about 17 percent of the world total. The average annual growth rate was 0.7 per- 
cent in 1980 and is projected to decline to  0.5 percent by 2000 and 0.3 percent by 2025 
(for the medium variant). 
In 1980 the less developed regions of the world accounted for 3.33 billion people, 
approximately 75 percent of the world total; by 2025 this is expected to  reach 7.6 billion 
people, about 83 percent of the world total. The average annual growth rate was 2.1 per- 
cent in 1980 and is projected to  decline to  1.7 percent by 2000 and 1.1 percent by 2025 
(for the medium variant). 
The less developed regions will contribute the overwhelming majority of people to  
the future population increase (95 percent of the increase in world population by 2025). 
Africa exhibits the highest average annual rate of population increase, and in absolute 
Fertility Mortality Migration 
High Medium High 
Medium Medium Medium 
Low Medium Low 
Constant Medium Medium 
terms South Asia will show the largest population growth up to 2025. 
Demographic trends in China dictate the trends for the East Asian region as a 
whole. This reinforces the notion that there are eight to ten countries in the less 
developed regions which dominate any population forecast due to current population size 
and growth rates. 
While the global growth rate is projected to decline, the annual increment added to 
the world population will continue to increase, peaking at approximately 89 million 
around 2000 and declining to approximately 74 million by 2025 (it was approximately 77 
million in 1975). 
2.4. Frejka: Long-Term Prospects  for  World Populat ion G r o w t h  
2.4.1. Introduct ion 
This projection represents an update of the projections prepared by Frejka (1973) 
where he first introduced the method of using the assumed date of attainment of replace- 
ment level fertility as the major determinant of the projection. It was published in Popu- 
lation and Development Review 7. No. 3, (September 1981) pp. 489-511. 
2.4.2. Scale a n d  resolution 
Projections are made for eight areas of the world: four developing (East Asia, South 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America) and four developed (Europe, North America, U.S.S.R, 
and Oceania). These generally correspond with the "major areas" used by the United 
Nations and defined for global environmental studies in this project. 
The primary source of data was the 1978 United Nations figures (published in 1980), 
supplemented with data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the U.S. National Academy 
of Science Country Reports, World Fertility Survey Reports, and national statistical 
documents. The baseline data are for the period 1975-80. Projections are made for 1980, 
1990,2000, 2050, 2100, and 2150. 
2.4.3. Method  
The component method of projection is used. The innovation introduced by Frejka 
(1973) is to calculate growth rates based on assumptions about the date of attainment of 
replacement level fertility. Four time periods for achieving replacement level fertility are 
used. These are: 1980-85, 2000-05, 2020-25, and 2040-45. Only a single trend of mortality 
is assumed. A straight line interpolation between the assumed attainment of replacement 
level fertility and the base year of 1980 is utilized. Model life tables developed by Coale 
and Demeny (1966) are used in the calculations. 
2.4.4. Assumptions 
The key assumption is that of the date of attainment of replacement level fertility -- 
which is the major determinant of the projections. The procedure of assuming that 
replacement level fertility will be reached at some future time decouples the projection 
from strict adherence to trends of the recent past concerning fertility and mortality. It 
provides an explicit input of "expert opinion" concerning future periods during which 
replacement level fertility may be achieved. This allows one to know the judgement of the 
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demographer and to learn about probable high, medium, and low variant future world 
projections. 
For example, assuming that replacement level fertility is achieved between 1980-85, 
something we know in 1985 is not true, allows one to establish a lower limit for actual 
future world population. To quote Frejka, "[Ilt appears almost certain that in the year 
2000 the world will be larger than 5.3 billion ... it is likely that in 2100 the world popula- 
tion will exceed 7.0 billion ..."( Frejka, 1981:493). 
Similarly, the projection assuming replacement level fertility is attained by 2040-45 
represents a high trajectory compared with recent trends. Therefore, it is probable 
according to Frejka, that in the year 2000 the world population will not exceed 6.4 billion 
people and in 2100 it will not exceed 13.4 billion people. As with the other projections we 
have considered, the projections decrease in precision the further one extends them into 
the future, general having good predictive power in the near futures (15-20 years). 
2.4.5. Conclusions 
Table 2.3 presents projections for the world and for eight regions. These data are 
graphed in Figures 2.7 through 2.9. The figures presented by Frejka in his Tables 5, 6, 
and 7, have been aggregated into high, medium, and low variant projections. 
The main conclusions of the projections are that "By the year 2000 the world popu- 
lation is likely to grow by about 40 percent from its present level of 4.4 billion people to 
somewhat over 6.0 billion" By 2100 the world population is not likely to exceed 13 billion 
people. 
2.5. Wor ld  Bank:  Wor ld  Development Repor t  1984 a n d  Wor ld  Popula t ion  
Project ions 1984 
2.5.1. In t roduc t ion  
The World Bank's annual World Development Reports are a reference guide to the 
world economy: an overview of the state of development, and a detailed analysis of a 
related topic. The 1984 issue highlights five principal aspects of population change and 
economic development: demographic change and public policy; the consequences of popu- 
lation change; policies that reduce population growth; family planning programs; and pol- 
icy agendas for specific countries. The World Population Projections 1984 presents 
details of the Report's projections and of the methods and assumptions on which they are 
based. These two books should be used together because the projections in the Projec- 
tions are geographically more comprehensive and extend farther into the future, while the 
Report provides extensive background information and analysis. They are published as: 
World Development Report 1984. International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank, 1984. (New York: Oxford University Press) and World 
Population Projections 1984: Short- and Long-Term Estimates by Age and Sex with 
Related Demographic Statistics. My T. Vu, 1984. (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank). The Report and Projections are referred to below collectively as "the World 
Bank's projections." 
2.5.2. Scale a n d  resolution 
The Report presents two tables of projections: one shows a single estimate for each 
of 126 countries, for 1990 and 2000. The other shows three estimates for each of 99 coun- 
tries, for 2000 and 2050. The Projections give detailed projections (one trajectory only) 
by age and sex for 185 countries or other geo-political entities (e.g., Greenland) a t  5- year 
intervals from 1980 to 2025 and at  25-year intervals for a 175-year period (to 2155) dur- 
ing which stationarity is assumed to occur everywhere (the time when stationarity occurs 
is not stated). 
2.5.3. M e t h o d  
The cohort-component method was used to generate the tables in the Report and the 
Projections. The base year for these projections is 1980; sources for numbers included the 
UN, national censuses, the US Bureau of the Census, and the Bank. Age and sex distribu- 
tions come from the UN. Base year mortality levels are from the UN except where Bank 
analysis indicated a difference. Because of recent evidence [not cited] linking female edu- 
cation and childhood mortality, the Projections' authors divided all countries into a "low" 
group (<70% female primary enrollment) and a "high" group (>70%) and then used these 
levels to estimate mortality trends. Principal sources for base fertility rates were the 
U.N.'s revised projections, the Bank's economic reports, the World Fertility Survey, and 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The year a t  which the net reproduction rate is likely to  
reach unity was calculated for each country (assumed to  be between 2000 and 2050). The 
country's status regarding family planning was estimated on the basis of the percentage of 
married women 15-44 years of age who were currently using some method of contracep 
tion. The total fertility rate in the year in which NRR = 1 was estimated on the basis of 
the country's mortality level in that year. In those countries in which fertility is 
presently below replacement level, i t  was assumed that fertility would rise back up to 
unity. Presumably this assumption was made to  make the projections consistent; no rea- 
sons for fertility to go back up to unity were given. 
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Revised U.N. population projections and data also from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census and the Bank itself were used to estimate international migration; for most 
economies this was assumed to be zero by 2000. (The leading 10 receiving countries and 
the leading 10 sending countries in 1980-85 are listed in the introduction to the Projec- 
tions.) 
2.5.4. Conclusions 
Table 2.4 and Figures 2.10 through 2.12 summarize the data from the Projections. 
According to them, the total world population could increase to 6.145 billion in 2000 and 
to approximately 10 billion by 2075 (2080 is the closest year calculated, with population 
of 10.644 billion). Less developed regions may account for 80% of the population in 2000 
and 86% in 2050. Persons with low and lower-middle income (the Report defines these) -- 
at least twethirds the 1985 population -- would constitute 82% of world population in 
2000 and 90% by 2050. The estimated hypothetical stationary global population is 11.2 
billion. When this number would be achieved is not stated, but the estimate for 2155 is 
11.145 billion (Vu, 1984: passim). By 2000 there may be 25 urban agglomerations with 
population more than 10 million each (World Bank, 1984:68). 
Paul Demeny (1984) has made a critique of the projections presented in the 1983 
version of the Report. He claims that the Bank's projections are "poorly known" because 
of "limited access" [limited by what or whom, and to whom not stated] although he later 
characterizes the distribution of the Reports as "wide." He praises the preparation of indi- 
vidual country projections because it "enhances the scope for critical examination [and] ... 
according to criteria other than geographic contiguity" but he also comments that the 
table of population trends revised each year by the Bank for these Reports "lacks detail" 
and "is awkward in form" (Demeny, 1984:105) -- a complaint that may have been 
remedied by the 1984 Report's focus on population and by the Projections. 
Although his point is well taken that projections a century and a half or more into 
the future are so remote that it may be difficult to be concerned about them, such projec- 
tions -- especially the nearer long-term points, such as 50-75-100 years, calculated "along 
the way" -- are surely more useful to planners and policy-makers than those for only 30 
years or so, in spite of the unavoidably increasing inaccuracy of projections with time. 
While the 1984 Report gives three variants (for the years 2000 and 2050, for 99 
countries) the Projections give only one projection (no low-middle-high). While this 
allows "uncluttered focus on a single hypothetical reference projection" (Demeny, 
1984:105), i t  does not lend itself to gauging how changes in population parameters or in 
economic and social policies might alter the picture (the Projections [p. xvii] do caution 
readers, a t  least regarding stationarity, that "no account is taken of the effects that ... 
future female education level and family planning might have"). A useful caveat that 
Demeny makes regarding stationarity is "...much of the projected growth is bound to  
occur in the decades immediately ahead, long before a stationary state is supposed to  be 
universally attained" (Demeny, 1984:124), a fact to  which the figures by themselves do 
not call attention (or a t  least not without close scrutiny). 
2.6. C.E.Q.: Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the 21st Century 
2.6.1. Introduction 
"Global 2000" is a study of the probable changes in the world's population, natural 
resources, and environment through the end of this century made by agencies of the US 
Government at the behest of President Carter, starting in 1977. It is the most comprehen- 
sive examination of the future by the US Government and may be at  least as well known 
for the reaction it provoked as for its content. Two projections of population were 
prepared, one by the US Census Bureau and the other by the Community and Family 
Study Center (CFSC) of the University of Chicago; the CFSC's projections were included 
because it was felt that they provide a useful illustration of how population estimates are 
affected by differences in basic assumptions about such factors as fertility rates. 
The Census Bureau projections (rather than those of CFSC) are used in other sec- 
tions of Global 2000 where population numbers are needed, because they are US Govern- 
ment data and this is a US Government report. This study is published as Global 2000 
Report to  the President: Entering the 21st Century vol. 2, Technical Report (Washing- 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), and vol. 3, Documentation on the 
Government's Global Sectoral Models: the Government's "Global Model" (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981). 
2.6.2. Scale and resolution 
Projections were made for the world; for five major regions (Africa; Asia and 
Oceania; Latin America; USSR and Eastern Europe; Northern America, Western Europe, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand); for 12 less developed countries (which represent 
about 75% of that category's 1975 population); and for five developed countries or regions 
(Eastern Europe, Western Europe, USSR, USA, and Japan). Three trajectories (high, 
medium, and low) were produced for every five years 1975-2000. (The Census Bureau 
later made a single-trajectory projection to  2100; this was not integrated with its earlier 
ones or those of CFSC.) 
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Figure 2.13 World population - Global 2000, USCB 
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2.6.3. Method 
Both the Census Bureau and the CFSC used the standard component method. In 
making its projections, the Census Bureau assumed that: 
(a) the less developed countries will continue to progress; 
(b) this socio-economic development will be accompanied by a decline in fertility; 
(c) knowledge that families can be limited, and methods to do so, will become 
better known and better used; 
(d) almost all countries will be making family planning programs available to an 
appreciable portion of their population by 2000. 
The CFSC made these assumptions: 
(a) Throughout the world the need to reduce the pace of population growth is being 
increasingly felt, even in nations where this has not been officially recognized; 
(b) The present pace of economic development and modernization will bring down 
fertility gradually to replacement level; 
(c) The pace of fertility decline being directly influenced by family planning pro- 
grams, the larger the investment in such programs, the more whole-hearted the official 
support, and the greater the public accessibility to such services, the faster will be the fer- 
tility decline. 
(d) By the end of the century, every nation on earth may be expected to have at 
least some kind of a substantial family planning effort, and these programs may be 
expected to have a substantial impact in reducing fertility faster than would otherwise be 
the case. 
The CFSC identified each country for which projections were made as having strong, 
moderate, weak, or no family planning efforts. Its high projections assume no 
intensification in current family planning status; the medium projections assume "some" 
increase, and the low projections assume "a considerable" increase. The Census Bureau 
used life table estimates to develop mortality estimates. No specific life expectancy for 
any certain time is stated. 
CFSC's mortality assumptions are those made by the World Bank, which 
rescheduled UN figures to reflect slower-than-anticipated declines in mortality [no cita- 
tions given]. 
2.6.4. Conclusions 
The average annual growth rate of the Census Bureau's medium series projections 
stays a t  1.8% until it reaches 1.7% in 1995-2000. CFSC's medium series's average annual 
growth rate declines gradually from 1.82% in 1975-79 to 1.34% in 1995-99. 
The Census Bureau's projections are higher than those of CFSC: high is 14% higher, 
medium is 8% higher, and low is 3% higher (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 and Figures 2.13 
through 2.18). CFSC uses the same 1975 figures for each trajectory, but the Census 
Bureau's 1975 figures for the less developed areas do vary, presumably taking into 
account that even retrospective historical information from those regions may be esti- 
mates subject to  assumptions. Interestingly, the CFSC and Census Bureau do not agree 
on the 1975 population for the USA. 
For the kinds of long-term, large-scale environmental studies we are interested in 
here, we feel that Global 2000's numbers are not particularly useful. They go only to 
2000 and they cannot be re-aggregated into the eight-region grouping developed for global 
studies. This is not a dismissal of the whole report, however. One source of potential 
surprises is in scientific or technological breakthroughs. Such might be a substantially 
better contraceptive that became widely available; significant improvements in infant and 
child survival; or another "Green Revolution" which would increase the Earth's carrying 
capacity for humans. Another source of surprises lies in non-anthropogenic or a t  least not 
deliberate events, some of which could be a new plague in humans, or in a major food 
source; no more demographic transitions; some massive, relatively swift environmental 
chaage (some disruption in an element cycle, for example). 
3. M O D E L  E V A L U A T I O N  A N D  D I S C U S S I O N  
3.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Five major studies containing six projections of global population (to the years from 
2000 t o  2150) were reviewed. Their low, medium, and high variant projections are 
presented in Table 3.1 and graphed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
These studies were initially selected because either (1) they serve as inputs to  major 
energy and agricultural models or (2) they were cited in the demographic literature as 
being major forecasts of future world population. Below we evaluate and review these 
projections in comparison with each other to determine their potential for contributing to  
the goals and objectives of the long-term, large-scale environmental studies as described in 
Section 1. 
These studies usually seek to examine global problems of ecologically sustainable 
development over 100 years. Practically, this translates into our being interested in the 
time period from 1975-2075. 
3.2. K e y  V a r i a b l e s  
Population projections can be represented by the following equation (after Alho and 
Spencer, 1985): 
where Pt = initial population size and structure, 
Bt = birth rate a t  time t (i.e. fertility) 
Dt = death rate a t  time t (i.e. mortality) 
Nt = net migration a t  time t (i.e. migration) 
These are the  key variables for the six population projections reviewed here. Table 3.2 
presents a comparison of the values for these key variables used in the different projec- 
tions. One can easily see the differences in assumptions concerning the initial values of 
these variables and their rates of change over time. In addition, one can compare the 
values for the  initial population size (base year = 1975)) which although representing a 
point in history, differ as well. The only additional factor should be considered and does 
not appear in this table is the age-sex structure. This is a part of the initial specifications 
of the projection method and is not easily obtained from the published projections. It 
should be noted however that  this can differ between projections. 
The key variables listed above comprise the major sources of uncertainty for popula- 
tion projections. The contribution of each factor to  the uncertainty of population projec- 
tions has been assessed in terms of their contribution to  the possible error in a projection 
T d l e  3.1 -ison of global population projections (10e9) 
V r i m t  
----------- 
1975 MOO 2025 2050 2075 2100 
------- 
------ -- ---------- 
Frejka, 1981 Index 1 1.41 2.24 2.41 
l k d i u m  
Pop' n 4.41 6.2 9.9 10.6 
Index 1 1.44 2.5 2.8 
High 
Pop'n 4.41 6.35 11.02 12.35 
-------------- ---- --- 
Index 1 1.37 1.99 2.09 
L w  
Pop'n 4.41 6.05 8.76 9.21 
---- ---------------- - --- 
Keyfi tz e t  al., 1983 Index 1 1.53 1.95 2.2 2.25 
fledium 
Pop'n 3.97 6.08 7-72' 8.68 8.93 
----------- 
Index 1 1.63 2.26 2.69 2.87 
High 
Pop' n 3.97 6.47 8.96 10.68 11.4 
------- -------- --- 
Index 1 1.48 1.85 2.06 2.12 
Lou 
Pop'n 3.97 5.89 7.36 8.2 8.45 
Cbrld Bark, 1984 Index 1 1.4 1.91 2.25 2.53 
Bedium 
Pop' n 4.42 6.21 8.45 9.97 11.2 
United Nations, 1985 Index 1 1.5 2 
Hedium 
Pop' n 4.08 6.1 8.18 
Index 1 1.56 2.25 
High 
Pop' n 4.08 6.4 9.19 
----------------------------- 
Index 1 1.44 1.76 
L w  
Pop' n 4.08 5.9 7.28 
-------- ------- -----------A 
Global 2000, USCB, 1980 Index 1 1.55 2.1 3.2 4.3 6.7 
Medium 
Pop' n 4.09 6.4 9.3 13.3 19.1 27.6 
----------- ------------- 
I d e x  1 1.64 
High 
Pop' n 4.13 6.8 
----- ------ ------- 
Index 1 1.47 
L w  
Pop' n 4.04 5.92 
-------------------------------------- 
Global 2000, CFSC, 1980 Index 1 1.47 
fledium 
Pop' n 4.02 5.88 
---- -- ------ 
Index 1 1.49 
High 
Pop' n 4.02 5.97 
Index 1 1.43 
Lou 
Pop'n 4.02 5.75 
..................... ------------ 
----------- -- 
Table 3.2 Carpuison of indicators o f  s i x  majw project ions 
1975 MOO 2025 2050 2075 
HIGH EDIUH LOU HIGH WDIUM LOW HIGH MEDIUH LOW HIGHMEDIUM LOU HIGHREDIWI LW 
................................................................................................................ 
UNITED p y d b i l )  -- 4.08 -- 6.37 6.13 5.90 9.19 8.18 7.28 -- -- -- -- -- a 
NFITIONS births - 30.8 -- 25.2 23.3 21.4 20.9 17.6 15 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1982 deaths -- 12.1 -- 8.6 8.9 9.3 7.7 8.4 9.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
(1) youth -- 1.90 -- 1.69 1.46 1.21 1.33 0.93 0.59 -- -- -- -- -- - - 
US popn(bi1) 4.13 4.09 4.04 6.80 6.35 5.92 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- 
CENSUS b i rthr 32 30.4 28.8 29.4 25.6 21.9 -- -- - - -- -- - - -- -- -- 
1980 deaths 11.9 12.3 12.9 8.9 9.1 9.4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- 
(2) y o u t h  1.8 1.7 - -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- 
popncbil) -- 4.01 -- -- 5.97 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
CFSC b i r t hs  -- 26.6 -- -- 17.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1980 deaths -- 11.2 -- -- 8.25 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
(3) y o u t h  -- 1.82 -- -- 1.34 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- -- 
pop(b i1 )  - 4.41 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
FREJKA b i r t hs  -- 29.4 -- -- 23.5 18.9 -- -- -- -- 14.6 15 -- -- -- 
1981 deaths - 11.5 -- - 8.6 8.9 -- -- -- -- 10 12.1 -- -- -- 
(4) g w t h  -- 1.8 -- 1.6 1.5 1.0 -- -- -- 0.6 0.5 0.3 -- -- -- 
WORLD pop(b i1 )  - 4.42(7) -- -- 6.15 -- -- 8.30 -- -- 9.78 -- - - - - -- 
BFIW b i r t h s  -- -- -- -- 23.8 -- -- 17.4 -- -- - -- -- -- -- 
1984 deaths -- -- -- - 8.7 -- -- 8.1 -- -- -- - - -- - - -- 
(5) g ~ t h  -- 1.73(7) -- -- 1.51 -- -- 0.93 -- -- 0.45 -- -- - - -- 
p o p ( b i  1 ) -- 3.97 -- 6.47 -- 6.08 8.96 -- 7.72 10.7 -- 8.68 11.4 -- 8.93 
KEYFITZ b i r t hs  - -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- 
1983 deaths -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - - - -- -- 
(6) gouth -- 1.8 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
- - - -  - - - ~ - -  
KEY: popncbil) - p o p l a t i o n  i n  b i l l i o n s  (10e9) 
b i r t hs  - b i r t h  r a te  per thousand 
deaths - death r a t e  per thousand 
gouth - per cent annual grouth 
(1) - cbes not specify date &en net replacement r a te  (NRR) I 1 
(2) - cbes not specify date &en NRR = 1 
(3) does not specify date &en NRR = 1 
(4) - assumes NRR s: 1 f o r  lou i n  2000-05; medium i n  2020-25; high i n  2040-45 
(5) - assumes NRR = 1.076 i n  2025 
(6) - assumes NRR = 1 f o r  low i n  2000-05; f o r  high i n  2015-20 
(7) - f i gu re  f o r  1980 
Figure 3.1 Population projections - medium 
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Figure 3.2 Factor increase - medium 
by Keyfitz (1981a, 1981b), Stoto (1984)) Alho and Spencer (1985) and Keyfitz and Hodges 
(1985). 
A general ranking of the contribution of each of these variables to the overall error 
in a population projection, from largest to smallest contributor, would be fertility, migra- 
tion (at the national level), base line population size and age-sex structure, and mortality. 
3.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Classical sensitivity analysis (that is, the perturbation of a key variable away from 
its initialized value and an assessment of the effect of that change on the outcome of the 
projection) was not available for any of the projections we reviewed, nor did we attempt 
to conduct such analyses ourselves. However, the literature concerning the accuracy of 
population projections and information obtained from examining the changes in values of 
the key variables used to formulate high and low variant projections can provide informa- 
tion similar to that obtained from a sensitivity analysis. 
Stoto (1984) has evaluated the error of population projections in terms of "jump off 
error and random error. He concludes that the date when the forecast was made is the 
major factor determining error in population projections. This suggests a high sensitivity 
in short-term population projections (15 - 20 years) to errors concerning initial population 
size and age-sex structure. However, demographers generally assume that the uncertainty 
concerning initial conditions is small and therefor not a significant source of error. 
With respect to fertility, mortality, and migration, Keyfitz (1981a, 1981b), Alho and 
Spencer (1985), and Keyfittz and Hodges (1985) have found fertility and migration to be 
major components affecting the accuracy of population projections. These also tend to be 
the key variables with the greatest uncertainty as well as the ones which are varied in 
developing different projections. For example, the United Nations (1985) in developing 
its high, medium, low, and constant variant projections vary fertility first and secondarily 
vary migration holding mortality and base year assumptions constant. 
Mortality is generally considered to have a small effect on the error of population 
projections. Decreases in mortality, where life expectancy already equals or exceeds 
reproductive life span (15-45 years), generally have a minor impact on the total numbers 
of a population projection but rather affect the age-sex structure of the population. While 
many demographers feel there is little uncertainty surrounding mortality, others argue 
that there are numerous conflicting theories about the rate an d direction of future mor- 
tality change, and therefore demographers must admit uncertainty. Keyfitz and Hodges 
(1985) in reviewing past United Nations forecasts point out that their demographers have 
a better record in predicting changes in mortality than fertility. In any event, as average 
life expectancy exceeds the reproductive age limit in most countries, changes in mortality 
have a negligible effect on future population size, but important effects on the age-sex 
structure. 
From the above discussion, one can conclude that short-term population projections 
are most sensitive to errors in estimating the initial population size and age-sex structure, 
and secondarily to  errors in assumptions about rates of fertility and migration. Since the 
later two are the factors with the greatest uncertainty, these are the key factors which 
should be watched most carefully as sources of surprise and may in some sense be con- 
sidered the most sensitive key variables. 
3.4. W h y  t h e  Projections Differ? 
In general, demographers agree that in the short run (15-20 years), extrapolation of 
recent trends and informed judgement about their future rate of change yield reasonably 
accurate population projections. This can be seen in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 where the 
medium variant of the six projections for the year 2000 range between 5.9 and 6.4 billion 
people with a mean of 6.1 billion and a standard deviation of f 0.2 billion. These 
correspond to implied average annual rates of increase of 1.5 to  1.8 with a mean of 1.6 
and a standard deviation of f 0.15. Keyfitz (1983), Stoto (1984), and Alho and Spencer 
(1985) have independently concluded that in the short run an error term of f 0.34-0.4 
percent for the rate of increase is acceptable. Using the work of Keyfitz (1983), a 66% 
confidence interval around the median of these projections to  the year 2000 would be 5.6 
to  6.6 billion people. 
Keyfitz (1983) has also pointed out that there is a strong possibility that the projec- 
tions we considered (and others) are not independent and therefore one should not attach 
too much significance to  their close agreement. In part this is because some of the same 
data bases are used by all forecasters. Also, demographers do not work in a vacuum - 
they talk with one another, they read the same articles concerning changes in fertility and 
mortality and related causal factors, and so they inadvertently may influence each other. 
An examination of projections beyond 2000 in Table 3.2 and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
shows that the studies differ significantly in their long-run projections. Below we discuss 
some of the reasons for these differences. 
Judgement is a necessary ingredient of all demographic forecasting. In the six major 
projections reviewed here, different numbers are presented for the base year. The reasons 
for this difference include different sources of information, as well as judgements concern- 
ing the accuracy of various sources and subsequent adjustments made to  the baseline 
data. These differences will be compounded for future years. 
The average annual growth rates used by the various projections are shown in Table 
3.2. These differ both among variants within a given projection and between different 
projections. Furthermore, they differ in initial magnitude and assumed rate of change 
over time. It is in the selection of appropriate fertility, migration, and mortality rates 
that judgement has its greatest effect on the outcome of projections. This is where the 
theoretical arguments concerning the determinants of these factors get implicitly included 
in the model as knowledge via expert judgement of the forecaster (as well as researcher 
bias). 
4. CONCLUSION A N D  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  
4.1. Selection of Studies  
Hammel (1984), in a letter to  the editor of Science has pointed out the need for 
"authors to  provide explicit information on a range of plausible [population] estimates and 
the sensitivity of their analysis to  the alternatives". Where this is not possible he states 
that "they should stress that the projection used is strictly illustrative and dependent on 
the validity of the particular assumptions underlying that projection". We aim to under- 
stand future, long-term environmental crises arising from the interaction of development 
and the biosphere. Population is important both in its role as modifier of the biosphere 
via development, and as a stakeholder in that development being ecologically sustainable. 
Population projections are one of the key inputs to  agriculture and energy models to pr+ 
vide information on valued environmental components. Therefore a particular population 
projection must be selected carefully. 
Our review of the leading population projections has resulted in the following conclu- 
sions. 
(1) In the near and short run (15 to 20 years) one credible population projection is as 
good as the next. In the long run (up to 100 years) only some of the existing popula- 
tion projections yield useful information. Keyfitz and Hodges (1985) have developed 
a method of population projection which allows for the assignment of probabilities to 
a projection of future population size for a given year. It is possible that this 
method of population projection could be useful for long-term environmental studies. 
(2) Wherever possible the level of aggregation utilized should be the nation-state level. 
This level will link well with the assessments of energy and agriculture projections. 
Additionally, a t  this level of detail we are able to aggregate the world into regions 
based on scale effects which may be interesting to the large-scale environmental stu- 
dies. 
(3) Attention must be paid to the differences between the more developed and less 
developed regions of the world. In the more developed regions the interesting focus 
will be on the requirements (ecological, fiscal, political) to support an increasingly 
aging population by fewer working people. In the less developed regions the area of 
concern will be the resource demands of populations that are still "coasting" to sta- 
tionarity, with both a large proportion of young people, and rising economic expecta- 
tions. 
(4) Migration can have an effect on the future population growth (especially at the 
national and regional level) and the projection method selected should be able to  
treat assumptions of migration. 
(5) Documentation of the projection methods and assumptions differ among the studies. 
Potential users should select a well documented projection. 
Three of the six population projections may be appropriate for use in long-term, large- 
scale development-environment studies. 
(1) The most recent United Nations projections appear to be the best documented (including specification of assumptions for key demographic variables) and are very 
credible; one limitation of these projections is that they only extend to 2025. Given 
the increasing uncertainty in population projections as they extend into the future, 
the users could make reasonable assumptions and extend these projections to the 
year 2075. One additional advantage of using the U.N. figures is that they are 
widely consulted, scrutinized and updated regularly. 
(2) The Key fitz et al. (1983) projections are particularly attractive to environmental 
studies as they are reasonably well documented, are a t  a high level of disaggregation, 
and are used in numerous energy and agriculture models. Additionally they extend 
to 2075. The drawback is that they were prepared as a one-time effort, have been 
criticized as being on the low side and don't provide for the easy construction of 
error bands on variant projections. Additionally the specification of assumptions 
concerning key demographic variables is not clear. 
(3) The World Bank (1984) projections appear also to  be a candidate for use in studies 
of development-environment interactions. Our preliminary assessment is that this 
also could serve as an adequate source of population projections. 
We conclude that any of the above projections are suitable candidates for use in environ- 
mental studies. A hybrid of the above would probably be the best choice. 
4.2. Time/Space Scales 
We have already addressed the notion of spatial scale by pointing out the long-term 
nature of environmental changes and the need to  consider periods of time in the range of 
100 years. A 100 year look into the future should also include a t  least a 200 year look 
into the past. Such a perspective with respect to  population is especially important in 
determining whether an event has a long-term effect on the final population trajectory or 
merely depresses the curve for a relatively short period of time (i.e., the plague of the 
Middle Ages, or the effects of a limited nuclear war -- if such an event is plausible). 
With respect to  spatial scale we conclude that development-environment studies 
must begin at  the level of the nation-state with the possibility of aggregating up to  
regional levels as long as such an aggregation does not obscure important differences in 
population growth between nations. As population is not distributed proportionally to  
available resources (e.g. land, water, food, energy) it is important that we choose a level 
of aggregation that does not overlook localized problems which add up to  global crises. 
Another conclusion is that we should not just be concerned with the magnitude of 
the increase but we must also examine the rate of increase. It is possible that in a case 
where the magnitude of the increase presents no problem to the biosphere, the rate of 
increase may exceed the ability of the existing systems to meet that demand and therefore 
present problems to  the biosphere. 
Finally, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present Lorenz curves developed for the world popula- 
tion in 1975 and 2075. These graphs show that 70 percent of the world's population uses 
20 percent of the world's land and that this relation appears not to  change as the popula- 
tion increases over time. 
4.3. Surpr i se  
Lacking a causal theory to  forecast demographic change, and relying on forecasts 
based on trend extrapolation, it is likely that even using a stochastic method to  project 
future population growth, interesting future histories will be omitted. Sources of surprise 
are likely in the key determinants of population growth (fertility, mortality, migration) as 
well as in the consequences of such growth (e.g., increasing urbanization). 
4.4. Some Things Learned 
Long-term, large-scale environmental studies should develop a consistent set of well 
documented population scenarios for the future to serve as a basis for assessing impacts 
mediated via population growth. These should be developed as a single projection with 
error bands or a series of projections where the high and low variants act to bound the 
uncertainty. 
Since family planning may be the key determinant of population growth in the 
future, these environmental studies should pay attention to  any attempt a t  assessing the 
causal relationship between family planning efforts and changes in growth rate. This may 
improve the uncertainty in human behavior (1984 and the New Utopians). 
The lack of feedback between all the models reviewed here and the environment 
should be addressed. 
Finally, and at  odds with much of the preceding analysis one can argue that while 
population is important to  the broad-scale environmental studies, it does not need to  be 
known with any precision. Minimum possible population numbers and growth rates, 
which are then increased incrementally until environmental effects are discerned may 
prove to be the most useful learning tool in this exercise. 
Figure 4.1 Lorenz curve for the world population in 1975 
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Figure 4.2 Lorenz curve for the world population in 2075 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: A catalogue of population effects on the environment 
ACTION EFFECT (Reference) 
Filling/draining/polluting wetlands Destruction of estuaries as fish habitat 
(1 :96) 
Fossil fuel combustion 
Biomass combustion 
Migration 
Solid waste disposal 
Urbanization 
Incr. carbon dioxide, leads to incr. 
absorption of infra-red radiation, which 
leads to increased warming; also leads to 
decr. heat loss from below 
Incr. particulates in atmosphere => < 
solar radiation => > 
absorption/retention of heat => warming 
of climate 
Importation of diseases by immigrants, 
exposure of immigrants to  "new" diseases 
=> incr. morbidity & mortality 
Physical pollution of land air and water 
(1 :67) 
Perception of noise, odor, congestion, 
"hassle," ugliness => decr. psychological 
satisfaction, decr. level of mental, maybe 
of physical well-being (2) 
Loss of cultivable land to urban use 
(2:375) 
Decr. wind velocity, incr. temperature 
(2:375) 
"Mismanagement" of agriculture or tropi- Deterioration of soil's long-term produc- 
cal forestry tivity , e.g., lateralization 
Run-off from construction sites Siltation destroys coral reef (1:96) 
Toxin (e.g. pesticides) accumulating in Diminution of predator populations => 
food chainlpyramid loss of natural control of prey species 
Mining e.g. of coal Acid drainage (1:49) 
Mining; reservoir construction Loss of agricultural, recreational, & 
residential lands, of wild-life habitat 
(2:375) 
Power generation Release of radioactivity (1:53) 
Liquefied natural gas carrier accident Release of methane (1:53) 
Oil spill in polar waters Reduced albedo of pack ice => climate 
warming (1:53) 
2nd law of thermodynamics ("All energy Release to  atmosphere of anthropogenic 
ends as low- temperature heat no matter heat=> possible climate change (1:86) 
for what purpose or by what means it has 
been converted") 
Petroleum combustion 
Discharge of untreated 
domestic/industrial wastewater 
Agricultural runoff 
Agricultural runoff 
Hydrocarbon pollution of air (1 :66) 
Water polluted with pathogens or with 
industrial chemicals => unpotable (1:67) 
Pesticide pollution of water => unpot- 
able (1:67) 
Nutrient overloading => eutrophication 
(1 :67) 
Increased demand for groundwater (irri- Land subsidence, salt-water intrusion into 
gation, domestic, etc.) aquifer, depletion of aquifer (1:ll) 
Exceeding maximum sustainable yield of Stocks depleted beyond re-generative 
fishery capability (1:20) 
Exceeding carrying capacity of grazing Desertification, flooding (1:20) 
land or forest 
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APPENDIX 2: List of countries belonging to the eight major regions 
developed for global environmental studies 
A f r i c a  
Algeria 
E ~ Y  pt 
Libya 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Chad 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Benin 
Cape Verde 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Ivory Coast 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Burkinafasa 
Angola 
Cameroon 
Centr.Afric.R. 
Congo, Pe0p.R. 
Equat. Guinea 
Gabon 
Sao TomekPrinc. 
Zaire 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Somalia 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Afghanistan 
Bahrain 
Cyprus 
Iran,Isl.Rep. 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab R. 
Turkey 
Un.Arab. Emir. 
Yemen Arab. R. 
Yemen, PDR 
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  
Antigua&Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 
Dominicans 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 
St. Lucia 
St. VincentkGren 
TrinidadkTobago 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Suriname 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Chile 
Uruguay 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Burma 
East Asia 
Chi.Turk .&Tibet 
Chi.Proper 
Chi.Man.&In.Mon 
Mongolia 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Korea, Dem.Rep. 
Korea, Rep. of 
Macau 
Taiwan 
Indonesia 
Kampuchea,Dem. 
Lao PDR 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Vie t Nam 
Papua New Guinea 
Oceania 
Australia 
Fiji 
New Zealand 
Solomon Islands 
Vauatu 
Western Samoa 
Europe 
Albania 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
German Dem.Rep. 
German Fed.Rep. 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Yugoslavia 
U.S.S. R. 
USSR in Europe 
USSR Kaz&C.Asia 
USSR Siber&F.East 
North America 
Canada East.Pr. 
Canada West.Pr. 
AlaskakYukon T.  
Canada NW . Terr. 
USA Eastkcenter 
USA WestkPrair . 
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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N  
1.1. Tools for  Syndrome Analysis 
The Biosphere Project's purpose is to attempt to examine strategies for understand- 
ing and managing syndromes that emerge from the interaction of human activity and the 
environment. Syndromes, in this context, should be understood to be large-scale com- 
plexes of social, economic, and environmental forces that interact in an extremely inter- 
dependent and non-linear fashion. The understanding and the management of environ- 
mental syndromes require tools for the analysis of their interactions and of the impacts of 
various control and development strategies on these interactions. 
One of the main goals of this report is to provide a guide to energy models that may 
be useful in conducting meaningful research on energy development-biosphere interac- 
tions. Another one is to identify variables and actions that could seriously affect these 
development-environmen t inter actions. 
As a result, we have been examining studies of the long-term (50-100 years) global 
energy future. Within this time and space framework, we have concentrated primarily on 
the environmental and economic implications of energy use. 
1.2. Energy, Envi ronment  and Society 
Energy use is essential for each society. It is central to most human activities and is 
one of the major determinants of the structures of socioeconomic life. Its interconnections 
with all different levels of society are close: 
- The biophysical environment gives energy resources and absorbs energy use's often 
serious impacts. 
- The socioeconomic system demands, produces and consumes energy, and, impor- 
tantly, it determines the distribution of energy use and products made with 
energy. 
- Lnfrastructure is a major determinant of which energy form we can use because 
each fuel needs systems for distribution, technology etc.. 
- Political institutions try to rule these systems', deciding rules for energy use and 
energy taxes, and by investing in RkD and in infrastructure. 
- On the level of ideological attitudes, perspectives on energy use, on different fuels 
and new ideas, or on inventions and discoveries can influence the energy system 
particularly in the long-term perspective. 
Most energy models try to simulate the possible development of energy use by 
approximating the workings of the economic system in particular, with some linkages to 
infrastructure (realized technology) and the biophysical environment, perceived pri- 
marily as a resource base. Changes in the structures of socioeconomic, institutional and 
environmental systems and how such would influence energy use are not considered. Such 
simplifications are of course necessary. The models are often complicated enough as it is. 
But especially in a long-term perspective we should not expect these external (to the 
model) structures to be stable. They could be an important place to look for possible 
sources of surprise. Let us keep this in mind. 
The models are the central theme of this report. We try here to approach them from 
a broad perspective with the final aim of assessing their ability to illuminate important 
relations for the real energy future and to make useful predictions for shedding some light 
upon future collisions between biosphere and development. 
1.3. Problems of Scale a n d  Resolution 
Determining appropriate tools for analysis is difficult because of the fact that syn- 
dromes' effects may be felt on time and space scales far different than those associated 
with their generation. An example of this would be the syndrome of sulfur-related lake 
acidification. While the emission and deposition of SO, has a time scale on the order of 
days, and a space scale on the order of hundreds of kilometers, the use and construction of 
SO,-generating energy systems is dependent on social and economic forces with national 
to global space scales, and time scales at  least on the order of years, if not decades. The 
effects of acid deposition have yet a third time-space scale. Lake acidification scales, for 
example, center in space around a watershed, and in time on a period of up to thirty 
years. 
1.4. Grounds  for  "Tool" Classification 
Our assessment of models was guided by at least three sorts of time/space resolu- 
tions of effect (as distinguished from resolutions of creation, which, from the nature of our 
study, are taken to be global/long), which we characterize by the following examples of 
the types of impacts energy use may have on human well-being. 
World resolutions 
As a symbol of problems with the largest resolution (which we shall call "world"), 
we may picture a world in which some substantial climatic change has occurred due to 
the emission of greenhouse gases. The impacts of such change would presumably be 
spread, albeit unevenly, all over the world, and over a relatively long time frame. 
Regional rcclolutions 
As a symbol of the second type of resolution (which we shall call "regional"), we 
should picture a collection of regions, each of which may well overlap the boundaries of 
several nations, and each of which is facing soil, forest, or lake acidification (with related 
impacts on productivity or environmental quality) as a result of installed fossil fuel burn- 
ing capacity. 
Local resolutions 
The third type of resolution (which we shall call "local") may perhaps best be seen 
as an even larger collection of cities, each of which is faced with extremely serious air 
pollution/public health problems as a result of dense population and concentrated toxics 
emissions due to intensive energy use. 
1.5. Overview 
The rest of this report describes the results from our assessments of energy models 
and projections. We start in the second section with a description of how we arrived at  
environmental criteria, or "valued environmental components" (VECs) with which we 
assessed our studies. In the third section of this report, we describe and evaluate the 
models that we have examined and that we felt were relevant to the particular 
problems/concerns of the long-term large-scale environmental studies. In the fourth and 
concluding section we attempt to evaluate the issues of energy and biosphere across 
models to reach some summarizing conclusions. 
2. V E C s  A N D  O T H E R  I N D I C A T O R S  
2.1. Bases for a V E C  Framework 
One of our tasks was to develop some key actions and indicators from which 
interesting scenarios could be constructed. For the Biosphere Project, the identification of 
such actions must be based on the degree of their influence on the environment (or 
VECs). During work on Action-VEC-matrices of the global energy system we encoun- 
tered serious inconsistencies in the action list. Our actions (energy use, resource availabil- 
ity, fuel mix, conservation, pollution control) spanned several very different levels within 
the energy sector. They covered a wide range of social activities, beginning from lifestyle 
patterns and government policies up to the very direct impacts of burning fossil fuels. 
Apart from the fact that these actions can't be put into one category, our main 
problem was that such a general matrix wouldn't be very useful for explaining the 
environmental impacts of the energy system because of its too great aggregation. 
We decided then to split the framework into two parts, the modeling of the energy 
sector and the assessment of impacts of the energy sector. In order to be able to directly 
measure the impacts of various energy futures, we identified fuel mix and energy demand 
as immediate actions on the environment and called them "activity levels" of the energy 
system. The matrix in the second part should be an analysis of the pathways by which 
these direct actions lead to stresses on the VECs and should give a characterization and 
quantification of these stresses. All other activities - we call them system descriptors - 
belong to the first part and only act on the activity levels. The distinction of two steps 
helps to  avoid confusion and allows the description of environmental impacts more pre- 
cisely. 
Figure 2.1 shows the general structure of the framework. At the beginning is a 
description and formulation of the sociopolitical and economic framework of the world. 
The future evolution of the world is formulated in a scrcalled scenario, a kind of short 
story of possible futures. This gives the background for the development of the energy sec- 
tor which itself can be characterized by main driving forces, the key variables. These sys- 
tem descriptors are numeric variables that quantify the general sociopolitical and 
economic formulations and the particular scenario assumptions. To assess the activity lev- 
els of the energy system one uses either formal models or expert judgement. 


Figure 2.3 Regional and global VECs 
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Once the energy demand is calculated, the matrix in our second step gives a qualita- 
tive assessment of the impacts on the VECs. If a more detailed and quantitative result is 
desired, the matrix has to  be replaced by a more formal model. After establishing this 
framework one can start to  consider possible feedbacks of VECs on the other system com- 
ponents. These feedbacks can impose very important constraints on the input side of the 
model and should therefore be carefully evaluated - a consideration that is left out in most 
of the studies. 
2.2. VEC Matr ices  
In order to  determine the environmental components that were important to the 
energy sector, we conducted a literature review that was initially split according to the 
media where the impacts or "stresses" to the environment took place (Holdren and Bud- 
nitz, 1976; Ehrlich et al., 1977; Smil, 1984; Holdren, 1977; Bach et al., 1980). 
Energy systems' impact on the environment are most clearly traced through the mix 
of fuel sources that they use to  generate energy services. We felt that the most direct way 
of identifying the relative importance of future energy options was to  trace the influence 
of various fuel types on the environment. Thus we initially specified five VEC/fuel type 
tables, one each for air, water, land, biota, and sociopolitical systems/interactions (see 
Appendix 2 for some of these). Initially, these tables were semi-quantitative indicators of 
the relative importance of various actions on those VECs that we discovered. 
Once we had compiled some media-specific VEC tables, we felt that recombining the 
VECs according to  the time and space scales discussed above (local, regional, global) 
would enhance their usability (see Figure 2.2 and 2.3). The congruence between small 
spatial scales and short time scales, or large spatial scales and long time scales of interac- 
tion was relatively good, so that the classification represented a fair guideline. We tried 
to  classify VECs in accordance with these guidelines by seeking to answer the question, 
for each VEC, "At what resolution would you need to  measure an indicator or to design a 
policy in order to  understand or to influence a particular development/environment 
interaction?" 
A simple example of this process is the case of land erosion. While land erosion due 
to  coal mining may take place over thousands of sqpare kilometers, any action taken to  
mitigate it must be designed to  affect the resolution at  which individual mines sit, e.g. 
local. This categorization does not exclude broad-scale policies like taxation, but simply 
specifies that such policies as may be implemented must have an effect on the scale of con- 
cern. For example, a taxation policy designed to change the end-use patterns of coal 
burning must be very differently designed than a policy directed at  changing mine loca- 
tions. 
In the matrices, our already crude quantifications were simply translated into rela- 
tive symbols of the importance of our fuels on environment. The types of VECs that 
emerge grouped from our re-aggregation according to  time and space scales constitute an 
interesting result of our efforts. We find, for example, that air is present a t  every scale of 
resolution. At the global level, the only energy VEC was the rather aggregate one of 
greenhouse gases. At the regional level, water concerns enter the picture, along with one 
land component: soil quality, mostly influenced by the more regional factors (acidified 
water, heavy metal transport in air, etc.). We found the greatest multiplicity of factors 
a t  the local level. Most of these observations can be explained by examining the relative 
mobility of the factors involved (air more mobile than water, water more mobile than 
land). 
In retrospect, we seemed to  run into two difficulties with this approach in the energy 
field. First and most importantly, we found very few VECs that had direct feedbacks on 
energy production. According to  the models we examined, and our own sense of the 
energy world, most of the feedbacks (such as C02-induced warming) were mediated by a t  
least one, if not several, social processes (increased energy use for cooling, environmental 
opposition to coal burning, etc.). 
This conclusion was considerably different than those reached by the agriculture 
assessment study (Chapter 4)) whose VECs had some definite impacts on and within their 
own realms. This limitation of our tables may due to  a more general limitation of impos- 
ing direct environmental and development feedbacks on energy systems. 
The second limitation we encountered was in clearly specifying the valued sociopolit- 
ical components. We found that energy was so intertwined with all stages of action that 
no single framework that we came upon could capture its impacts on sociopolitical sys- 
tems (see the previous discussion of the role of energy in the world). The Valued Sociopol- 
itical Components may be too complex for simple matrix representation (see an attempt 
a t  one in Appendix 2). 
3. M O D E L  D E S C R I P T I O N  A N D  EVALUATION 
3.1. Project ion Methodologies 
3.1.1. Introduct ion 
In order to relate the energy sector to the biosphere we conducted a review and 
evaluation of different energy studies, their approaches, assumptions, and the different 
futures they predict. A guiding criterion was the usability of the models for assessing 
environmental impacts. 
To stay consistent with the time and space scale of the long-term, large-scale 
environmental studies, we selected only global, long-term studies. We decided to  look 
only at  prominent, ambitious studies which were heavily used or cited. These studies 
differ greatly in their design, the extent to which formal models are employed, in their 
aggregation and resolution with respect to fuels, geography and other factors (Ausubel 
and Nordhaus, 1983). This is the reviewed set of studies: 
International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA), Energy in a Finite 
World by the Energy Systems Program Group (Haefele et al., 1981.). 
Edmonds & Reilly, Institute for Energy Analysis (IEA), Oak Ridge Associated 
Universities (Edmonds & Reilly, 1983a, 1983b, 1985). 
Nordhaus W.D. & Yohe G.W., Future Paths of Energy and Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, (Nordhaus & Yohe, 1983). 
World Energy Conference, J.R. Frisch, ed., World Energy Conference, New 
Delhi, Conservation Commission Report, (Frisch, 1983). 
Global 2000, Report t o  the President by the Council on Environmental Quality 
and the Department of State, US. (CEQ, 1980). 
World Energy Outlook, International Energy Agency (OECD) (IEA, 1982). 
Other comparative studies of energy system projections have been conducted by 
Ausubel and Nordhaus (1983) and by A.M. Perry a t  the Energy division of Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (Perry, 1982) in order to  assess future carbon dioxide emissions. 
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Figure 3.1 Energy conversion and use 
3.1.2. Methodologies 
Figure 3.1 gives some definitions about energy forms and levels at  various stages of 
conversion and use in order to clarify the nature of the energy problem. 
This section is a short introduction to the main approaches used in projection stu- 
dies of global energy demand and indicates some of the differences that exist, the 
methods' relative advantages and problems. One can distinguish five main approaches: 
- end use approach: formal model; 
- economic approach: formal model; 
- expert opinion approach: expert estimations, simple economic calculations; 
- IEW approach: International Energy Workshop, comparing different study-results; 
- phenomenological approach: discerning patterns from phenomena of the past, and 
applying them to the future. 
The formal model approach uses a mathematical description of the complex struc- 
tures and links of the energy sector. These mathematical structures can be implemented 
on computers and provide a very useful tool for developing and reproducing alternative 
scenarios in order to get a better understanding of the system behavior. The other 
approaches mainly profit from the experience and the knowledge of a group of experts. 
One has to keep in mind that studies, although using the same approach, can differ in 
size, complexity, scale and resolution. 
3.1.2.1. E n d  use  approach  
The energy sector is disaggregated into a multitude of end use categories. The "use- 
ful energy demand" is then converted into final energy, taking into account the technical 
efficiencies. For each end use category the energy demand is related to a set of determin- 
ing factors which can be macroeconomic aggregates, physical quantities or technological 
coefficients. These general scenario parameters are then disaggregated in terms of 
economic structure (set of industrial products), demographic structure (lifestyles), and 
technological structures (energy intensiveness/efficiencies). The energy demand projec- 
tions result from the evolutions assigned to these factors. This approach has a good abil- 
ity to handle structural and technological changes because scenarios are built in a very 
"close-to-reality" way. It is also good a t  evaluating the effect of policy strategies on the 
end use sector (fuel taxation, conservation measures favored by government, etc.). The 
IIASA study Energy in a Finite World is an example of a study using this approach (Hae- 
fele et al., 1981). 
Problems: High need for disaggregated data, many input parameters, high need for 
expert knowledge to use the model, difficulty in defining a consistent set of input parame- 
ters for the construction of a consistent scenario, because of the quantity of parameters. 
3.1.2.2. Economic approach  
This approach uses the interrelationships of highly aggregated economic indicators 
to model the energy system. The most important parameters are often: GNP, as an indi- 
cator of economic activities, and income and price elasticities of energy demand. The 
expression of different demand patterns and structural and technological changes is 
accomplished by varying elasticities. Based on these elasticities, the model calculates the 
energy demand, the economic activities, the cost of energy production and the changes of 
energy prices. Because the description of real world is done with a few variables, the 
model is very usable and compact, and allows easy scenario building. Examples of studies 
using this kind of approach are the Edmonds & Reilly model (Edmonds & Reilly, 1983a, 
1983b) and - less complex - the Nordhaus & Yohe study (Nordhaus & Yohe, 1983). 
Probleme: Such models require a lot of experience to translate complex structures 
into elasticities. It is difficult to check the assumptions built into the elasticity figures. 
Elasticity coefficients are more widely used for short term projections. They become more 
questionable, as the long-term are considered. 
3.1.2.3. Expert opinion approach  
This type of projection is based on experts' judgements. The World Energy Confer- 
ence, as an example of this approach, consisted of one central team (coordination) and 10 
regional working groups (50 experts and 20 national committees). Because these experts 
use different approaches and techniques, the cooperation profits from various knowledge 
and is likely to  produce reasonable results. This methodology represents a more normative 
approach, and is often used by governments to develop medium-term energy policy pr* 
grams. 
Problems: Difficulty of reproducing results and the impossibility of creating new and 
different scenarios out of this approach. 
3.1.2.4. In te rna t iona l  Energy  Workshop approach  
This approach is a variation of the expert opinion approach. It does not create an 
original projection, but takes the most upt*date, long-term energy studies available and 
compiles them. The range thus produced may permit the establishment of a kind of uncer- 
tainty bound around expert opinion. This approach is very useful for obtaining a better 
understanding for the reasons for differences between energy projections and it acts there- 
fore as a corrective measure in the energy modeling field. The IEW approach makes a 
kind of inventory in the energy modeling field, gives an overview of the state of the art 
and is very well suited as an consistency check for modeling techniques. 
Problems: This comparative approach does not really create new insights in the real 
world of energy systems. It cannot be used to create different future energy scenarios. 
3.1.2.5. Phenomenological approach 
The phenomenological approach looks at  the empirical history of an aspect of the 
energy system and seeks to  fit a functional form to this evolution. It describes and 
predicts those processes without explanation. Marchetti and Nakicenovic (1979) have 
developed a model that treats energy sources as technologies competing for a market and 
applies a form of market penetration analysis. A logistic function is used to  describe the 
evolution of energy sources and is fitted to  historical statistical data. A driving force 
appears t o  be the geographical density of energy consumption. The mechanisms leading to  
switch from one source t o  another are the different technical characteristics associated 
with each energy source (Ausubel and Nordhaus, 1983). This model explains very well the 
substitution processes between competing fuels and is very useful t o  show time constraints 
for new energy technologies. Another example of this methodology is the resource deple- 
tion studies of M.K. Hubbert (1962). 
Problems: The phenomenological approach can only make very rough estimates of 
the total energy demand. It is therefore not very well suited for evaluating the amount of 
future energy demand. Because of its ability to  describe substitution processes it should 
be integrated into other studies (It was in fact used in the IIASA study, see Haefele et al., 
1981). 
3.1.3. Concluding remarks 
It is not easy to classify energy models, because many of them use a combination of 
the different approaches. Furthermore, the expert opinion method will always play a role 
because it determines the structure of the mathematical models, as well as the values of 
the input parameters. Each approach has its pros and cons. In fact, it is nearly impossi- 
ble to  decide which technique is the best adapted for long-term energy projections for use 
in environmental studies. Not only the approach, but also the complexity, the scale and 
the resolution of a model are very important for evaluating its contributions to  an under- 
standing of the global links between the energy sector and the biosphere. 
3.2. IIASA: Energy in a Finite World 
3.2.1. Description 
3.2.1.1. Source and objective 
Source: Haefele et al., 1981. Energy in a finite world. Voll: Paths to  a sustainable 
future, a summary and analysis. Vo12: A global systems analysis, the technical report. 
Report by the Energy Systems Program Group of the International Institute of Applied 
System Analysis (IIASA). Program leader: Wolf Haefele. Ballinger Publishing Company, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Objective: Study of the global and long-term development of the energy system, 
exploration of possible energy futures, especially the transition to  post-fossil systems. 
3.2.1.2. Scale and resolution 
Time scale: Standard time frame of 50 years, 1980 - 2030. Base year: 1975 
Space scale: Global 
Time resolution: Iteration intervals of 5 years 
Spatial resolution: Division of the world in seven groupings, selected for their economic 
and energy similarities, and not so much for geographic proximity 
Region 1: NA North America 
Region 2: SU/EE Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
Region 3: WE/JANZ Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New 
Zeeland, South Africa, Israel 
Region 4: LA Latin America 
Region 5: Af/SEA Africa, South and Southeast Asia 
Region 6: ME/NAf Middle East and Northern Africa 
Region 7: C/CPA China and Centrally Planned Asian Economies 
Fuel disaggregation: Seven fuels are considered in this study. Oil, Gas, Coal 
(conventional/synfueIs), Nuclear (Light Water Reactor/Fast Breeder Reactor), 
Hydroelectricity, Solar, Renewables (biogas, geothermal, commercial wood) 
3.2.1.3. Exogenous var iables  a n d  key assumptions 
Input variables: 
- Population growth 
- Economic growth 
- Lifestyles/private consumption 
- Investments 
- Resource availabilities and costs 
- Future energy prices 
- Market penetration of fuels and new technologies 
- Efficiencies of energy use 
- Imports and exports 
- Potential labor force 
- Cost/buildup rates of energy producing facilities 
- Institutional variables (productivity, capital-output) 
Output (derived variables, results): 
- Aggregate final energy demands in macrosectors 
- Regional and global primary energy production, fuel mix 
- Energy - GDP elasticities 
- Total required capital investments 
- Potential market for final energy forms 
- Contribution of new technologies 
- Shadow prices of fuels and electricity 
- Socioeconomic and environmental impacts (indirect investments, 
water-, energy-, land-, material-, manpower- requirements, 
climate, risks) 
Main scenario assumptions: 
- Continuity, no jumps and surprises in evolution (wars, technological break- 
throughs) 
- Modest population and economic growth 
- Match demand and supply, no gaps 
- Only economic and resource- and energy-related constraints are considered. Politi- 
cal, social and environmental constraints are recognized, but were not applied 
explicitly 
- The US dollar and other monetary units have constant (1975) value, inflation 
aspects of the energy problem are neglected 
- Temporal frame assumptions: Three time phases (IIASA, 1981, Vol 2, p.9) 
Present phase: 198G2000, oil supply problem 
First transition phase: 2000-2030, moving from clean and 
cheap oil to  different energy carriers 
Ultimate trans. phase: 2030-xxxx, moving to a sustainable 
energy supply system 
3.2.1.4. Approach  
The modeling techniques: 
MEDEE: end use approach 
MESSAGE: linear programming optimization model 
IMPACT: energy oriented dynamic input-output model 
MACRO: aggregated economy model 
Description of the model structure: 
The three of IIASA energy models are connected by an information flow between the 
models, in what has been described as a loop of models (Figure 3.2). The demand for final 
energy in each of the seven world regions is evaluated in the demand model MEDEE, 
which is driven by population and economic growth (exogenous). The supply model MES- 
SAGE then determines the optimal cost conversion system and calculates the required 
primary energy, taking into account resource availability, technological, environmental 
and other relevant constraints. The economic and other impacts of these energy supply 
strategies are evaluated in the model IMPACT (only interpretative results, no direct feed- 
back links), and the macroeconomic issues are assessed in the aggregated economy model 
MACRO (which, in the end, was never applied). This whole procedure is iterated region 
by region, taking into account interregional energy trade, until a globally consistent 
energy demand and supply pattern evolves. 
Scenario 
Definition 
r--------- (economic, popu- 
I 
I r 
I 
I I 
I 
I Economic Structure, 
Energy Demand Lifestyles, 
I Technical Effic~encies 
I 
1 I 
I Secondary Fuel Mix 
and Substitutions 
Product~on Limits 
for each 
world region 
--------------------I---------------------- 
/ ; ]  , 
Interregional 
Energy Trade 
Formal mathematical models (-1 Assumptions, judgments, manual calculations 
-+ Direct flow of information (only major flows shown) 
--- Feedback flow of information (only major flows shown) 
Figure 3.2 IIASA's set of energy models: a simplified representation 
Consistency checks are also carried out on the information flow between the models 
in each step of iteration. This is because the models are not "hard-wired" together, but 
rather allow for human judgement. All the inputs and outputs are examined to be sure 
that credible results appear a t  all steps. 
Final energy demand model MEDEE 
MEDEE is an end-use-approach energy demand model that evaluates the influence 
on energy demand of social, economic, technological and policy changes. This model is 
only a calculation tool interrelating the major determinants of both useful and final 
energy demand. Although it contains many variables and relations, its structure is quite 
transparent and simple. 
The energy sector is disaggregated into a multitude of end use categories. For each 
category the useful energy demand is related to a set of determining factors which can be 
macroeconomic aggregates, physical quantities or technological coefficients. These general 
scenario parameters must be disaggregated in terms of economic structure (set of indus- 
trial products), demographic structure (economic growth, lifestyles) and technological 
structure (energy intensiveness, efficiency, market penetration). A macroeconomic module 
translates the socioeconomic scenario assumptions into specific activity levels of the end 
use categories. Final energy demand is then calculated for each category in three other 
modules (household/services, industry, transportation) using activity levels and techne 
logical determinants. Because of the high level of disaggregation, few structural assump 
tions are built in the model. 
MEDEE does not deal directly with the problem of interfuel substitution because 
this problem is treated within the supply model MESSAGE. For competing final energy 
sources no market penetration is modeled; it has to be introduced exogenously. Energy 
demand is also not related directly to energy prices by means of elasticity coefficients - 
this approach is considered inapplicable for making energy predictions because it uses pri- 
marily trend analysis and trend extrapolations from the past. Price-energy relations are 
used in the scenario writing process as expert-opinion-based background information for 
modifying past trends. 
Primary energy demand model MESSAGE 
A number of primary energy sources and their associated conversion technologies are 
considered to calculate the primary energy demand from the secondary energy demand 
assessed in MEDEE. The MESSAGE model has an objective function which is the sum of 
discounted costs of capital, operating, maintenance and fuels (primary energies). This 
function is minimized by the optimization model. The conversion model takes account of 
costs, availability and quality of resources, buildup rates, and energy production capaci- 
ties. Emission constraints and pollutant concentration constraints (Krypton, GOz) were 
available but neither used nor binding in the model. 
Economic and environmental impacts model IMPACT 
IMPACT is an energy oriented dynamic input-output model that calculates the fol- 
lowing: 
- Direct and indirect capital investments in energy system development 
- Investment in energy system development 
- Required energy-related indirect capital investments, materials, equipment and 
services 
- Direct and indirect 'WELMM" requirements (non energy resources), i.e. Water 
(mining, energy production), Energy (for construction), Land (for power plants 
and mining capacities), Materials (for construction), Manpower 
- Impacts on climate (C02,  Waste heat, changes in surface characteristics due to 
large scale solar power ~ l a n t s )  
- Risks of energy technologies for human health. Risk estimation, risk evaluation, 
risk management, valued as costs 
- Time constraints for market penetration (Marchetti) 
Macroeconomic model MACRO 
This aggregated economy model would have supplied the economic input values for 
MEDEE after integrating the capital requirements for the energy sector in the overall 
economy. This model finally was not used, because the group had difficulties in integrat- 
ing it with the rest of the model set (compatibility of aggregation levels). 
3.2.1.5. Model  results 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the input assumptions for Population and GNP per capita 
and the results for primary energy per GNP, which is an important measure for efficiency, 
total primary energy supply and primary energy per capita. These values are plotted in 
the form of factor increase where the 1975 value equals 1 (see Table 4.3 "The Model 
DATA" and Table 4.4 for the exact values). Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the fuel 
mix. 
3.2.2. Evaluat ion 
3.2.2.1. St ruc tu ra l  evaluation - appropriateness  for  environmental  s tudies  
The model describes the potential of a reasonable evolution of global and regional 
energy systems. It captures long-term slowly changing macro-economic characteristics, 
structural changes on regional and global level. Thus the model is able to  capture the 
effects on the energy sector of investment policies, technological changes, lifestyle pat- 
terns, structural changes in the economy like the transition to a postindustrial phase and 
development policies/strategies for LDC's. The model provides global and regional final 
energy demand, primary energy production and fuel mixes. It models the evaluation of 
energy supply, conversion and distribution systems and incorporates impacts of alterna- 
tive strategies on resources, economy (capital, cost) and some on environment (land use, 
water use, C 0 2  emissions). 
A major constraint is that no feedbacks of environmental impacts are taken into 
account to impose limits on the energy sector. Only technical and economic constraints 
are considered. The fact that non-commercial energies are not included makes it very 
difficult to create realistic development scenarios for LDC's (todays share of non- 
commercial fuels: 40 - 90%). Major environmental problems of developing countries like 
competing land uses between non-commercial energies and agriculture or the impacts of 
extensive use of biomass fuels cannot be considered. This flaw holds true for most of the 
global energy studies. 
The resolution in time and space of the IIASA study is valuable to consider even 
regional (parts of the model work on national level and are later aggregated to the 7 
regions) and medium term effects (decade), but the time scale could be too short for 
long-term impacts on the biosphere (1975 - 2030). It is questionable to  extend the time 
frame up to  2075 with a five year time resolution. Time periods for long-term models 
might have to be longer in order to describe only the general trends and to limit uncer- 
tainties caused by short-term bias. 
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For most of the atmospheric pollution problems (like acid rain, NO,), except for 
COz, the regional grid seems to be too large. But it seems to be possible to get a higher 
spatial resolution with few modifications. 
Some other socioeconomic considerations left out by the model are institutional, 
societal and policy issues. The model does not predict energy pricing policies, market 
fluctuations, interest rates or multisectoral dynamics. It does not evaluate the effects of 
specific tax, quota, regulatory and financial incentive policies in detail or explain inter- 
country migration effects on the energy sector. It does not treat technological details of 
small scale energy systems, simulate carefully the full nuclear fuel cycle or address ques- 
tions of safety or arms control. Nor can the model identify local gaps in energy supply. 
3.2.2.2. Scenario design and use 
The model is very complex and not easy to handle. This is caused by the high 
disaggregation of the energy sector, which creates a great number of variables. It takes a 
long time and much experience to  create consistent scenarios. This was the reason why 
only a few scenarios were built: high case, low case, nuclear moratorium case, enhanced 
nuclear case, alternative 16 TW demand case, IIASA '83 scenario. Only the first two 
scenarios have been completely accomplished, the others did not pass through the itera- 
tive modeling process to make them totally consistent (Haefele et al., 1981, Vol 2). The 
complexity of the model makes it difficult to summarize and understand the differences 
between scenarios. 
The model is therefore not very suitable to be used to create as many different pic- 
tures of the future energy world as possible in order to  get a better understanding of glo- 
bal environmental problems. 
3.2.2.3. Criticisms 
The model results are criticized for being "highly unstable and based on informal 
guesswork" (Keepin and Wynne, 1984:691). The main reproach is that "the models essen- 
tially reproduce informally the prescribed input projections that pass through the model 
set unchanged". The study shows a considerable lack of sensitivity analysis on the models 
key variables. Mainly the energy conversion module MESSAGE, which uses a linear pro- 
gramming approach, is shown to be very sensitive to the energy price assumptions for 
different fuels. Only small changes in assumptions (less than 20%) led to totally different 
fuel mixes. These findings bring several conclusions drawn from the scenarios into ques- 
tion (Keepin, 1984). 
Nevertheless the IIASA study is valuable for providing detailed informations on 
many other fields - the modeling was only one part of the entire program. Important 
results were produced concerning global energy resources and production limits. Other 
contributions include the logistic substitution model (market penetration analysis of 
different fuels) and the work on COz, technological risk perception, and solar energy. 
3.3. E d m o n d s  & Reilly: Global  Energy  - Assessing t h e  F u t u r e  
3.3.1. Description. 
The Edmonds & Reilly model, developed by Jae Edmonds and J.A. Reilly of the 
Institute for Energy Analysis of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (IEAIORAU), has 
been extensively used in the United States since at  least 1982 (Edmonds and Reilly, 
1984). A second version of the model that is somewhat differently specified has been 
developed in the last year, but has yet to be widely diffused (Edmonds et al., 1985). As a 
result, this description will focus primarily on the former version, while mentioning some 
of the more salient differences that exist in the latter. 
3.3.1.1. Scale  a n d  resolution. 
Time Scale: Analysis in the authors' published expositions of the model is conducted 
to the year 2050 in four steps: 1975,2000, 2025, 2050. The model has been used in several 
other contexts to  examine intervals as far out as 2100 (Rose et al., 1983; Reister, 1984; 
Edmonds and Reilly, 1983a). A fundamental assumption of the model is that capital in 
the energy system is completely replaced every twenty-five years, thus the 25 year inter- 
val between model iterations. 
Space Scale: The Edmonds and Reilly (E&R) model divides the world into 9 spa- 
tially contiguous regions: four "developing" (Africa, Middle East, Latin America and 
South & East Asia ), two "centrally plannedN( Eastern Europe/USSR and China and 
some surrounding countries), and three OECD (USA, Canada and Western Europe, and 
OECD Pacific, meaning Japan, Australia, etc..). 
Fuel &aggregation: The model provides, for each time and space interval, the mix 
of six primary sources (oil, coal, gas, hydro, solar, and nuclear), four secondary sources 
(liquids, solids, gas, and electricity), and biomass, shale oil, and synfuels. 
3.3.1.2. Approach  a n d  s t ructure .  
Initially conceived as a tool for exploring the C02 problem and policy/development 
options influencing it, a run of the Edmonds and Reilly model provides, in a relatively 
simple framework, five detailed and balanced commercial energy demand/supply and C02 
snapshots out to  2100. For each of the nine regions, model outputs include detailed pri- 
mary and secondary fuel mixes, a variety of trade, price and development indicators, and 
C02 emissions information. 
Two parts of the model are economically driven: the demand module and the energy 
balance module. The supply module is primarily resourceconstrained, with only a par- 
tially economic specification. (The major change in the most recent version is a further 
economic specification in the energy supply sector). Fundamental to  the approach are 
assumptions about the importance of market mechanisms, prices, incomes, labor produc- 
tivity, and population as driving variables in the energy sector. This basic structural 
underpinning of the E&R model is well expressed in Figure 3.6. The energy forecasting 
part of the model is broken up into three sub-sections. 
Energy demand 
The model uses population and GNP projections, based on assumptions about the 
fraction of the population in the active labor force as well as the productivity of labor, as 
indicators of economic activity and income. Regional primary energy prices are derived 
from world prices with region-specific add-on costs (mimicing transport costs, taxes and 
tariffs). The model may be manipulated, via these costs, to  restrict trade or simulate 
various government policies. 
The cost of secondary and tertiary (including electric) energy services is calculated 
next in a framework of interfuel, cost-based competition for shares of the electricity 
market. The regional demand for energy services is then calculated from a region-specific 
energy service price, and income and price elasticities of energy demand. Demand can be 
further affected by a parameter for technological change/energy productivity, which per- 
mits the incorporation of various assumptions about structural economic change and 
improved energy efficiency. 
The demand module then calculates a final energy demand for four secondary fuels, 
based on this aggregate demand for energy services and the relative cost of energy produc- 
tion with each of these fuels. The relative fuel shares within this demand are again deter- 
mined in a market share competition framework. These demands for secondary fuels are 
converted into a demand for six primary fuels (oil, biomass and coal, gas, nuclear, hydro, 
and centralized solar) using appropriate conversion efficiency and production loss factors. 
Energy supply 
Three types of energy resource are defined: resource-constrained conventional 
(including conventional oil and gas), resourceconstrained renewable (including biomass, 
centralized solar, and hydroelectric), and unconstrained (including coal, shale oil, and 
nuclear). 
Resource-constrained energy supply is determined using a logistic depletion function 
(Hubbert, 1962) for non-renewable sources. Renewables are modeled under an assumption 
of a growth path leading to  their being exploited at  their maximal rate. Unconstrained 
technologies are assumed to  be of a "backstop" type, meaning that they break into the 
market a t  certain price levels, and thereafter provide relatively unlimited amounts of 
energy, according to  a price-supply schedule. Most of the modifications to the model have 
occurred in this supply section, and have been geared towards increasing the economic 
aspects of this section, rather than making it more complicated. 
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Finally, synthetic fuels production from coal has an economic dependency on the 
cost of coal, oil and gas, the cost of conversion, and the market shares of primary energy 
demand that synfuels are able to capture through price competition. 
Energy balance 
With trade occurring only in fossil fuels, world prices are modified to  ensure that all 
markets clear. These market-clearing-prices are iteratively used until an equilibrium is 
reached for each and every fuel market. 
COz emissions 
There is a fourth part of the model dedicated to  evaluating C 0 2  emissions that 
result from energy use projections. In this module, C 0 2  emission coefficients are applied 
to  the projected fuel uses for four fuel types (gases, liquids, solids, and shale oil). 
3.3.1.3. Model  resul ts  
Figure 3.7 shows the input assumptions for Population and GNP per capita and as 
results primary energy per GNP, which is an important measure for efficiency, total pri- 
mary energy supply and primary energy per capita. These values are plotted in form of 
factor increase where the 1975 value equals 1 (see Table 4.3 "The Model DATA" and 
Table 4.4 for the exact values). Figure 3.8 shows the evolution of the fuel mix. 
3.3.2. Model  Evaluat ion.  
3.3.2.1. Table  of key variables 
(see Table 3.1) 
3.3.2.2. Sensitivity analysis 
The recent version of the Edmonds and Reilly model has been tested for sensitivity 
and uncertainty through extensive Monte Carlo analysis (Edmonds et al., 1985). From 
such testing three input variables clearly emerged as being the most important in deter- 
mining energy demand for most time and regional distributions calculated within the 
model. These were the rates of labor productivity growth, and of energy efficiency change, 
and the income elasticity of less developed countries. A less rigorous analysis conducted 
on the earlier version of the model found base GNP, coal supply and unconventional oil 
parameters more important than labor productivity. These shifts in sensitivity are most 
likely attributable to  the aforementioned model modifications. This shift points to  the 
value of sensitivity analysis in determining how closely a model conforms to  our expecta- 
tions of how the world works. Such shifts illustrate the variance that can exist within 
even one model as to what are sensitive inputs to  the energy system. 
Within the more recent analysis, the explanatory power (or correlation to  variabil- 
ity) of about 80 input variables on such outputs as region-specific fuel mixes, prices, and 
production was also tested (Edmonds et al., 1985:41.). Edmonds et al. note in that study 
that no unexpected results emerge from their uncertainty analysis. For example, coal 
production as projected by the model turns out to be sensitive to labor productivity 
increase and environmental costs of coal more than anything else. 
Knowing that model outputs make sense is valuable in assessing its suitability for 
use in environmental studies. It would be unreasonable, however, to assign explanatory 
powers or to  base actions in reality on the ranking of those variables explaining detailed 
results of the model. These input variables had generally low correlations associated with 
Table 3.1 Key variables in the Edmonds & Reilly model 
BASE 
DEMAND VARIABLES 
GENERAL 
Population growth rate (%/year) .94 
GNP growth rate (%/year) 2.9 
Developed 2.3 
Developing 4 
Population bssc (millions) 3976 
GNP base (billion 19751) 6056 
Labor productivity growth (%/year) 
Exogenous energy efficiency growth (%/year) .35 
(soft case=2.0) 
SUBSTITUTION RATES 
Fuel substitution (cross-elasticities) 
oil-own -.7 
oil-gas .1 
oil-coal .1 
g-own -.62 
gas-oil .13 
g-coal .12 
coal-own -.56 
coal-oil .22 
coal-gas .16 
Electricity generation substitution 
ELASTICITIES 
Income 
3 OECD REGIONS 
ns./comm. cap.income) 1 
industrial (YGNP) 1 
EUSSR 1.26 
ELSE 1.4 
GNP feedback .05 
Aggregate price 
OECD REGIONS 
- .8 
-.7 
-.9 
-.8 
DEMAND RELATED FUEL ASSUMPTIONS 
(prices include taxes and transport costs) 
Coal 
price (1975$/G J )  .26 
electricity generation costs (1975$/GJ) 
w/scrubbem 6.87 
.I/. 5.86 
conversion efficiency .3 
BASE 
Conventional Oil 
price (1975S/G J )  2 
electricity generation costs (1975$/GJ) 4.63 
conversion eff. .27 
Oil shale 
price (1975$/G J )  3.85 
Natural gaa 
price (1975$/G J )  1 
electricity generation costs (1976$/GJ) 4.61 
conversion eff. .27 
Unconventional gas 
breakthrough price (1976$/GJ) 3.7 
Synfuels 
cost oil 4.55 
gas 3.3 
Nuclear 
electricity generation costs (1976$/GJ) 9.19 
Solar/Renewables 
electricity generation costs (1976$/GJ) 20 
Biomass 
cost waste 0 
farmed 2.1 
Hydroelectric 
electricity generation costs 1975s GJ) 6.12 
Electricity from coal (non-fui 
SUPPLY RELATED VARIABLES 
Coal 
increase in production (ratelyear) 2.9 
min. breakthrough price 
normal breakthrough price 
short-term price elasticity control 
Oil 
resource (EJ) 12715 
logistic path constraints 
Gas 
resource (EJ) 9953 
logistic path constraints of 
supply and flaring 
Hydroelectric 
resource (EJ) 35.41 
Non-coal backstop technologies 
min. breakthrough price 
normal breakthrough price 
short-term price elasticity control 
Synfuels 
production costs 
cost of other fuels 
LOW 
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their rankings as explanatory variables. 
In the Monte Carlo analysis that was conducted, another interesting feature of the 
Edmonds and Reilly model emerged. The model, when its inputs are varied over the 
kinds of ranges used for Monte Carlo analysis, can provide an extremely wide range of 
total primary energy use and carbon emissions scenarios. For example, the 95% 
confidence bounds for primary energy use in 2075 range from a little less than 7 terawatts 
(TW) to a little more than 314. This result indicates that the model can really be used as  
a "scenario generating" machine, delivering a set of internally consistent projections for a 
wide range of input assumptions. 
Despite the breadth of the Monte Carlo results, some interesting conclusions do 
emerge. One is that, of all the model runs, only 10% projected growth akin to that that 
has occurred in the last 55 years (Edmonds et al., 1985:65). Whether this represents a 
genuine insight into the energy world or the model's biases is difficult to judge. Edmonds 
and Reilly strongly link energy growth with GNP growth, based on their long-term an* 
lyses of the energy market. But this growth-inducing tendency is offset by their modeling 
of resource availability as having peaked for the cheapest fuels. The time-frame from 
which model calibration data is drawn strongly influences such parameters in models. 
3.3.2.3. St ruc tu ra l  evaluation 
Overall, the Edmonds and Reilly model is a simple and worthwhile tool for exploring 
global energy and C 0 2  futures. It is admirably documented, fairly simple to use in light 
of its level of disaggregation, and has been extensively tested and run in several indepen- 
dent settings. 
Through its use by several different studies (Rose et al., 1983; Reister, 1984; 
Edmonds and Reilly, 1983a), a number of criticisms have emerged, not all of which have 
been answered by the recent modifications. The criticisms here listed will be applicable to 
the older version of the model. We have split other studies' criticisms and our own into 
three categories: inadequately or incompletely specified key relationships, non-modeled 
economic variables or relationships, and non-modeled energy relationships. Model flaws 
in the first category may have been remedied in the new version. 
The first category of problems with the model includes the fact that the supplies of 
oil and gas are not price-determined (Lave, 1981:2; Keepin et al., 1985:55; Rose et al., 
1983:42), that the modeled supply function for coal has proven to be quite inelastic (Reis- 
ter, 1984), and that these incomplete economic specifications cast some doubt on the 
model's suitability for analyzing energy use in economies with active government inter- 
vention (Keepin et al., 1985:55). 
The second category of flaws are reported in Rose et al. (1983). In their use of the 
Edmonds and Reilly model, they question the model's procedure of assuming no carry 
over in capital stock for periods greater than the model's 25 year interval, because of the 
potentially longer life that many energy systems in fact have. They further report that 
the model's elasticity oriented approach to the energy sector leaves a lot to be desired 
when trying to understand or design scenarios aimed at exploring the role of specific sec- 
tors of the economy. This flaw clearly emerges from the sensitivity analysis' identification 
of income elasticity as a key variable. To know that the income elasticity of energy 
demand is a driving variable is almost a trivial result because income elasticity is such an 
aggregate measure of the behavior of commercial energy systems. Finally, the model 
lacks an adequate structure for introducing really new energy technologies. 
The third set of flaws are shared with most of the energy field, and are discussed in 
further detail later. They include the fact that non-commercial fuels and environmental 
feedbacks on the energy system, such as societal response to C02-induced warming are 
not included in the E&R model. For example, the model predicts a rise in primary 
energy/GNP ratios at least through 2050 for less-developed countries. Were non- 
commercial fuels to be included, it would be hard to imagine how the ratio could not 
drop, considering the inefficiency of traditional fuel use. 
The model also predicts an absolute increase in the already large energy gaps 
between less-developed and developed countries. Policy makers using detailed scenarios 
generated from this model may find their credibility somewhat limited because of this fac- 
tor. This too may be due to the lack of model structure describing the transition from 
non-commercial to commercial energy use. 
3.3.2.4. Scenario design and use 
Because of the speed with which the model runs, and the relative simplicity of its 
design, scenario construction with the Edmonds and Reilly model has been relatively 
prolific. The differences between scenarios are easily summarized and understood. The 
criticism of too much end-use aggregation mentioned above here becomes a strong benefit 
in using the model. While all the input variables we might want to tune are not expli- 
citly incorporated in the model, the model permits a design through broad variables of 
many of the energy sector evolutions that might be interesting. 
As mentioned earlier, a model that is flexible enough to provide a large range of 
scenarios can be extremely useful for exploring energy futures in a consistent way. 
3.3.2.5. Appropriateness for long-term, large-scale environmental studies 
Besides its widespread use in the analysis of the C 0 2  problem, the Edmonds and 
Reilly model holds some promise for the analysis of other interactions between energy and 
development and the environment. Most clearly, it represents a good tool for exploring 
long-term energy futures at  global and large-region scales. 
The model may prove, with some further modification and/or verification, also to be 
useful in analyzing some of the environmental concerns on the regional/national scale. For 
example, the model might be able to provide some continental scale indicators of land use 
by biomass farms, heavy metal mobilization from mining and combustion of fossil fuels, 
or emission levels of other radiatively active gasses. This would require some re- 
calibration and verification with respect to those Action/VEC relationships that might be 
explored with the model, but the effort may be worthwhile. 
Finally, the time scale of the model may be able to be changed in order to explore 
other intervals. This would have to be undertaken with great care for the model's under- 
lying assumptions about capital turnover and transitions in the energy sector. 
3.4. The Nordhaus and Yohe Model 
3.4.1. Description 
3.4.1.1. Source and objective 
Source: Nordhaus, W.D., Yohe, G. W. (1983). Future Paths of Energy and Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions. In Changing Climate, Washington D.C. 
References: Rose et al. (1983), Edmonds et al. (1983a, 1983b), Keepin et al. (1985) 
Objective: Global C 0 2  emissions and concentration predictions 
3.4.1.2. Scale a n d  resolution 
Time scale: Basically 1975 - 2100 (can be adapted to a particular case). 
Space scale: Global, for the world. 
Time resolution: A continuoua-time simulation model with possibility of different 
time resolution according to the time scale and the purpose of simulation. In the basic 
source the resolution applied is: 1975 - 2000 - 2025 - 2050 - 2075 - 2100. 
Space resolution: 1 Region - the World. 
Fuel disaggregation: 2 aggregated fuel types - fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal, shale oil, syn- 
fuels) and nonfossil fuels (nuclear, solar, hydro, renewable). 
3.4.1.3. Variables 
Inputs: Population growth rate, labour productivity, rates of technological change in 
energy industry, the fuel mix among fossil fuels. 
Outputs: Consumption of fossil fuels, consumption of nonfossil fuels, fossil fuel 
prices, nonfossil fuel prices, GNP, carbon emissions, C 0 2  concentration. 
3.4.1.4. Approach 
An aggregated, dynamic, econometric model for energy consumption based on gen- 
eralized Cobb-Douglas production function. The main output of energy part is fuel mix 
between fossil and nonfossil fuels. Then, using an exogenously assumed fuel mix among 
fossil fuels, the model calculates C02  emissions and atmospheric C 0 2  concentration. 
3.4.1.5. Model  results 
Figure 3.9 shows the input assumptions for Population and GNP per capita and as 
results primary energy per GNP, which is an important measure for efficiency, total pri- 
mary energy supply and primary energy per capita. These values are plotted in form of 
factor increase where the 1975 value equal 1 (See Table 4.3 "The Model DATA" and 
Table 4.4 for the exact values). Figure 3.10 shows the evolution of the fuel mix. 
3.4.2. Evaluat ion 
The report presents a dynamic, global-scale econometric model of energy consump 
tion, focused on such environmental impacts as C 0 2  emissions and cumulative C 0 2  con- 
centration in the atmosphere. 
The model represents a compact, mathematical structure utilizing a generalized 
Cobb-Douglas production function - a fundamental relationship used for calculation of 
global GNP. There is no spatial resolution within the model; the World is considered as 
one region. Energy sources are divided into two categories: fossil and nonfossil fuels. Sub- 
stitution between them is driven mainly by fuel prices, depending on technological 
changes in energy industry, resource availability, extraction/transportation cost of fuels, 
taxation policy. 
The unique feature of the study is the systematic treatment of uncertainties within 
the model predictions by probabilistic scenario analysis. As a result, the set of key vari- 
ables and parameters explaining most output uncertainty has been recognized. 
Figure 3.9 Factor increase - Nordhaus and Yohe 
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Figure 3.10 Fuel mix - Nordhaus and Yohe 
The highly aggregated structure causes the model to lose some information concern- 
ing substantial differences between regions (especially between industrialized countries 
and less developed countries). The existence of only two fuel types leads to high sensi- 
tivity among parameters controlling the substitution between them. Furthermore, the 
specific model structure overestimates the importance of some parameters (such as elasti- 
city of substitution fossil-nonfossil fuels, elasticity of substitution labour-energy). These 
are probably less important in real systems, and are not considered explicitly at all in 
other models (compare Appendix 5 for more detailed analysis). 
On the other hand, the simple structure of the model facilitates the calculations and 
makes investigation of different strategies and scenarios possible. For this reason, the 
approach can be useful in constructing environment oriented strategies. In the main 
report, some examples of alternative taxation polices focused on environment protection 
are presented. A modified version of the model, based on combination of the Nordhaus- 
Yohe approach with some elements of the Edmonds and Reilly model, is applied in 
Appendix 5 to investigate a simple "surprise" rich scenario. 
3.5. The World Energy Conference Model 
3.5.1. Description 
3.5.1.1. Source and objective 
Source: Frisch, J.D.  ed. Energy 2000-2020: World Prospects and Regional Stresses. 
Report of Conservation Commission of the World Energy Conference, New Dehli 1983. 
Graham and Trotman, London. 
References: Keepin et al. (1985). 
Objective: Primary energy forecast for the World, disaggregated by the regions and 
fuel types. 
3.5.1.2. Scale and resolution 
Time scale: Basic scale 1978 - 2020 (historical data for the year 1960). 
Time resolution: 1960 - 1978 - 2000 - 2020. 
Space resolution: 
10 Regions of the World considered 
R1 - North America, 
R2 - Western Europe, 
R3 - Industrial Countries of the Pacific, 
R4 - Eastern Europe, 
R5 - North AfricaIMiddle East, 
R6 - Sub-Saharian Africa, 
R7 - South Asia, 
R8 - South-East Asia, 
R10 - Latin America. 
Fuel disaggregation: 8 fuel types considered; oil, coal, natural gas, hydro, nuclear, 
wood, vegetable and animal waste, new energies. 
3.5.1.3. Variables  
Inputs: Population, GNP, income elasticities. 
Outputs (state variables): Commercial energy consumption, noncommercial energy 
consumption, primary energy consumption, fuel mix, international trade of fuels. 
3.5.1.4. Approach  
The forecast is a static prediction of historical trends, based mainly on expert opin- 
ions and simple calculations of main relations. The Central Team provides 10 Regional 
Working Teams with consistent (1960 - 1978) historical data as well as input forecasts 
for population and GNP growth. The Regional Working Teams calculate primary energy 
demand and supply (disaggregated by 8 fuel sources), fuel imports and exports. The C 0 2  
emissions are not directly considered but they can be calculated from primary energy con- 
sumption. 
3.5.1.5. Model  resul ts  
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the input assumptions for Population and GNP per c a p  
ita and as results primary energy per GNP, which is an important measure for efficiency, 
total primary energy supply and primary energy per capita. These values are plotted in 
form of factor increase where the 1975 value equals 1 (see Table 4.3 "The Model DATA" 
and Table 4.4 for the exact values). Figure 3.13 shows the evolution of the fuel mix. 
3.5.2. Evaluat ion 
The report presents forecast of global primary energy consumption for the years 
2000 and 2020, based on historical data for 1960 and 1978 (the latter as the base year). A 
consistent and relatively detailed regional resolution (10 Regions) takes the following cri- 
teria in consideration: (i) geographical proximities, (ii) continental frontiers, (iii) types of 
economic systems, (iv) the stage of development of the countries. 
The final forecast reflects energy experts' opinions from all the Regions, stated in the 
year 1982. The prediction method does not use a single mathematical framework; it is 
based on the cooperation of a Central Team (which provides consistent historical data 
and basic assumption for scenarios) with 10 Regional Working Teams (elaborate detailed 
regional forecasts). Two alternative scenarios are considered: (i) high - "normative 
cooperation scenario", and (ii) low - "increasing stresses scenario". 
The final results present total and per capita economic growth, commercial and non- 
commercial energy consumption - disaggregated by region and by fuel type. An important 
feature of the project is its detailed fuel disaggregation by 8 types. The model's 
identification of noncommercial energy use (fuel wood, vegetable and animal waste) as 
being important over the next decades mainly in LDCs is valuable for environmental con- 
siderations . 
The report can not be directly applied to  an environment-oriented project since it 
does not represent any formal, reproducible approach. On the other hand, since it is a 
consistent representation of a complex expert opinion, it may be valuable as a compara- 
tive and auxiliary study for other projects. It is also important that the results will be 
updated by the future World Energy Conferences. 
Figure 3.11 Factor increase - WEC high 
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3.6. Short-Term Studies: Global 2000 and World Energy Outlook 
3.6.1. Global 2000 
Source: CEQ: The Global 2000 Report to the President, U.S.Government Washing- 
ton 1981. Vo1.2:161-185, 569-577; Vo1.3:289-327. 
Objective: Forecast the World's energy future (from an American perspective). 
Time-span: 1975-1990 (2000) 
Time resolution: 1985, 1990 
Space resolution: Four main regions: OECD, CPE, OPEC and non-OPEC LDCs. 
OECD can be highly disaggregated for both subregions, nations and sectors. (This is 
because of the fact that the input-data for OECD are disaggregated and often modeled in 
the beginning.) The other regions' demand and supply are based on expert opinions and 
trend-extrapolations i.e. without very much sectoral and national disaggregation. 
Fuel disaggregation: Oil, coal, gas, nuclear and others. Only the fossil fuels are 
modeled, the others are used as constants for each year. 
Modeling: Six submodels for Demand (for OECD the OECD Demand Model is 
used), Supply, Transportation, Electric Utilities, Refining and Miscellaneous Conversions 
prepare data for the linear programming matrix IEES that approximates the workings of 
a competitive market. These are all econometric models using elasticities. The common 
goal is to minimize the total global cost. The LP-matrix is run, with new prices calculated 
with price elasticities for fuels and sectors from the OECD-model, until supply and 
demand are equilibrated. 
Inputs: 
Population Growth 
Economic Growth 
Oil Supply / Price Model Parameters: Technological Progress 
Electrification 
Conservation 
Country Policies for import, conservation and taxation of energy. 
Built-in Assumptions: Continuity, no surprises except for oil price and supply. 
Data: Mainly OECD and other Global 2000-studies. 
Outputs: Fuel mix (primary energy); Energy consumption (commercial) for different 
sectors and regions with special emphasis on U.S. and OECD. 
Scenarios: High, medium and low. In the high there are high population growth, 
high economic growth and a relatively stable and cheap oil supply. 
3.6.2. Wor ld  Energy  Outlook 
Source: World Energy Outlook , IEA/OECD Paris 1982 
Objective: To forecast the World's energy future to set the scene for a discussion of 
problems of energy availability for the OECD-countries. An important objective is to  
draw some conclusions that is meant as advice for governments in the industrialized 
world. 
Time resolution: 1985, 1990 and 2000. 
Space resolution: Four main regions: OECD, CPE, OPEC and non-OPEC LDCs. 
Fuel disaggregation: Oil, gas, coal, nuclear and others. 
Modeling: The OECD Energy Demand Model is an elasticity model used to  forecast 
energy demand in the OECD-countries. For other regions demand and for regional and 
global supplies expert assumptions and trend-extrapolations are used. Demand and supply 
sides are not balanced. Final energy demand is for OECD disaggregated for five sectors in 
the OECD: industry, electricity, transportation, residential-commercial and non-energy 
uses. 
Inputs: 
Economic Growth 
Oil Price/Supply 
Model Parameters: 
Technological Progress 
Electrification 
Conservation 
Built-in Assumptions: 
Electricity expands at  higher rates than during the 70s. 
Price of energy follows oil price. 
Private consumption follows GNP. 
Policy actions will encourage energy conservation. 
Data: Mainly OECD. 
Outpub: Energy demand (especially for the sectors and different parts of the 
OECD-region); Energy supply (expert opinions, in other regions than OECD mainly the 
excess supply is interesting). 
Scenarios: High ( High economic growth, stable oil price and supply ), low and low 
oil scenarios are presented. 
3.6.3. Commentary  t o  t h e  Short-Term Studies 
We considered after some analysis both Global 2000 and World Energy Outlook as 
inappropriate for long-term, environmental studies and decided to concentrate on the 
other studies. The main reasons for this were: 
(1) Their too short time-perspective. This makes them too anchored in the present 
situation. They further don't take great changes in the energy system into account. 
(2) No deeper discussion of environmental impacts. The only environmental issues 
mentioned are those connected with coal and nuclear power use. Their short time- 
perspective makes of course that all long-term effects of energy use are not of any interest. 
(3) The relative ethnocentrism or concentration on the OECD-region and the rela- 
tively crude treatment of the other regions that is a common trait for many of the studies 
is a bit extreme in these studies. This makes them inappropriate for providing a base for 
any deeper discussions of the energy future of the developing world. 
This critique, however, does not at  all disqualify them as future studies. They are 
certainly as good as most other studies. What has been the most interesting thing about 
them and that has made them interesting to have as comparative material is their "nor- 
mative" approach. They both have the explicit objective to provide a base for policy- 
making. That should also be one of the areas of concern for the project. 
4. M O D E L  EVALUATION 
4.1. Introduct ion 
The main objective of our study is to formulate a general approach to the scientific 
investigation of long-term, environmental implications of energy production. For this pur- 
pose, in Section 2 we have recognized the set of most "vulnerable" Valued Environmental 
Components that can be affected by energy production. The linkages (mainly qualitative) 
between activity levels in the energy sector and VECs were presented in a form of the 
respective matrices. 
Now we want to recognize the main factors which determine the state of energy sys- 
tem. In this case, as opposed to the energy-environment relationship, there exist tools for 
quantitative evaluation of input - output relationships within energy system. These tools 
are mathematical energy models presented in Section 3. 
Each model is built to give an answer to some specific question. For this reason, 
models differ as to their main assumptions as well as to their mathematical structure. On 
the other hand, it may be possible to distinguish a set of descriptors which can character- 
ize some general family of models or even the energy system as a whole. 
By a comparative analysis of a set of energy models we have tried to find a general 
set of "key variables" driving a representative model of energy system. Such an analysis, 
and a resulting set of key variables are presented in Section 4.2.1. 
The results of this analysis, however general as it may be, reflects some limitations 
of the models used as a base for consideration. In Section 4.2.2 we try to find key vari- 
ables representing the real energy system, based on a direct analysis of this system, not its 
mathematical models. 
In attempting to understand the nature of actions that could be useful in exploring 
energy-environment interactions, we have primarily sought to identify those "key vari- 
ables and relationships" that are most interesting for those phenomena. Two of the stu- 
dies (Edmonds & Reilly, and Nordhaus & Yohe) that we have examined have actually 
conducted quite rigorous analysis of the causes of uncertainty and variation in their 
models. Keepin et al. (1985), among others, caution us, however, not to  confuse sensi- 
tivity, as determined in a model, with sensitivity of the real system being considered. 
False sensitivities abound in any model. They can arise because of the greater 
degree of specification that certain variables enjoy over others (see the previous evalua- 
tions of Edmonds & Reilly and Nordhaus & Yohe for more on this) and they can fade out 
with excessive tuning of a model. 
The quantification of uncertainty is extremely important for improving our ability 
to model the evolution of the environmental system. Our fundamental inability to 
describe accurately all the relationships that can influence it must never be forgotten. In 
using and interpreting model results their value must be assessed with an understanding 
of such inherent limits to  their "realism". 
These considerations led us to the following illustrative framework for variable 
analysis (see Figure 4.1). In this diagram, a distinction is drawn between modeled evolu- 
tions of the energy system, and real evolutions. There are "inputs" to  both paths, with 
the model inputs always being a (usually) small subset of the real ones. These inputs 
then evolve, respectively, into a modeled and a real energy scenario. The modeled energy 
system usually has an assigned uncertainty represented here by a grey area, and in actual 
studies by high and low scenarios. We believe that the real system, though we cannot 
often measure it precisely, has no such uncertainty and therefore is, from point to  point, 
precisely determined. Depending on luck, the timelspace frame of the model, and the 
skill of the modelers, the model's uncertainty range will overlap more or less with the real 
world situation. 
This energy situation then evolves into various environmental impacts that are of 
particular interest to  us. Here again we find a real and modeled evolution. We felt that 
one more input that might not so directly affect the energy evolution but would certainly 
affect the environment, was the degree of environmental control in effect at the time of 
energy-biosphere interactions. Thus in the diagram environmental controls are seen as 
modifying the biosphere impacts of energy use directly through the energy sector. In the 
modeling of energy-environment impacts however, they are usually seen as having an 
insignificant effect on the energy system. If considered at  all, they have more of an effect 
on the environmental sector. We believed this to  be a crucial variable whose role has not 
been adequately explored. 
4.2. Evaluat ion 
4.2.1. Overall  key  assumptions and sensitivities 
One of the objectives of this etudy was to select a set of energy models appropriate 
for investigating alternative environment-oriented strategies and scenarios. For this pur- 
pose, we have recognized some criteria which should be satisfied by the models used. It 
seems that the most important are the following: 
(1) A relatively simple, dynamic mathematical structure that can be repeatedly used 
for constructing alternative scenarios; 
(2) The possibility of global, long-term analysis for investigating cumulative 
environmental impacts; 
(3) A flexible structure with a possibility of adaptation to  a specific purpose; 
(4) Availability of input data; 
(5) Ease of transition from model's output to  the respective VECs. 

Following the above conditions we have analyzed the energy models presented in 
Section 3. We believe that three of the models characterized there are the most appropri- 
ate for biosphere-oriented applications. These are: the IIASA model, the Edmonds and 
Reilly model ( E R )  and the Nordhaus and Yohe model (N-Y). 
The other models, for various reasons, can not be used directly but are valuable as 
comparative studies. In particular, the WEC model can not be repeatedly used since it is 
based on an expert opinion and lacks a specific mathematical structure. Some of its 
results, on the other hand, may be useful, eg. precise spatial resolution and very detailed 
splitting of fuel types. For environmental impacts, the distinction that study draws of 
non-commercial fuels (fuel wood, animal and vegetable wastes) is very important due to 
the fact that they provide a significant share of energy in Developing Countries. 
The Energy Outlook and the Global 2000 models are focused on OECD countries 
which constrains them to specific assumptions and model structures. For these reasons it 
would be difficult to adapt them directly to more general applications. It seems, however, 
that their specific energy demand submodels can be useful for more disaggregated 
approaches. 
The studies selected for the further analysis represent advanced, upto-date tech- 
niques of energy modeling and can be adapted to environmental applications. The E R  
model and the N-Y model, in spite of differences in levels of aggregation and spatial reso- 
lution, use the same time-space scale and have similar structures. Both are focused on glo- 
bal C 0 2  emissions and cumulative C 0 2  concentration in the atmosphere. 
Given the representative set of energy models, we have conducted a comparative 
sensitivity analysis in order to recognize the key variables and parameters that could be 
important not only to specific models but also to the real energy system being considered. 
For the N-Y model and the E R  model very detailed, probabilistic uncertainty 
analysis has been conducted (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983; Edmonds and Reilly, 1985). As a 
result, a ranked list of key variables for each model was established. The ranking position 
of a specific variable or parameter indicates what amount of uncertainty in model's out- 
put is explained by this variable (see Edmonds and Reilly, 1985, for details ). The amount 
of uncertainty explained by a specific variable in the model's output depends, in the gen- 
eral case, on time (it is actually an indirect effect of state-dependence). For further 
analysis we assume, for simplicity's sake, the average values for the forecasting period. 
For the IIASA model, the importance of specific variables was evaluated by analysis 
of the model's assumptions, its mathematical structure and how they relate to reality. 
Results of this comparative analysis are summarized in Table 4.1 which groups the 
most important variables and parameters indicated by the individual models comparison. 
Since our objective was to obtain a set of key variables representing the system - not a 
specific model, the table contains some adjustments as to the importance of some vari- 
ables indicated by the models considered. In particular, the N-Y model is most sensitive 
to  a labor-energy substitution parameter which does not appear in other models. Impor- 
tance of this parameter is a consequence of a specific form of production function 
(Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983) - the fundamental relationship within this model. On the 
other hand, population - the driving force in all the models - has very low uncertainty 
ranking and does not appear a t  all in the E R  ranked list. This fact is a result of very nar- 
row input uncertainty attributed to population predictions (Edmonds and Reilly, 1985) 
which implies the low output uncertainty explained by this variable. 
Table 4.1 shows a sort of correlation across the models, with respect to the impor- 
tance of some variables. The variables that we concluded were the most important deter- 
minants of the energy system as explained by the models' own sensitivity analysis are 
grouped in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.1. Key variables in energy models 
INPUT VARIABLES E R  N- Y IIASA 
Capital Availability 
Energy Efficiency Rate 
Fuel Prices 
Fuel Resources 
Fuel Substitution 
GNP Growth 
GNP-Feedback Elasticities 
Income Elasticities 
Price Elasticities 
Labor Productivity 
Labor-E Substitution 
Life Style 
Market Penetration 
Population Distribution 
Population Growth 
Production Constraints 
Taxes 
Structural Change 
Note: 
x - Exogenous variable n - Endogenous variable 
Table 4.2 lists, in no particular order, the variables that our models indicated 
explained the  most about the evolution of the energy system. The first five variables are 
essential for all the models considered. The growth of GNP, labor productivity and popu- 
lation are the factors which, in one way or another, combine in our three models to  deter- 
mine the level of energy services provided. In the Edmonds and Reilly model, population 
and labor productivity give GNP. In the Nordhaus and Yohe model they are also the 
main factora in production function which determine the final GNP level. In the IIASA 
model, GNP is directly input to give the relative level of energy service demand, and 
population is d to  determine the distributional and basic needs energy requirements 
(automobile-miles traveled, etc.). 
The growth of energy efficiency and technological change, depending on a specific 
model structure, are important to  the calculation of secondary and final energy use. In 
some models, energy conservation, resulting from these two factors, is considered as an 
additional fuel. The fuel share is strongly controlled by fuel prices and energy resources 
availability. 
Income elasticities and life style/energy use patterns are very important in some 
specific model approaches. The first parameter is commonly used in econometric models 
(the Edmonds and Reilly model) whereas the second one is characteristic for the end-use 
approaches (the IIASA model). 
Table 4.2 Key variables in energy field 
(models' sensitivity analysis) 
GNP / Labor Productivity 
Population Growth 
Energy Efficiency / Technological change 
Fuel Prices 
Energy Resources Availability 
Income Elasticities 
Life Style / Energy End-Use Patterns 
4.2.2. Unmodeled o r  insensitive b u t  impor tant  variables a n d  relationships in 
energy-environment interactions 
This section of the report attempts to define two sets of variables: those that we felt 
were either left out of, or didn't emerge as particularly important variables for the energy 
sector in the energy models we examined, and those that may not be crucial to the energy 
sector, but are important in determining its impact on the environment. 
In the first category, we felt that population distribution and infrastructure, though 
they are implicitly modeled in Edmonds and Reilly, and explicitly in the IIASA study, 
deserve an importance as influencers of energy-environment interactions far greater than 
that indicated in the results of those studies and sensitivity analyses. Considerations such 
as the patterns in which energy is used, the structures available for implementing new 
energy options, and the location of energy users are all recognized as crucial in the deter- 
mination of final energy demand. While these models do capture some of these effects, we 
felt that their sensitivity to these issues was too low. 
We further felt that the entire field of long-term non-commercial energy use is 
grossly neglected. The nature of our ignorance about the noncommercial sector can be 
broken into three groups variables and their relationships. First, we found a clear lack of 
an understanding of the nature of the transition from non-commercial to commercial 
fuels, which in turn introduced some unrealism in these models' descriptions of LDC 
energy futures. Today, 70% of the world's people use 15-25% of its primary energy. 
Their transition to marketed fuels in the coming century will no doubt be critical. 
Second, in order to illuminate and perhaps model the transition, we felt that an 
understanding was needed of what the present and future availability of non-commercial 
fuels would be (in the form of fuelwood, dung, wind, solar, etc.) to various energy-using 
sectors. Third, we felt that some attempt would also have to be made to understand the 
long-term quantities and patterns of non-commercial fuel uses. 
In the framework described in the introduction to this section, we drew a distinction 
of key variables that might be critical to energy's impact on the environment without 
being critical to the actual future of energy demand and supply. The only such variable 
we felt the need to identify was the degree of pollution control, both structural (due to 
economic and use-pattern shifts) and technological, that may exist in the future. 
4.2.3. Comparison of t h e  results 
In this section we present the basic input data and the results generated by the 
models considered. Predictions of population growth shown in Figure 4.2 confirm a very 
narrow range of uncertainty attributed to this input variable (compare Edmonds et al., 
1985); predictions are almost the same in spite of different sources used by the authors. 
Some differences in GNP/cap values (Figure 4.3) between the models follow from different 
mathematical approaches to  GNP calculation. 
In spite of differences in model structures, there are no significant differences in the 
total primary energy predictions (Figure 4.5). This may indicate that the aggregated 
model results reflect the actual state of the knowledge rather than a specific model struc- 
ture. The values of primary energy/cap (Figure 4.6) are also very similar because of very 
small differences in the population predictions mentioned above. Differences across the 
models in energy efficiency (Figure 4.4) flow from different assumptions about energy 
efficiency increase. 
In Figures 4.7 through 4.9 the fuel mix evolution over the forecasting period 1975 - 
2100 is presented. Here we can also observe a general correlation between the models, 
especially for the period 1975 - 2025. The higher values of fossil fuels calculated by the 
Nordhaus and Yohe model are a result of the fact that only two fuel types 
(fossil/nonfossil) were considered by this approach. This implies a significant difference, in 
comparison to  the other models, in the year 2100. The existence of only two fuel types in 
this model implies very high substitution of fossil fuels by nonfossil fuels as a result of 
price increases in conventional fuels. 
All the results for the models considered are grouped in Table 4.3 which shows popu- 
lation and economic growth, total and per capita values of energy use, energy efficiency 
and fuel mix. Two different scenarios for the WEC and the IIASA model are taken into 
account. Table 4.4 presents the above results in a form of factors of increase from 1975, 
which make a direct comparison between the models possible. 
4.3. T h e  Models' Cons t ra in t s  a n d  Abilities t o  Serve as Tools for  Assessing 
F u t u r e  Envi ronmenta l  Impac t s  of Energy Use 
Through the summer, we have sought to identify key variables and actions to the 
energy field that would be crucial to develop interesting and consistent energy futures (see 
Scenario Appendix 1). As a final conclusion of this report we will present some thoughts 
on the use of these models in long-term, large-scale environmental studies. 
The environment is not in general an area of primary concern for the energy studies. 
The only part of it that is of concern is most often its function as resource base. Only two 
of the studies we have looked at, Edmonds & Reilly and Nordhaus & Yohe, went any 
further towards studying the impacts of future energy use and only the IIASA study had 
some form of environmental feedbacks, except for resource constraints. This is a serious 
lack because it is not unlikely that environmental concerns will be one determinant of the 
energy future. 
But if we keep this limitation in mind it is not unreasonable to  use these studies as a 
base for analysis of the environmental impacts connected with possible energy futures. 
The task of long-term environmental studies is just that: to try and use the knowledge we 
have, however uncertain i t  may be, to manage environmental interactions. 
The ability of the studies to serve as such tools are very dependent on their resolu- 
tions in time and space. To be able to say something about for example the acid rain in 
Scandinavia you need to  know something on the development of energy use in a about a 
dozen European countries, on at  least a five year resolution. For other impacts there are 
other resolutions needed. (For a further discussion see Piotr Holnicki's paper in the 
Appendix 5) What follows here is an assessment of the usability of the different studies to 
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Table 4.4 Factor increase in  the  energy project ions 
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Edmonds b R e i l l y  (DOE) 
UEC high 
1975 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
MOO 1.5 1.7 .7 1.9 1.3 
2025 1.9 2.6 .6 3.1 1.5 
K C  low 
Nordhaus & Yohe 
1975 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2000 1.5 1.7 .6 1.4 1.0 
2025 1.9 2.8 .5 2.8 1.5 
2050 2.0 3.9 .5 3.8 1.8 
2075 2.1 5.4 .5 5.0 2.4 
2100 2.1 8.4 .4 6.6 3.2 
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illuminate energy use impacts on the VECs. 
4.3.1. Space scale considerations 
On the global scale there are usually not any problems. With the exception for 
WEO, the studies all give the global fuel mix, which can be a tool to calculate the 
development of the concentration of C 0 2  and other climatechanging gases in the a t m ~  
sphere. 
But when we come down to smaller scales the real problems begin. The regions 
chosen are definitely not very often well-adapted to assess any environmental effects. 
More disaggregated regions than are most often offered are for example needed to analyze 
acid rain (part of a continent), land-use competition (national at  least) and water ques- 
tions (most often subnational). Some models allow further disaggregations (e.g. IIASA 
and the OECD Demand Model), but these are usually not easily accessible or usable, and 
are not included in the presentation of the scenario results. 
In several of the studies the data and forecasts concerning the industrialized world 
are much more elaborate and disaggregated than those of the developing world, which 
often are very crude estimates. This makes it impossible to come to terms with problem- 
complexes like biomass-deforestation in the developing countries. Only one study, WEC, 
touched for example on the use of non-commercial fuels, which in many parts of the world 
is the most important energy source. One can certainly discern a need for more ambitious 
studies of the energy future of the Third World. In such a study it would probably be 
impossible not to put more emphasis on the connections between energy use and environ- 
ment. 
4.3.2. Time scale considerations 
When it comes to timescales the main concern for global environmental studies is 
the very long-term perspective. For this most of our studies are insufficient. Only 
Edmonds & Reilly and Nordhaus & Yohe (for COz) really try to tell us something about 
the future towards 2100. The IIASA study gives some indications. 
In the short-term we are better-off. But here time-resolution is really important. A 
time resolution of, for example, 25 years as in Edmonds & Reilly is too long for most 
regional, medium to short term problems like acid rain and land-water-biota issues. 
We feel that additional work on the needs identified above would be extremely 
beneficial to the understanding of development-biosphere interactions in the energy field. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Surprise 
The important thing is to  try to  find surprises that have large-scale consequences 
both in time and space. To be able to have this the surprise event got to influence some 
basic structures in the environmental, technological, social, economical, political or i dee  
logical fields. But since we don't have any general frameworks for the scenarios yet we 
have tried to  connect the surprises as closely as possible to  the key variables and to save 
the more scenario related ones to  later occasions. 
1. LIFESTYLE CHANGES 
Important countries try the Lovins way. The high increase in energy use in connec- 
tion with urbanization could make it very hazardous to try to  foresee energy use expan- 
sion in LDC. The increase in primary energy use as a consequence of electrification. 
2. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
A Decisions not to  use nuclear power (or coal) 
B Decisions of producers not to  produce enough to balance demand, e.g. coal- 
cartel to  keep coal-use within an environmentally acceptable range. 
3. AN UNSTABLE ENERGY SYSTEM WITH SHOCKS REGULARLY 
A Nuclear: New Three Mile Island-accident 
B Price shocks 
APPENDIX 2 
The Different Energy Fuels Problems and Consequences for Societies 
Stefan Anderberg 
This paper focuses on and tries to  summarize problems, consequences and impacts of 
the use of the different energy fuels. It is a short development of a matrix on societal 
impacts of energy use. The matrix contained the following VECs: Health, Social Accepta- 
bility, Lnvestment, Distribution of Energy (centralized or decentralized use), Energy Avai- 
lability (distribution of energy use between generations and nations), Dependencies (Level 
of autonomy) and Political Stability (Security). On the other axis were the different fuel 
alternatives. The background is for each fuel to  assess the consequences if it  was t o  be, if 
not the leading so a very important fuel globally. Point of departure must be: 
- What are the possibilities (supply, substitution etc.) for this fuel in the future ? 
- What is needed for expansion of its use? 
In this part primarily investment and social acceptability are discussed. Then what 
would the consequences be: 
- Centralized or decentralized control and decision-making? 
- How independent can the various nations be? 
- Which are the critical dependencies ? 
- Could this create tensions in the social and political systems ? 
- What would be the consequences of long-term energy-use ? 
Some problems are general for all the different fuels: primarily the problem with the 
uneven distribution. For everything, energy resources, technological know-how, capital, 
etc. there are haves and have-nots. For industrialized countries it is often a main problem 
that they do not control the production of the energy fuels they use e.g. oil. For the LDCs 
it might be that  one has a lack of almost everything. Most important is perhaps the ina- 
bility to  develop appropriate technologies for the use of energy-sources one has got. 
The future 
The use of oil has severe restrictions in a long-term perspective. After the year 2000 
conventional oil will be more and more replaced by unconventional (e.g. oil shales). No 
higher market share than today will ever be possible. But oil is hard t o  substitute totally 
and as a liquid fuel it is very comfortable. Its dominant position as base for the industrial- 
ized society with built-up distribution, refining and consumption systems etc. will prob- 
ably make an active large-scale revolutionary transition from oil a less attractive alterna- 
tive than going on using it as long as possible, even with much more expensive and com- 
plicated production processes (see the different energy studies). 
Health 
Oil has direct health risks. The closest example is pollution, noise etc. from traffic- 
pollution. 
Social Acceptability 
Despite the obvious health-risks its necessity is not seriously questioned by the pub- 
lic. Investment would be needed both for production and to  continue to minimize the 
risks that  are connected with its use. 
Independence 
The base for oil use is a highly integrated technological and economical system, 
which is unique in history (Pimentel k Pimentel, 1979). Inside this system there are 
definitely limits for national and local decision making. For example, it is not possible for 
a small country t o  make environmental legislation on its own, set new standards, etc. (the 
car sector could serve as an example). Because of the economic linkages and the depen- 
dencies on technology and supply, all actors must adapt t o  the system. Other actions 
would result in high costs both for consumers and producers. As a base for the "dominat- 
ing technology" oil has a wide range of advantages in comparison with other fuels just by 
its widespreadness, developed distribution, higher competition etc. The possibility of 
decentralized use is one of oil's great advantages. 
Availability 
Oil has many important and valuable features and this will make i t  hard t o  find a 
really satisfactory substitution for it .  (Loennroth et  al., 1977, Goodman et  al., 1981). 
Would i t  be fair towards the coming generations in both the industrialized and developing 
world that  the industrialized countries in the years between 1950 and 2000 consumed the 
main-part of the world's petroleum resources? 
Political st ability 
A large part  of the reserves is in OPEC-countries. This is a fact that  made "the oil 
price shock" in 1973 possible. The distribution-net and much of the capital and know-how 
in oil- production, refining etc. are in the hands of relatively few multinational corpora- 
tions, a controversial fact. These corporations are hard to  control and a country could a t  
least in theory be left without oil. But based on what happened in 1973 and 1979, one 
must say that  the corporations made a relatively equal distribution of the available oil 
possible. Even if this often gave them high profits it somehow shows tha t  it is in their 
interest tha t  the markets have faith in them (IEA, 1982). 
OECDs dependence upon OPEC-exports is one of the reasons behind the fact tha t  
conflicts in the Middle East are of main concern for the whole world and that  the region is 
a main arena for confrontation between the superpowers. Events that  threaten t o  disturb 
oil-trade could make e.g. USA or some of its allies intervene. Inside OECD there are no 
open conflicts because of oil. One shares a common interest to have a stable and cheap oil 
supply and their own reserves are not that  big that  they can be anything else but a com- 
plement. 
Gas 
The future 
The reserves seem t o  be large enough to  support a greater use than today, although 
not enough to  really replace oil. 
Investment 
It is very dependent upon infrastructure in distribution-systems etc. This will delay 
large-scale use in LDCs (Haefele, 1981). 
Health and Social acceptability 
Gas has with careful treatment less environmental impact than oil and has therefore 
high acceptability. This might not be true for the domestical sector, but it depends often 
on how used people are t o  gas use. 
Dependency and stability 
Often very direct dependence between producer and consumer through the 
distribution-system. The important producers are some more than for oil. Important 
trade-linkages will go from the USSR to Western Europe and from North Africa to 
Western Europe (IEA, 1982). These might be used as weapons in a conflict but would of 
course have limited effects on the long-term. I believe that the long-term effects are 
greater from the gains in negotiation-position. 
Since implementation of a gas network can serve as an important tool for regional 
policy there could be a competition between different areas a t  the national level. 
Coal 
The future 
There are relatively large resources of coal. It is often expected to be used more both 
in relative and absolute numbers (See most of the studies in this report). Liquefied coal 
might replace oil (Haefele et al., 1981). 
Investment 
RED in for example new coal combustion techniques is needed to  make it socially 
acceptable (Global 2000). Decentralized use is possible, but for a considerable increase in 
coal use new international systems for control and distribution would need to be formed. 
Dependency and stability 
As we can see it now, increased coal-use would not create any new crucial dependen- 
cies east-west or north-south. The largest reserves are in North America, the Soviet Union 
and China. But an increased coal demand must be met with a considerable increase of 
coal a t  the world market. An often forgotten constraint on coal use expansion could be 
that the main exporters, which also have most of the reserves are a couple of industrial- 
ized countries, that would not be so interested in exporting unlimited amounts of coal: 
- A too large share of resource-exports might make their industry less able to com- 
pete (in the short run) (Foley & Loennroth, 1981). 
- There could be environmental constraints to a massive expansion like for example 
water availability. It is a serious constraint already today to  the coal industry in the USA 
(Hollander, 1981). 
- Environmental concerns and public opinion could be an incentive not to expand 
production too much. With a handful of the world's most powerful countries together in a 
such dominating position, it would not be to  strange to imagine some sort of agreement to  
limit coal use expansion because of the problem with the ever-growing GOz- 
concentrations in the atmosphere, especially if they do not have very large marginal 
profits in the coal trade. 
Nuclear Power 
The Future 
For LWR-fission a more dominating role than what is planned for 1990-95 is highly 
unlikely because of fuel availability constraints. Breeders might create a new situation. It 
could be the base for a long-term energy system (Haefele et al., 1981; Fortescue, 1982). 
Investment 
Everything that concerns nuclear power demands large investment, high- 
technological control and centralized decisions. In most countries this means the national 
level (Loennroth, 1977). In the short-term it is probably not an alternative for the LDCs 
(El-Hinnawi et al., 1983). 
Acceptabi l i t y  
To make its large-scale implementation possible it will be necessary to make a reli- 
able impression on the public. Primarily this demands an acceptable solution of the waste 
problem (See e.g. Global 2000 and IEA, 1982). 
Energy  A vai labi l i ty  
NP could relieve the pressure on other fuels and thereby maybe make more fossil 
fuels available for the LDCs. 
Dependency  a n d  atabil i ty  
More than fossil fuels, nuclear power requires national action to be implemented. 
There are international dependencies through the whole cycle. It is not unlikely that pres- 
sures are put upon countries that do not participate. Especially if they could give valuable 
contribution with e.g. fuel resources, waste storage, technology etc. As a protection 
against nuclear arms diffusion, attentats etc. more totalitarian centralized technocratic 
"police-state" system could be formed. This could create dangerous tensions inside the 
industrialized world that could be used in conflicts between north-south or east-west. 
Renewable Energy Sources 
There are many promising kinds of renewable energy fuels. Some do need much more 
research and development before being ready for commercial use while others are quite 
mature. All of them need to pass some kind of threshold to gain full economies of scale to 
be able to really penetrate the world market. This would need deliberate international 
action and cooperation. On the national level a closer matching between the objectives of 
energy planning and overall social and economic development might be needed for a 
development in this direction (See e.g. El-Hinnawi et al., 1983 and Kursunoglu et a]., 
1982). 
SOLAR 
There is a big difference between centralized and decentralized solar power. Central- 
ized would mean enormously huge technological installations. It would probably have 
similar consequences as nuclear power. A problem with it, is that it demands large invest- 
ments and that the countries most suited for it e.g. in North Africa will not be interested 
for a while. Decentralized solar for primarily heating can rather fast penetrate the market 
with some support from oil price development and eventually subsidies (El-Hinnawi et al., 
1983). 
BIOMASS 
Biomass can in different forms become an important fuel. But it is important that it 
will not compete with other essential activities like for example agriculture in the LDCs. 
The most suited areas here would probably be in the industrialized world, but today it 
still seems unlikely that for example Europe would try to substitute biomass for imported 
oil (Lyttkens and Johansson, 1981). 
HYDRO 
Hydro-power is already a mature energy source and very much developed. It will 
still be an important energy source regionally but with rather low expansion-possibilities. 
The other renewables like wind could come to play marginal roles globally but could 
become very important locally or regionally, especially in the developing world. In the 
field of renewable energy sources there are still many questions to consider before a large- 
scale implementation. But since such an implementation according to our studies seems 
remote it might be too early to see the real problems and to try to solve them. 
Final R e m a r k s  
This paper does not have higher ambitions than trying t o  summarize some of the 
problems with the different energy fuels from a societal point of view as they were shown 
in the studies we have reviewed. The energy situation and development are concerns for 
the whole society (the global as well as the local) and are intertwined with all different 
levels of human activity (see e.g. section 1.2 in this report). By political actions it is possi- 
ble t o  influence the energy system. If these actions are going t o  be wise, especially in a 
long-term perspective, they need t o  be based not only on economic or environmental con- 
siderations, but some sort of view of the whole societal web. This is one of the reasons 
why the sociopolitical framework never can be excluded more than temporarily. 
APPENDIX 3 
Detailed Description of the Edmonds and Reilly Model 
Michel Gelobter 
Energy demand 
The model uses population and GNP projections, based on assumptions about the 
fraction of the population in the active labor force as well as the productivity of labor, as 
indicators of economic activity and income. Regional primary energy prices are derived 
from world prices with region-specific add-on costs (mimicing transport costs, taxes and 
tariffs). The model may be manipulated, via these costs, to restrict trade or simulate 
various government policies. In the original model there are no such costs for non-traded 
fuels like solar, nuclear, or hydro-electric, but the newer implementation includes an 
environmental add-on cost that is applicable to  all fuels. 
The cost of secondary and tertiary (including electric) energy services is calculated 
next in a framework of interfuel, cost-based competition for shares of the electricity 
market. 
The regional demand for energy services is then calculated from a region-specific 
energy service price, and income and price elasticities of energy demand. Demand can be 
further affected by a parameter representing technological changelenergy productivity, 
that permits the incorporation of various assumptions about structural economic change 
and improved energy efficiency. Demand in the OECD regions is disaggregated into the 
three standard economic sectors: residential/commercial, transport, and industrial. In all 
other regions energy demand stems from one aggregate economic sector. 
The demand module then calculates a final energy demand for four secondary fuels 
based on this aggregate demand for energy services and the relative cost of energy produc- 
tion with each of these fuels. The relative fuel shares within this demand are again deter- 
mined in a market share competition framework. These demands for secondary fuels are 
converted into a demand for six primary fuels (oil, biomass and coal, gas, nuclear, hydro, 
and centralized solar) using appropriate conversion efficiency and production loss factors. 
Energy supply 
Three types of energy resource are defined: resource-constrained conventional 
(including conventional oil and gas), resource-constrained renewable (including biomass, 
centralized solar, and hydroelectric), and unconstrained (including coal, shale oil, and 
nuclear). Resource-constrained energy supply is determined using a (Hubbert, 1962) logis- 
tic depletion function for non-renewable sources. Renewables are modeled under an 
assumption of their eventually being exploited at their maximal rate. Unconstrained tech- 
nologies are assumed to be of a "backstop" type, meaning that they break into the market 
a t  certain price levels, and thereafter provide relatively unlimited amounts of energy, 
according to a price-supply schedule. (There is a further function that determines the 
extent of natural gas flaring, again due to  its importance as a source of CO,.) Most of the 
modifications to the model have occurred in this supply section, and have been geared 
towards increasing the economic aspects of this section, rather than making it  more com- 
plicated. 
Finally, synthetic fuels production from coal has an economic dependency on the 
cost of coal, oil and gas, the cost of conversion, and the market shares of primary energy 
demand that synfuels are able to capture through price competition. 
APPENDIX 4 
The IIASA final energy demand model MEDEE 
Structure and scenario assumptions 
by 
Christoph Schlenzig 
1. Objectives 
The scope of the final energy demand model MEDEE was to reflect structural 
changes in the socioeconomic and technological system affecting long-term energy demand 
and to analyze different consumption patterns of the energy sectors: household, industry 
and transportation. The idea was also to identify the potential market of each final energy 
form. A more technical consideration was that the model should be easily applicable to 
many countries. Figure A4.1 shows the general structure of MEDEE. 
2. Description 
MEDEE is an end-use-approach energy demand model that evaluates the influence 
of social, economic, technological and policy changes on energy demand. This model is 
only a calculation tool interrelating the major determinants of both useful and final 
energy demand. Although it contains many variables and relations, its structure is quite 
transparent and simple. 
The energy sector is disaggregated into a multitude of end use categories. For each 
category the useful energy demand is related to a set of determining factors which can be 
macroeconomic aggregates, physical quantities or technological coefficients. These general 
scenario parameters must be disaggregated in terms of economic structure (set of indus- 
trial products), demographic structure (economic growth, lifestyles) and technological 
structure (energy intensiveness, efficiency, market penetration). A macroeconomic module 
translates the socioeconomic scenario assumptions into specific activity levels of the end 
use categories. Final energy demand is then calculated for each category in three other 
modules (household/services, industry, transportation) using activity levels and techno- 
logical determinants. Because of the high level of disaggregation, few structural assump 
tions are built in the model. 
MEDEE does not deal directly with the problem of interfuel substitution, because 
this problem is treated within the supply model MESSAGE. For competing final energy 
sources no market penetration is modeled, it has to be introduced exogenously. Energy 
demand is not directly related to energy prices by means of elasticity coefficients - they 
are considered not applicable to the present energy situation because of trend extrapola- 
tion from the past. Price-energy relations are used in the scenario writing process as 
expert background information for modifying past trends. 
2.1. Resolution 
MEDEE works at  the national-level, it calculates the final energy demand for each 
country. Later on the results are aggregated to global regions. 
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Figure A4.1 General structure of MEDEE 2 (Source: Lapillone, 1978) 
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Figure A4.2 Determinants of useful and final energy demand (Source: Lapillone, 1978) 
2.2. State variables 
Socioeconomic: 
Total population 
Urban-rural split 
Economically active population 
Household size 
Specific heat requirements 
Type and size of dwellings 
Travel distances 
Automobile ownership 
Preferences for modes of travel (modal split) 
Load factors of transport means 
Macro-economic: 
GDP expenditure (private consumption, investments) 
GDP formation 
Activity level of industrial sectors (value added, GDP contribution) 
Technological: 
Efficiencies of energy using equipment 
Specific energy intensity of industrial sectors 
Fuel economy of vehicles 
Dwelling insulation 
Market penetration rates of competing energy sources 
2.3. Categories of final energy forms used in the model 
Substitutable final energy demand: 
Electricity (coal, nuclear) 
Solar 
District heat (coal, nuclear, geothermal) 
Coal 
Gas 
Liquid fuel 
Non-substitutable (specific) final energy demand: 
Electricity (for lighting, small engines) 
Motor fuel 
Coal (for steam engines) 
Coke (steel industry) 
Feedstocks (petrochemical industry) 
2.4. Disaggregat ion 
Transport Urban car, mass transport 
Intercity car, plane, bus, train 
Freight truck, train, pipeline 
Industry Agriculture 
Construction 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Household Space heating 
&Services Water heating 
Cooking + Cooling 
Electrical appliances 
Thermal uses 
2.5. D e r i v e d  va r iab les  and resu l t s  
Potential market shares of final energy forms Sectoral and regional final energy 
demand Secondary fuel mix Sectoral demand for energy services 
2.6. Scope  of  t h e  m o d e l  
- How will income growth affect energy demand through the increase of social needs? 
- How and when will the saturation of specific social needs influence energy demand 
in industrial countries? 
- How can a modification in the consumption patterns of the population affect energy 
demand? 
- How can the evolution of the international division of labour between industrial- 
ized and developing countries modify the industrial energy demand pattern? 
- How could a shift from automobile use to  public transportation (intercity and 
urban) affect energy demand? 
- What is the potential for energy conservation (increasing efficiency of energy using 
facilities)? 
- What is the potential market for new energy technologies (solar heating, heat 
pumps, district heating)? 
- How can price increases affect the energy demand or fuel mix? 
3. T h e  S c e n a r i o  W r i t i n g  A p p r o a c h  
This chapter describes the scenario writing philosophy and technique used by the 
Energy Systems Group a t  IIASA. 
3.1. S o m e  genera l  definit ions of  a scenario: 
- Scenarios are an aid t o  the learning process about smooth evolution of the energy 
system. 
- A scenario is a consistent description of a possible long-term development pattern 
of a country (economy), characterized mainly in terms of the long-term direction of 
governmental, socioeconomic policy. 
- A scenario specifies a logical sequence of events that  could transform the reference 
or base year state into the postulated future state. The postulated future state can 
represent the consensus of many experts or be outrageously absurd, provided that  i t  fol- 
lows from the  assumptions made. 
3.2. T h e  p r o c e d u r e  
- Identify the determinants of useful and final energy demand within the society 
(Figure A4.2 shows the determinants of useful and final energy demand). 
- Organization of these qualitative scenario descriptors into a hierarchical structure: 
how do "macr*determinantsa affect end use categories? (See Table A4.1) 
Table A4.1 Structure of qualitative descriptors in the MEDEE approach 
1. International Primary energy prices 
Environment Technological innovations 
New international economic order like: 
Strategy of multinational companies 
Policy of the developing countries block 
2. Slow moving 
trends 
Economic growth 
Human settlements 
Lifestyle features 
Industrialization type 
3. General policy of Transportation policy: Objectives 
the government Infrastructure 
General energy policy: Objectives 
Energy conservation 
Environment policy: Objectives 
Recycling, etc. 
4. Energy supply Final energy price characteristics 
characteristics Role of new energy sources (solar, 
district heat, etc.) 
5. Technologies Technological changes 
Energy efficiencies 
Fuel mix (market penetration) 
- Quantification of the qualitative scenario description. This is done by simplifying 
the system structure and grouping the determinants into the following variable categories: 
(a) Constants. They include initial values (from the base year) as well as some 
parameters which are assumed to be time constant throughout all model runs. 
(b) Exogenous determinants are factors for which the long-term evolution can be 
extrapolated from past and present trends in an acceptable way. This means that an 
intermediate evolution is postulated exogenously and assumed to be the same for all 
scenarios (e.g. population, load factors, etc.). 
(c) Scenario elements are variables whose evolution cannot be extrapolated from the 
past because structural changes might affect them in the long-term. 
In order to easily describe the scenario, the number of scenario elements is reduced 
as much as possible. Those factors, that only slightly influence energy demand are dis- 
carded and considered exogenous determinants. Figure A4.3 shows the conceptual scheme 
of the MEDEE approach, how these determinants are related to  the study elements. 
- The scenario writing (Figure A4.4) consists of formulating assumptions about the 
evolution of the scenario elements. To reduce the risk of inconsistencies one starts at the 
top of the hierarchy of qualitative deecriptors going to the bottom (see Table A4.1). 
- The quantification of qualitative scenarios must be carried out after a careful 
analysis has been made of the likely future evolution of the scenario elements. 
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Figure A4.4 Scenario writing in MEDEE 2 (Source: Lapillone, 1978) 
- The model translates the quantified assumptions (the "projection" of the 
socioeconomic evolution) in terms of final energy demand patterns. 
4. Development of a Scenario Using an Iterative Process 
- Make assumptions about basic input variables 
- Estimate final energy demand and supply in detail 
- Analyze results 
- Identify inconsistencies, unreasonable implications 
- Make appropriate changes to basic input variables (feedback) 
4.1. Guiding criteria in the IIASA study: 
- Consistency. Supply matches demand for each region, prices correspond to availa- 
bility, energy trade corresponds to energy use in various economic sectors. 
- Fkasonableness. Scenario projections in their totality must not be unreasonable 
judgement from experts. 
- Continuity. Assumed changes to historic trends develop in an orderly fashion 
(smoothness) . 
- Variation. Scenarios must span a sufficiently wide range in order to incorporate 
unavoidable uncertainties. 
4.2. QuaIitative description of the MEDEE scenario 
Population growth and GDP growth (macroeconomic development) are considered 
the main driving variables of the final energy demand. 
General Assumptions 
- Decreasing GDP growth rates 
- No major changes in the sociopolitical environment or in 
lifestyles, except those that accompany economic development 
- Improvements in energy efficiency of facilities 
- Focus on the transition away from oil towards renewable energy sources 
- Strong energy conservation trends 
- Increasing energy costs and prices 
- Structural changes of economy towards a postindustrial phase 
- No breakthroughs of new energy related technologies 
- No major cost changes for energy producing or resource 
extracting technologies 
- No explicit constraints with respect t o  environmental problems 
4.3. Detailed description of the assumptions 
4.8.1. Population 
- Bare replacement level of fertility in developing regions reached by 2015 
- Change in the age structure 
- Increasing urbanization 
4.8.2. GNP 
- Decreasing growth rates 
- Growth rates of developing regions are higher then of developed 
regions 
- Developed regions: decrease of industrial and agricultural 
share, increase of the service share 
- Developing regions: increase of the industrial sectors share, 
constant service sector share 
4.9.9. Transpor ta t ion sec tor  
- Slow growth of personal travel in developed regions, reaching 
saturation level 
- High growth of personal travel in developing regions, far from 
saturation mark 
- Higher share of air travel in developed regions 
- Moderately increased use of public transportation 
- Greater economies of gasoline consumption of cars 
- Reduction of average load factors (especially in developed 
regions - less crowded transport means) 
- Considerable increase in freight transportation (2-4 fold) 
because of increasing industrial output 
4.9.4. Household & serv ices  
- Number of persons per household dropping in all regions 
- By 2030 in NA, WE/JANZ, 90% of the dwellings are centrally 
heated, 3@40% with air-conditioning 
- By 2030 in LA, Af/SEA, ME/NAf, 25% of dwellings require space 
heat, 17-19% are assumed to  use it 
- Service sector floor area increases quickly in all regions, 
especially fast in developing regions 
- Insulation improvements in new buildings (50% less heat losses) 
and of the existing housing stock (2@30% less heat losses) 
- Saturation for electrical appliances in households (NA, 
WE/JANZ, SU/EE), high increases in developing regions 
- Use of air-conditioning not limited to NA by 2030 but spread 
over all regions, applied especially in the service sector 
- Efficiency improvements for all fuels (1@25%) 
- Penetration of electricity, soft solar, district heat and 
heatpumps (extensive use of the latter, 4@50% in NA, SU/EE, 
WE/JANZ, 12% in DC) 
4.9.5. Industrial act ivi t ies  
- The overall final energy demand is obtained from the following: Distribution of 
value added among economic sectors. Energy intensiveness coefficients (energylvalue 
added) of each sector. Penetration of competing energy sources (electricity, district heat, 
heatpumps, solar energy, fossil fuels). Average process efficiencies. 
- The share of manufacturing activities out of total energy consumption decreases 
from 90-97% (1975) to 7690% (2030) in all regions 
- Decreasing energy requirements by improving efficiency and production processes 
and using less fossil fuels 
- Reduction of energy intensiveness due t o  modernization and structural changes by 
35-55% 
- Increasing efficiency in steal industry, reaching Japanese standard 
4.9.6. Agriculture 
- Agricultural GDP increases by a factor of 3.7-4.5 in LA, Af/SEA, ME/NAf, 2.2-2.5 
in NA, SU/EE, WE/JANZ 
- Low potential for expanding arable land in DC (LA, Af/SEA, ME/NAf) 
- Essential agricultural productivity improvements come from increases in the use of 
fertilizers, irrigation (underground water) and from mechanization 
- These improvements lead to a tenfold increase in agricultural energy intensiveness 
in developing regions, whereby the energy used to  produce fertilizers (2030: 2.8 
KWh/dollar = present value of developed regions) is counted in the manufacturing sector 
- Final energy demand increases by 37-45 times in developing regions, 2-2.4 times in 
developed regions 
- The share of agriculture in industrial energy consumption lies in the range of 3-5% 
(except for Af/SEA: 10-15%)) 1975: 1-4% 
1.3.7. Fuel use and fuel m i z  
Careful, intelligent, and selective use of fuels can be a highly effective means of 
energy conservation: 
- Liquid fuels to  be used primarily for premium uses as motor fuel and as feedstock 
for petrochemical products (share of premium uses from 64% in 1975 to 88-92% in 2030) 
mainly as a response to the relative price rises of liquid fuels 
- Shift towards coal and gas in developed regions for heat purposes in the industrial 
and household/service sector 
- Extensive use of renewable resources in developing regions. Organized commercial 
supply of charcoal and wood, agricultural wastes and biogas, 273-424 GW by 2030 in 
Af/SEA, 168247 GW by 2030 in LA. Nevertheless oil remains a major supplier of heat, 
although its share drops and is substituted by coal and gas 
1.3.8. Electricity use 
- The electricity use is demand driven in the near-term, but supply limitations 
impose constraints in the medium and long-term 
- Electricity enters modestly the domestic heat market (2030: 17% for NA, 
WE/JANZ) 
- Electricity slightly penetrates the industrial heat market (5-10%) 
- Electricity use for transportation (railways, urban mass transit, electric cars) is 
assumed to  increase (1-2% globally, 4 9 %  in Europe and SU) 
4.3.9. Soft solar 
- In region NA, WE/JANZ 50% of all new (post-1975) single family centrally heated 
homes and low rise service sector buildings are installing solar heating systems, which are 
50-70% solar and require 50-30% backup from oil, coal, gas 
- By 2030 nearly 40% of all households are using solar water heating systems 
- The ultimate contribution is limited by the market size - the demand for space and 
water heat in detached or low rise buildings is limited 
- Because of the lower heat demand in developing countries, soft solar heating sys- 
tems penetrate later and relatively slowly 
- Solar share of NA WE/JANZ LA,Af/SEA,ME/NAf 
Space heat demand (res.) 14% 7% 
Water heat demand 28% 28% 1 14% 
Service sector heat 6-7% 6% 
Industrial heat demand 10% 10% 4% 
1.9.10. Coneervation 
The ratio final energy demand/GDP continues to decrease for NA, SU/EE, 
WE/JANZ. It increases, a t  least initially, for the developing regions, but later on it levels 
off and even starts decreasing in LA, ME/NAf. 
- The demand reduction through conservation measures represent an important 
"supply" source (7.3 to 18.3 TW globally by 2030). 
- These savings are only achieved by improving efficiencies, not by cutting back 
energy demand. 
- Time constraints for conservation measures: it takes a decade to retool a major 
industry, a century to  replace a nation's housing stock. 
A P P E N D I X  5 
A Procedure  for Investigating Global Environmental  
Impacts  of Energy Sector 
Piotr  Holnicki 
1. Introduct ion 
Scientific investigation posits that long-term, cumulative environmental impacts of 
human activities are the basic determinants of sustainable development of the biosphere. 
However, we can observe that in most actual cases, long-term implications are analyzed 
at the global scale while short-term effects at  the local. This time-space correlation of 
models' scale of investigation is illustrated in Figure A5.1 (see Clark, 1985), where 
different scale phenomena, affecting air quality (a) or meteorological conditions (b), are 
grouped. 
For reasons mentioned above, global long-term environmental models play an impor- 
tant role in investigations of possible development scenarios and strategies. They give us a 
significant insight into the main sources of cumulative degradation of environment and 
therefore can provide us with knowledge for formulating optimal development policy. 
Large levels of uncertainty result in such large-scale modeling, since the global struc- 
ture of a model is usually only a very simplified picture of the real system. In addition, 
long forecasting periods form another source of uncertainty. 
One way of dealing with the problem is formal sensitivity analysis (Edmonds et al., 
1984) or uncertainty analysis (Edmonds et al., 1985; Nordhaus and Yohe, 19831, which is 
usually applied to a specific model, examining its structure and key variables. Some gen- 
eral remarks and definitions concerning a formal approach are presented in Section 2. 
Given sensitivity analysis results for a specific model (or a family of models with 
similar descriptors), we can consider which portion of the resulting sensitivity can be 
explained by real world variations and which is explained by a specific model structure. 
Consequently, we can try to modify the structure of the model in order to eliminate the 
most "vulnerable" elements. An example of such an "optimization", based on the combi- 
nation of two existing models (Edmonds and Reilly, 1985; Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983), is 
suggested in Section 3. 
Next, a calculation procedure is formulated in Section 4. In Section 5 the procedure 
is applied in the investigation of a very simple surprise-rich scenario. 
2. Uncertainty a n d  sensitivity in global energy modeling 
Numerous studies have addressed the issue of future global impacts of energy pr- 
duction (McDonald, 1981; Edmonds and Reilly, 1985; Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983). All of 
them are based on mathematical models which are more or less sophisticated. A 
schematic outline of such a model is shown in Figure A5.2. The basic determinants are: 
(i) input variables driving a system, (ii) state (or output) variables which uniquely deter- 
mine the state of the system at each time point - t ,  (iii) structural linkages between input 
and state variables, determined by mathematical relations and parameters. 
For reasons mentioned above, a large level of uncertainty exists as to the nature of 
the state variables. Even if an energy model structure accurately represents the system 
being modeled - uncertainty flows from the input variables and the model's parameters 
(Edmonds et al., 1984). Therefore, it is critical to know not only the prediction itself, but 

_X(t) - input vector 
Y ( t )  - state vector 
al, . . . , a k  - parameters 
t E [ To, T] - forecast. period 
Figure A5.2 The main descriptors of the model 
to  also have some notion of the uncertainty surrounding the forecast. Referring to the 
diagram shown in Figure A5.2, uncertainty may be attributed to input variables, parame- 
ters or a specific structure of the model. 
Sensitivity analysis is a classical technique which can be used for examining the first 
two types of uncertainty. The technique indicates the contribution of each variable or 
parameter to  the state (Y) variability. It is usually expressed as the percentage of varia- 
bility of the model's prediction explained by a normalized variance of a particular vari- 
able or parameter. For a general dynamic model, sensitivity to the respective input vari- 
able X can be characterized by the index: 
a vi 
Sx,(t) = - 0) ax, 
Xj = X; ;=I, ..., n) 
t E (To, TI. 
Sensitivity with respect to time independent parameters is characterized in a similar way. 
The presented formal approach can be utilized in simple mathematical structures 
which make a formal differentiation possible. In practice, sensitivity is investigated in an 
experimental way, as the ratio of the percentage change of the output to  the percentage 
change of the input variable (Edmonds et al., 1984). 
We must bear in mind that sensitivity depends on time and on the specific scenario 
being investigated. This is implicitly expressed by formula (2.1), where the sensitivity 
index Sz, is uniquely equation or a fixed time moment - t and a specified scenario - Xi. 
For this reason, a "cross sensitivity" index against alternative scenarios is an important 
indicator (compare Edmonds et al., 1984). 
In recent years, more complex, probabilistic uncertainty analysis has been developed 
(Edmonds et al., 1985; Gardner and Trabalka, 1985; Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983). The 
approach is to  recognize the set of key variables or parameters in terms of a percentage of 
uncertainty in the model's state explained by each them. This is done by specifying, for 
each variable or parameter, the full range of possible input values. Next, these are exam- 
ined in terms of a set of input scenarios. The emphasis is not to  resolve uncertainties into 
particular variables, but to  represent their current values and thus to  integrate them into 
the model structure in a consistent way. The process generates a range of possible paths 
for major state variables (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983). 
By attributing portions of uncertainty to  individual variables or parameters one can 
rank their importance (compare Edmonds et  al., 1985). Such a ranking is more useful 
than a classical sensitivity ranking because it reflects the full range of possible input vari- 
abilities rather than a single scenario (sensitivity can be useful if the prediction of a 
specific variable is precisely known). On the other hand, as i t  is shown in Figure A5.3, the 
indicator of uncertainty also depends on time. 
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Figure A5.3 Some parameters explaining uncertainty in 
primary energy use in the E R  model 
Analytical or experimental methods for examining the uncertainty attributed to  the 
structure of the model are almost non-existent. Once a basic structure is fixed, i t  can not 
be easily altered t o  make exploration of structural uncertainty possible. In the next sec- 
tion we try to  introduce some elements of structural analysis, discussing uncertainty in 
terms of two specific models. 
3. Application of sensitivity analysis to optimization of model 
structure 
Each model usually has a precisely determined domain of possible applications; i t  is 
built t o  give an answer to  a set of specific questions. Given the preliminary structure of 
the model, sensitivity analysis can provide useful information for the design of a reason- 
able formulation of spatial resolution, as well as for recognizing the most appropriate 
aggregation of key variables and parameters. Provided that  the precise range of the 
model's applications is known, we can try t o  "optimize" its structure. In other words, the 
objective is to  find the simplest structure sufficient for investigating problems which pro- 
vide the focus of the model. Sensitivity (or uncertainty) analysis enables us to  select a set 
of key variables, as well as to  determine a cross correlation between them - a very impor- 
tant criterion of variable aggregation. 
For illustrative purposes, we have analyzed the Edmonds and Reilly ( E R )  model 
(Edmonds and Reilly, 1985; Edmonds et al., 1985) and the Nordhaus and Yohe (N-Y) 
model (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983). Both models were built to investigate how global 
C02 emissions can be controlled by alternative long-term energy polices. The general 
structure of the models is similar, but they differ in their spatial resolution, their levels of 
variable aggregation as well as in differences in specific parameters. Both apply popula- 
tion growth rate and labour productivity as base input variables used to  calculate GNP 
and energy demand. The principal state variables are GNP, fuel prices and fuel mix. 
As far as the spatial resolution is concerned, the E R  model uses 9 regions; while the 
N-Y approach considers the world as one region. To illustrate some aspects of spatial 
aggregation let us consider population and GNP growth for the E R  regionalization, 
shown in Table A5.1. We observe a significant correlation among industrialized countries 
(Regions 1-4) and developing countries (Regions 6-9). China could be included in either of 
the groups. On the other hand, the highly aggregated N-Y model loses essential informa- 
tion about differences between industrialized and developing countries. This suggests that 
the optimal spatial resolution might be a two-regional disaggregation of the World (or 
three-regional with China handled by itself). This conclusion is confirmed by Table A5.2 
which presents differences in labour productivity between these two big regions. Labour 
productivity is one of the most important key variables in both models (compare Table 
A5.3 and Table A5.4). 
In Table A5.3 we present a ranked list of the most important key variables for the 
disaggregated E R  model, obtained through a very complex probabilistic uncertainty 
analysis. The numbers in the central column also indicate spatial regionalization of a par- 
ticular variable. We see, that in a disaggregated E R  model, the most important source of 
uncertainty is labour productivity, but this is considered only for two large regions. 
The N-Y model does not utilize an energy efficiency variable, while the E R  model 
considers only one aggregated value for the world. In general, we can also consider two 
distinct patterns of energy efficiency - one in industrialized countries and another in 
developing countries (McDonald, 1981) (see Figure A5.4). Regional income elasticity is 
disaggregated into 3 big regions, but significant correlation between the respective vari- 
ables: .7-.9 (see Edmonds et al., 1985:28), makes two-regional aggregation possible. 
The next three parameters in Table A5.3 explain relatively little uncertainty in the 
model's output. In addition, price elasticity is aggregated to  give one global value. Magni- 
tudes of environmental costs of coal and biomass can be distinguished for industrialized 
countries and developing countries, respectively. As a result, both variables would be 
disaggregated into two global regions. 
It is important to  note that population, which is the principal driving variable in the 
model, does not affect uncertainty. This fact is explained by only a narrow range of input 
uncertainty of this variable (compare Edmonds et al., 1985: 16). 
The above analysis shows that,  with respect to basic functions, the spatial resolution 
into 2 big regions - Industrialized Countries (IC) and Developing Countries (DC) is possi- 
ble and is likely to  be sufficient. Such an approach implies aggregation of variables and 
parameters in the E R  model into two regions. On the other hand, the overly aggregated 
N-Y version neglects many important differences in energy patterns. 
The list of ranked key variables in the N-Y model is given in Table A5.4. We can 
observe similarities with respect to  some variables presented in Table A5.3. On the other 
hand, high sensitivity of the price-induced elasticity of substitution of fossil by nonfossil 
fuel, as well as the elasticity of substitution of labour by energy is implied by a specific 
Table A5.1. Population and GNP growth for the E R  model (1975 multiples) 
(Source: Edmonds et al., 1985) 
UNITED STATES 
Population GNP 
1.000 1 .ooo 
1.189 1.877 
1.317 3.021 
1.347 4.505 
1.3664 6.699 
1.3664 9.720 
OECD REGIONS 
WEUR+CAN OECD PACIFIC 
Population GNP Population GNP 
1 .ooo 1 .ooo 1 .ooo 1.000 
1.176 1.978 1.201 2.701 
1.303 3.534 1.279 5.432 
1.365 5.709 1.305 9.121 
1.3872 8.490 1.3176 13.234 
1.3872 12.318 1.3176 19.202 
CENTRALLY PLANNED AND MIDDLE EAST REGIONS 
EUSSR 
Population GNP 
1 .ooo 1 .ooo 
1.196 1.815 
1.308 2.943 
1.351 4.442 
1.372 6.606 
1.372 9.585 
AFRICA 
Population GNP 
1 .ooo 1 .ooo 
1.745 3.069 
2.361 7.327 
2.758 13.806 
2.8807 23.787 
2.8807 39.025 
ACENPL 
Population GNP 
1 .ooo 1 .ooo 
1.370 2.665 
1.645 5.468 
1.770 10.335 
1.8081 17.376 
1.8081 28.507 
MIDEAST 
Population GNP 
1 .ooo 1 .ooo 
1.803 3.649 
2.448 8.959 
2.847 18.044 
2.9595 30.337 
2.9595 49.771 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY REGIONS 
LATIN AMERICA SOUTH & EAST ASIA 
Population GNP Population GNP 
1 .ooo 1 .ooo 1 .ooo 1 .ooo 
1.728 3.475 1.685 3.079 
2.298 9.005 2.226 7.169 
2.631 16.395 2.556 13.502 
2.7144 28.248 2.6504 23.263 
2.7144 46.343 2.6504 38.166 
Table A5.2 Initial (1975) labor productivity 
(Source: Edmonds et al., 1985) 
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Figure A5.4 Final energy per unit of gross domestic product for the 
high scenario in (a) developed, and (b) developing regions 
Table A5.3. Variables ranking in the E R  model. 
Variable or parameter Number of regions Uncert. rank. 
- 
Labour productivity 2 .14 - .27 
Energy efficiency 1 .16 - .19 
Income elasticity 3 .2 - .17 
Price elasticity 1 .1 - .2 
Environm. cost of coal 3 .1 - .2 
Biomass cost scale 1 .4 - .O 
Population 3 .O 
Table A5.4. Variables ranking in the N-Y model 
- - -  - 
Variable or parameter Variance 
1. Price elasticity of substitution 
fossil-nonfossil fuels 100 
2. Labour productivity 7 6 
3. Elasticity of substitution 
energy-labour 56 
4. Extraction cost of fossil fuels 50 
5. Production cost of energy 48 
6. Fuel mix among fossil fuels 31 
7. Population growth 22 
form of the production function - a fundamental relationship in the N-Y model (compare 
Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983:102). The overestimation of the importance of these two vari- 
ables arises because they are treated as power factors in two further equations (see 
Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983:104-105). Furthermore, the N-Y formulation of the production 
function implicitly aggregates labour and energy productivity growth in the labour pro- 
ductivity parameter, while the two component variables are not correlated in either case 
(Edmonds et al., 1985). These inconsistencies suggest some modifications in calculation 
of energy demand. 
The next two parameters in Table A5.4 refer, in general, to  fuel prices (they drive 
substitution between fossil and nonfossil fuels) and emission characteristics. Existence of 
only two fuel types in the model leads to high sensitivity among parameters controlling - 
by fuel prices - the substitution between them. 
Uncertainty attributed to  the fuel share among fossil fuels also suggests necessity for 
a more detailed disaggregation. Table A5.5 illustrates that in models focusing on C02  
emissions, dividing fossil fuels into two groups: (i) conventional fossil fuels (oil, natural 
gas, coal) and (ii) unconventional fossil fuels (synfuels, shale oil) is likely to be sufficient. 
This conclusion is confirmed, to some extent, by carbon emission predictions generated by 
the family of models listed in Table A5.6. We can observe that variability of fuel mix 
among conventional fuels does not significantly change the carbon emissions, whereas 
shale oil has strong effect. 
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Table A5.5. Carbon emissions from fossil fuel (Source: Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983) 
Fuel kg of c/lo9 J kg of C/mtce 
Petroleum 19.7 577 
Gas 13.8 404 
Coal 23.9 700 
Shale oil 41.8 1224 
Table A5.6. Aggregate carbon emissions (Source: Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983) 
Fuel proportions 
Proportions 
Carbon 
Year Source Oil Gas Coal Shale Emissions 
1975 Table 2.3 
2025 IIASA high 
IIASA low 
IEA 
RF F 
2050 IIASA high 
IIASA low 
IEA 
RFF 
Based on the remarks in this section, it would be useful to formulate a simplified 
global-scale energy model focusing on specific environmental impacts. One possible ver- 
sion of such a model is suggested in the next section. 
4. The simple calculation procedure 
Following the conclusions of Section 3 we shall try to formulate a mathematical 
algorithm for investigating global, long-term environmental impacts of energy production. 
We focus on C02 concentration but with a little modification the procedure could be 
applied to trace through other impacts. 
As we pointed out above, the world can be represented by: 
(1) Industrialized Countries (Regions 1-5 in the E-R model) - IC, 
(2) Developing Countries (Regions 6 9  in the E-R model) - DC. 
An additional advantage of such a resolution is that regions are homogeneous with 
respect to such global effects as: C02 concentration increase and greenhouse effect, global 
acidity and, use of biomass as a fuel. The regions cover both Hemispheres, that allows 
investigation of global differences in temperature distribution. 
I ENERGY SECTOR I ENVIRONMENT I 
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Figure A5.5 General structure of the algorithm 
Fuels can be aggregated into three groups: 
(1) Conventional fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas, biomass) - CF, 
(2) Unconventional fossil fuels (synfuels, shale oil) - SF, 
(3) Nonfossil fuels (nuclear, hydro, solar, renewable) - NF. 
A general structure of the algorithm, shown in Figure A5.5, is based on the N-Y 
approach combined with the elements of the E R  model which calculate GNP and fuel 
mix. 
Below we present the basic mathematical relations for a region (we use values of 
elasticities recommended by Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983). 
1) Prices of three types of fuels 
2)  Relative fuel shares 
3)  Total price of energy 
P ( t )  = S C ( t )  *PC(t)+S"t) *P"t)+Sn(t) *Pn(t ) .  (4.3) 
4 )  Part of GNP devoted for paying for energy ( 1  - d(t))  
d ( t )  = [k*P(t)-0.4 + 11-l. 
5 )  GNP prediction 
X ( t )  = X ( t  - A t )  * ( I  + a)*' * ~ ( t ) / L ( t  - A t ) .  (4.5) 
6 )  The final fuel mix 
P c ( t )  * ~ ' ( t )  + P b ( t )  *E"t) + Pn( t )  *En(t )  = ( 1  - d ( t ) )  * X ( t ) ,  (4.6) 
7 )  Total conventional fossil fuel consumption since to 
R ( t )  = EC(0)  + . . . + EC(t - A t ) .  
8 )  The feedbacks: energy-GNP and interregional cooperation-GNP 
The expressions used to  calculate C02 emissions and concentrations are given in 
Nordhaus and Yohe (1983). 
The variables used in (4.1.) - (4.8) are as follows; 
Ad.l 
P C ( t ) ,  P b ( t ) ,  P n ( t )  - real prices of CF, SF, NF in [75 dollar/mtce], 
Pi ,  P i ,  Pa - initial distribution costs in (75 dollar/mtce 1, 
P&, Pb, Po" - initial production costs in [75 dollar/mtce 1, 
h l ( t )  - rate of technological change in energy industry, 
h ( t ) ,  (i=2,3,4) - rate of technological change toward the respective 
type of energy, 
R - resources of CF in [mtce], 
R(t)  - total CF consumed in the period (t  ,t) in [mtce], 
Tc, T,, Tn - taxes in [75 U.S. dollar], 
g - depletion parameter, 
A t  - time interval in [nmb. of years]. 
Ad.2 
EC(t),  E8(t), En(t)  - consumption of CF, SF, NF in [mtce], 
SC(t),  S8(t), Sn(t)  - relative fuel shares, 
S;(t) , (i=1,2) - auxiliary factors, 
b;, (i = 1, 2) - scale parameters. 
Ad.3 
P ( t )  - total price of energy in 175 U.S. dollar] 
Ad.4 
(1-d(t)) - portion of GNP devoted for paying for energy, 
k - parameter identified for initial conditions. 
Ad.5 
X(t) - GNP in 175 U.S. dollar], 
L(t) - population, 
a ( t )  - productivity growth rate. 
Ad.8 
E(t)  - total energy consumption in [mtce], 
6E(t)- relative change of energy consumption, 
IR(t) - interregional cooperation indicator. 
The algorithm can be utilized to investigate various energy development scenarios, 
including alternative energy price polices, taxation polices (e.g. reflecting environmental 
costs), technological change. It can also simulate discontinuities within the system. An 
example of how the algorithm can be used to generate a "surpriseu-rich scenario is 
presented in the next section. 
5. Application of t he  a lgor i thm t o  price-discontinuity case 
In this section the algorithm of Section 4 is used to investigate temporal changes of 
fuel mix in a simple price-shock scenario. Between 1975-2075 we have assumed the popu- 
lation growth as presented in Table A5.7 (Edmonds et al., 1985). For simplicity we have 
not included energy-GNP feedback and assumed a "normative" interregional cooperation 
(Frisch, 1983) (IR(t)=IR(t-At)). 
The values of GNP reported in Table A5.7 are calculated according to  (4.5) for 
labour productivity values given in Table A5.8 (Edmonds et al., 1985; Nordhaus and 
Yohe, 1983). 
To simplify further, we consider only industrialized countries (the procedure for 
developing countries would be the same). We assume one global price for each fuel type 
and use data presented in Table A5.9 t o  set initial 1975 values of fuels consumption 
(Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983). 
The scale parameters in (4.2a,b) are then approximated as: bl=0.96, b2=0.42 (the 
last one relates to the initial values for the year 2000 - the "surprise" case described 
below). Next, applying the "normative" price evolution reported in Table A5.10 (compare 
Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983) we calculate by (4.2a-e) the percentage fuel mix for the 
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Table A5.7 Population and GNP forecasts 
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 
Population IC 1.14 1.36 1.49 1.54 1.56 
(lo9) DC 2.90 4.54 5.87 6.66 6.88 
GNP IC 4.89 9.10 14.8 22.0 32.8 
(1012 dollar) DC 1.05 3.56 9.41 17.06 29.33 
Table A5.8 Labour productivity growth rate 
Table A5.9 Energy consumption in the year 1975 
CF [mtce] 6.0 
SF [mtce] 0.0 
NF Imtcel 0.7 
Table A5.10 Relative fuel mix for the base case 
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 
P [U.S. dollar/mtce] 67 133 144 163 207 
P [U.S. dollar/mtce] 257 295 298 303 309 
s 1 - 1  0.89 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.61 
s [ - I  0.11 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.39 
s [ - I  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
surprise-free case. The calculated values are presented in Table A5.10. 
In the "surprise" scenario we consider a drastic limitation of nuclear production in 
the year 2000 as a consequence of two serious nuclear power plant accidents. The 
accidents lead to  a higher price of nuclear energy due to high environmental and social 
restrictions (T,). The price stabilizes over the next decades, largely through technological 
progress in solar and renewable energy production ( h ,  - negative). As a result of a rapid 
growth in demand for fossil fuels, coal exporting countries and OPEC countries fix very 
high prices for conventional fossil fuels, which continue to  rise over the next decades. The 
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Table A5.11 The fuel mix for the year 2000 
CF [mtce] 6.0 6.6 
SF [mtce] 0.0 0.7 
NF (mtcel 0.7 2 .O 
Table A5.12 Relative fuel mix for the "surprise" scenario 
price of shale oil falls due to  substantial technological progress (h, - negative). All the 
shock changes take place during the three-years period 2001-2003. The initial 2000 fuel 
mix is assumed as defined in Table A5.11. 
Thus, the formulas (4.2a-e) can be applied to calculate the relative fuel mix for the 
"surprise" scenario. The values calculated for the whole forecasting period are presented in 
Table A5.12. 
Using the data from Table A5.10 and Table A5.12, the amount of carbon released 
per unit energy can be calculated. Assuming an aggregated carbon emission for conven- 
tional fossil fuels of 600 kg of C/mtce (compare Table A5.5), we obtain the following C02 
emissions in the year 2075: 
a) for the base scenario 
0.61 * 600 = 366 kg of C/mtce, 
b) for the "surprise" scenario 
0.35 * 600 + 0.42 * 1224 = 724 kg of C/mtce. 
The fuel mix (total amount of energy by fuel type) can be calculated from Table 
A5.7, Table A5.10 and Table A5.12 by the set of equations (4.4) -(4.6) (the k = 2 value of 
the parameter in equation (4.4) can be estimated from the initial data). Using formula (7) 
in Nordhaus and Yohe (1983) - the cumulative C02 concentration over the forecasting 
period can be calculated. 
Note that the fuel-type disaggregation presented above focuses on global C02 
impacts. Using another criterion for disaggregation, the algorithm procedure can be 
applied to  an analysis of global acidity or other impacts. Extending the "surprise" 
scenario described above to DCs it is possible to  trace through a substantial increase of 
noncommercial biomass use, together with its environmental effects. 
The analytical procedure described above is not a precise mathematical model but 
rather an algorithm that can be applied to simulate environmental impacts of various 
energy strategies and scenarios. It can potentially be used as a part of an interactive 
biosphere game (compare Figure A5.5), which could investigate environmental impacts of 
energy production. 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a simple approach for analyzing alternative 
impacts of the energy sector on the biosphere. Further refinements should be focused on 
eliminating some of the formal weaknesses and inconsistencies within the algorithm 
presented. In particular, is important to  consider international trade of fuels, and to for- 
mulate more precise methods for model calibration. 
APPENDM 6 
A Simplified Explanatory Approach to the Global Energy System 
Chri8toph Schlenzig 
Objective: 
Time scale: 
Spatial scale: 
Time resolution: 
Spatial resolution: 
Fuel disaggregation: 
Input: 
Output: 
Calculating global primary energy demand 
(= consumption) and the fuel mix 
1975 - 2075 
Global 
Periods of 25 years 
8 regions 
6 fuels 
North America 
Latin America 
Europe 
Africa 
USSR 
Indian subcontinent 
Asia 
Oceania 
Synfuel + Shale 
Coal + Oil 
Gas 
Biomass 
Hydro + Solar 
Nuclear 
For every region and period: 
GNP/Cap 
Population figures 
Energy - GNP elasticities 
Yearly growth rates of energy demand 
Efficiency coefficients 
Fuel shares in % 
Production Ceilings 
Regional and global 
primary energy demand 
fuel mix 
GNP 
Energy/Cap 
Depletion times of resources 
The approach 
The simple modeling approach can be used to  get a quick overview of the energy sec- 
tor and a feel for the orders of magnitude of the main statistical indicators GNP, popula- 
tion, energy per capita and fuel mix. It cannot provide detailed analysis of energy futures. 
It should be a useful tool to learn about the critical components and evolutions of the 
energy system. 
The approach consists mainly in projecting the future Energy per Capita Consump 
tion (Ergcap). In order to  get these values we use two different methods (see Figure 
A6.1): 
In the -called economical approach we use GNP per capita projections and 
Energy-GNP elasticity coefficients. To crosscheck the GNP/Cap assumptions, total GNP 
is calculated in order to  judge reasonableness. 
In the technical approach we calculate the Energy per Capita from a yearly demand 
growth rate, reflecting lifestyle, income situation and fuel prices, combined with one 
efficiency coefficient for the 25 year period reflecting improvements in efficiency and tech- 
nological change achieved during this period. 
The assumptions of these two methods have to  be made consistent, which means 
that both calculated Energy per Capita figures should match each other. 
Together with population figures the regional and global primary energy demand is 
calculated. 
In order to assess some implications for the environment, the shares of different fuels 
have to be calculated. This is done by introducing the percentage split of primary energy 
demand into the different fuel types for every region. 
In order to check whether the scenario is realistic or not, annual global production 
ceilings (maximum production capacities) for every fuel type together with the global 
amount of resources are provided. 
Note: Unfortunately the task of creating the actual spreadsheet with graphic 
representation of the results has not been accomplished. 
STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 
elasticities 
Economical I 
approach I 
Technical 
approach 
Consistency +----+ 
GNP per 
capita 
check 
ErglCap 
A 1  A 
STEP 4 
A 
Demand 
growth rate 
Yearly produc- 
t ion ceilings 
for every 
Regional fuelmix 
(percentage) _, 
Efficiency 
coefficient 
resources 
Share of 
check 
GNP 
Primary - 
I resources I 
Population 
figures 
Consistency 
check 
lifestyle technological change 
income situation 
fuel prices 
every fuel 
in  [TW] 
Figure A6.1 A combined approach to energy modeling 
Consistency I 
energy 
demand 
A -b ErgICap 
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Set  of equations 
Step 1 
Economical approach: 
E r g C a ~ ~ ~ + ~  = ErgCapTi ( G N P C ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~ / G N P C ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ' T ~  
ErgCap Energy per capita (KW) 
Ti time period i (i=O is the base year) 
GNPCap Gross national product per capita (S) 
El Energy - GNP elasticity 
Technical approach: 
ErgCapTi+l = ErgCapTi EFFTi ( ~ + D e m ~ r w ~ ~ / l ~ ) ~  
Demgrw yearly growth rate of energy demand in % 
N number of years in one period (N=25) 
EFF Efficiency coefficient for one period 
(1975 EFF = 1) 
Step 2 
ErgCapTi PopTi = PrimErgTi 
POP Population figures 
PrimErg primary energy demand (TW) 
Step 3 
PrimErgTi F ~ e l j % ~ ~ /  100 = SharejTi 
Fuelj% percentage share of fuel j 
Sharej Share in TW of fuel j 
Step 4 
Dpltimej = Resj/Sharej~~=~075 
Dpltimej depletion time of resource j 
Resj amount of resources for fuel j 
These equations have to be evaluated for each period and each region. Afterwards 
the global results are aggregated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the Biosphere project at the International Institute for Applied Sys- 
tems Analysis is to  examine the long run sustainable development of the biosphere. 
Specifically can the world's biosphere support the possible course of socioeconomic 
development and how might future conflicts between development and the environment 
be managed? Focusing on the agricultural component of economic development, we were 
concerned with two key questions: 
(1) What are the implications of projected agricultural development for the environment 
and for the resource base; and 
(2) What consequences might degradation of the environment and the resource base 
have on the future of agriculture? 
No study of long-term global agricultural development has explicitly addressed these 
questions. However a number of studies have attempted to  define future scenarios and 
describe how agriculture may evolve. This paper is a critical review of six of these studies 
(listed in Table 1.1) in light of the above stated objectives. The studies are described and 
evaluated here to  define how each may contribute to  studies of long-term, large-scale 
environmental problems. Reviews of the individual studies comprise Section 2 of this 
paper. The descriptive section of each review reports the scale and resolution of the 
study, the basic approach undertaken, the key assumptions and major exogenous vari- 
ables of the study and finally the principal results or output. 
Ln the evaluation part, we first discuss the sensitivity of results of each study. The 
sensitivity of results is analyzed with respect to  both changes in initial values of ex* 
genous variables and altered structural assumptions and constraints. 
The second part of the evaluation responds to  the question, "What are possible 
sources of surprise to  the study?" An analogous question would be, "To what shocks are 
the results most vulnerable?" We take it as given that surprises or shocks will alter the 
setting established for each study. The question is intended to  identify explicit or implicit 
assumptions or model linkages that may change in a dynamic and uncertain world. 
Table 1.1 Agricultural Studies 
Agriculture-Toward 2000 (AT 2000) 
Agro-ecological Zones P r o j e c t  (AEZ) 
Food and Agriculture Organization of t h e  United Nations. 1981. Agricul- 
t u r e  toward 2000. Economic and Social  Development Se r ies ,  23. 
Rome : FA0 . 
Food and Agriculture Organization of t h e  United Nations. 1978-1981. 
Repor t s  of t h e  Agro-ecological Zones Pro jec t .  World Soil Resources 
Repor t  48. Vol. 1-Vol.4. Rome:FAO. 
Shah,  M.M. ,  G.M. Higgins, A.H. Kassam and G. Fischer.  1985. Land 
r e s o u r c e s  and productivity potential  - agro-ecological methodology f o r  
agr icul tura l  development planning. Publication number CP-85-14. 
IIASA, Laxenburg,  Austria. 
I Global 2000 
I Model of International  Relations in Agri- 
cu l tu re  (MOIRA) 
Council on Environmental Quality and Department of Sta te .  1980. Global 
2000 Repor t  to t h e  Pres ident :  Entering t h e  Twenty-first Century. Wash- 
ington, D. C. : U. S.  Government Printing Office. (Three  Volumes.) 
Linnemann, H., J. De Hoogh, M. A. Keyzer,  H. D.J. Van Heemst. 1979. 
MOIRA Model of International  Relations in Agriculture. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Company. 
I 
! Food and Agricultural Program.  1985. A background note  f o r  t h e  task  
/ f o r c e  meeting on economic s t ra tegies :  hunger ,  equity and growth. 1 Manuscript. IIASA, Laxenburg.  Austria. 
Food and Agricultural Program (FAP) Par ikh ,  K. S.  1981. Exploring national food policies in a n  international  
set t ing.  Publication number WP-81-12. IIASA, Laxenburg,  Austria. 
1 1 Future.  Washinnton. D.C. I 
I 
Resources  f o r  t h e  Future  (RFF) Crosson, P .  R. and B. Sterl ing.  1982. Resource  and environmental 
e f fec t s  of U.S. ag r icu l tu re .  Research p a p e r  from Resources  f o r  t h e  
The relevance of each study to  the objectives of long-term, large-scale environmental 
studies is evaluated next. A list of six environmental characteristics and four develop 
ment characteristics was compiled as an aid for assessing the contributions of the studies. 
This list is presented in Table 1.2. The reviews of Section 2 report whether or not these 
are addressed in the studies. The first six are broadly stated characteristics of the 
environment deemed critical for sustaining a high level of agricultural production. Both 
quality and quantity characteristics are included because, over the long run, the biosphere 
must both absorb the effects of production and supply future inputs t o  agriculture. 
Table 1.2 Environmental and development characteristics 
Environmental characteristics 
- land quality and availability 
- water quality and availability 
- ecosystem quality, including genetic diversity, 
assimilative capacity, and biota 
- air quality 
- climate 
- mineral resources. 
Development characteristics 
- wealth (GDP) 
- equity (income distribution) 
- nutrition 
- self-sufficiency. 
The development characteristics are important because different paths of agricul- 
tural growth have significantly different effects on human welfare. Producing enough food 
t o  feed the world's population is not sufficient t o  solve the problem of hunger. Distribu- 
tion is also critical. The production objective also fails t o  address other development 
goals. Thus a study of the future of agriculture must account for progress (or lack of pro- 
gress) in attaining broader social goals. Another reason t o  direct attention to  welfare 
indicators is that  often agricultural policies are designed with such indicators as goals. As 
a result welfare, agriculture and the environment become completely intertwined. 
Section 3 is a comparative evaluation of the six studies. The first part describes how 
the diversity among the studies contributes t o  a better understanding of agricultural 
development. Differences between the studies establish a broad base from which we can 
explore how could they be used in environmental studies. The second part compares the 
approaches and scope of the six studies to  identify differences and similarities. A list of 
common variables is also developed. The final part discusses a number of limitations and 
omissions common t o  the six studies. 
2. D E S C R I P T I O N S  A N D  EVALUATIONS OF A G R I C U L T U R A L  
S T U D I E S  
2.1. Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZ) and 
L a n d  Resources for  Future Populat ions ( L R F P )  
FAO. 1978-1981. Reports of the Agro-ecological Zones Project. World Soil 
Resources Report 48.Vol.l-Vo1.4. Rome: FAO. 
Shah, M.M., G.M. Higgins, A.H. Kassam and G. Fischer. 1985. Land resources and 
productivity potential - agro-ecological methodology for agricultural development plan- 
ning. Publication number CP-85-14. International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
2.1.1. Description 
"AEZ, the Agro-ecological Zones Project, was initiated in 1977 in the Soil Resources 
Management and Conservation Service of the Land and Water Development Division 
(FAO). The aim of the Project was to  assess the rainfed production potential of the 
world's land resources ..."( Higgins and Kassam, 1980:99). Later it was decided that the 
population supporting capacity of the world's land resources should also be addressed in a 
different study (LRFP). Another important aim of these studies is to  show that in the 
long run, land productivity may diminish due to some specific ways of using the land. 
Land productivity can be maintained only by preserving the land base. 
2.1.1.1. Scale a n d  resolution 
Since AEZ is a methodology whose goal is to assess the potential land based produc- 
tive capacity of the world, it is "timeless" with no fixed time scale. Spatially AEZ has a 
global scope built up from national or regional components. Only the developing world 
(117 countries) has been studied so far. However the methodology can theoretically be 
expanded to  the rest of the world. 
The data base of AEZ consists basically of a climate inventory (a generalized map 
from the monthly record of 3500 weather stations) and a soil inventory (FAO/UNESCO 
Soil Map of the World containing 106 soil units in over 5000 mapping units). 
The climate inventory contains 14 major climates. On the basis of moisture availa- 
bility, temperature, and length of growing period, zones are defined into which climatic 
regions are classified. The Global study, based on the FAO/UNESCO 1:5 million Soil 
Map of the World, used a 10,000 km2 grid. The Kenya Case study used the 1:l million 
exploratory soil map of Kenya that was digitized based on a 100 ha grid size. By com- 
parison, MOIRA uses 222 land units for the whole world while AEZ uses about 50,000 for 
the developing world alone. 
2.1.1.2. Approach  
AEZ determines potential biomass production of the most significant crops based 
upon their genetic characteristics, climate and natural resources. This maximal biomass 
production is reduced by agro-climatic, soil and input constraints and by the level of tech- 
nology. The principal steps of the AEZ methodology are: 
- climate 
- inventory of climate 
- evaluation of climatic requirements of crops 
- classification of climatic characteristics into climate 
suitability categories 
- calculation of the productivity of crops by agro-climatical 
zones - Length of Growing Period (LGP) 
- soils 
- inventory of soils 
- evaluation of soil requirements of crops 
- classification of soils into soil suitability groups 
(very suitable, suitable, marginally suitable, non-suitable) 
- combination of climatic suitability with soil suitability 
into land suitability by crops for three levels of technology 
- establishment of potential crop yield by crops at  three levels 
of technology. 
2.1.1.3. Key  assumptions a n d  exogenous variables 
A set of assumptions underlie the AEZ methodology. A number of these, including 
criteria for class definitions are listed below. 
(1) Soil suitability is fixed in the first classification, but conceptually could change 
in the soil characteristics, mainly degradation, through insufficient fallowing of 
land, soil erosion, salinity, alkalinity, and other changes which influence soil 
phases. Of these, only soil erosion has been formally accounted for. 
(2) The non-agricultural requirement for land is .05 ha. per person. 
(3) Only 50% of the biomass production is assumed to be available for human con- 
sumption. Further allowances are made out of this edible portion for seed, 
waste and feed. 
(4) Agro-climatic productivity may be increased by multiple cropping. 
Several important characteristics enter the AEZ methodology exogenously. These 
include the level of irrigated production (taken from the AT 2000) and the demand for 
food per capita when estimating carrying capacity. Other criteria are used to have alter- 
native solutions, by using different levels of technology and choosing different objectives 
in the optimizing process for the choice of crops and their growing areas. Three levels of 
technology are used: 
low: traditional seeds, no fertilizer or chemicals, no soil conservation and con- 
tinuation of presently grown crop mix on all potentially cultivable rainfed 
land 
high: improved seeds, recommended fertilizers and chemicals, full soil conserva- 
tion, most productive cropping pattern on all potentially cultivable land. 
intermediate: mix of low and high. 
2.1.1.4. Results 
The results of AEZ are presented with respect to the three objectives of the study. 
One set of results is with respect to the land base and production potentials. The AEZ 
study not only assesses the land base by region (Figure 2.1) but also shows the possible 
losses of that base due to erosion when no conservation practices are employed (Figure 
2.2). On the production side the study identifies potential crops, yields and input require- 
ments for various categories of lands and climates. 
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Figure 2.1 The potential land base for rainfed agriculture (million ha) 
(Source: FAO, 1984:lO) 
A second set of results links production potentials with consumption needs and 
development strategies for agriculture. The population supporting capacity of an area is 
derived in the study by comparing production with the per capita calorie and protein 
requirements of the present and future populations. Also, one can calculate the difference 
between actual and potential production with data on present land use and its intensity 
(area, cropping pattern, input level, etc.). 
Finally the results of AEZ can be used to  answer questions in connection with the 
choices in strategy of agricultural development in a certain country such as: "which area 
to  develop, how much to  invest, which crops to promote, what level of farming technology 
is appropriate ..."( Shah et al., 1985a: I . ) .  
2.1.2. Evaluation 
2.1.2.1. Sensitivity analysis 
No formal sensitivity analysis has been performed for AEZ. Checking AEZ's sensi- 
tivity to  a certain variable is difficult due to  the large size of the data base. Only one 
part of the evaluation (the crop module) has deterministic relations. This part uses the 
net photosynthesis equation. Other estimations, such as those coming from climatic, soil 
and input constraints and the level of technology are based on expert estimations and use 
either a certain fixed ratio or wide range of values. An external action can affect AEZ 
results only if it causes a shift in some property of the model, e.g. in climatic or soil pro- 
perties. 
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Figure 2.2 The degradation threat: losses of rainfed cropland (million ha) 
(Source: FAO, 1984:9) 
2.1.2.2. Structural analysis 
The structure and approach of AEZ is static. There is no feedback in it, so it is not 
suitable for simulation. Consequently environmental effects and the effects of develop 
ment cannot be evaluated endogenously. Instead, the climate and resource data base 
must be exogenously adjusted to determine the long-term outcome. This means that to 
introduce climate change it is necessary to redraw the climate map. 
Another characteristic of AEZ is that potential production of the land resources is 
overestimated because areas for growing non-food crops (eg. vegetables, beverage crops, 
etc.) and forest (for timber, fuel wood, etc. - except steep areas and conservation forestry) 
have not been considered. For this reason "the result of the study would have to be 
reduced by at  least one third" (Shah et al., 1985b:5). However, the LRFP Kenya Case 
study includes both non-food crops and forests. 
A third feature of AEZ is that "the study assumed average mean climatic patterns. 
The effect of neither the short-term weather fluctuations nor the long-term changes in cli- 
mate have been considered" (Shah et al., 1985b:6). Here again, the LRFP Kenya Case 
study includes rainfall distribution patterns and provides production estimates for "good" 
and "bad" years in addition to  the "average" years. 
2.1.2.3. Sources of surpr i se  t o  AEZ 
Surprises to  the AEZ study can come from two sources: climate changes and new 
crop varieties. It is not easy t o  assess the adaptability of present crop varieties to new cli- 
mate or soil conditions. Similarly the changes implied by a new crop or variety may be of 
a similar magnitude to  those coming from climatic shifts. 
2.1.2.4. Relevance t o  long-term, large-scale environmental  s tud ies  
AEZ is concerned with the environment only with respect to land suitability. Land 
suitability in turn is a function of environmental indicators such as climatic changes and 
soil suitability changes. The indicators are highly dependent on the technological level 
applied. 
The AEZ study covers the environmental and development characteristics of interest 
to  development-environment studies only indirectly: 
- Water quality and quantity 
Water quality can be affected through a changing soil phase (namely salinity 
phase), while water quantity can affect crop production. Water quantity more 
directly affects land area through irrigation. The extent of irrigation in AEZ 
comes from estimations provided by AT 2000. 
- Land quality 
One of the main objectives of the AEZ study is to assess the extent of land 
area which are suitable for the production of the most important crops. Suita- 
bility is defined as meeting the climate and soil requirements of a specific crop, 
and is further classified into very suitable, suitable, marginally suitable and 
non-suitable. Soil conservation activities are needed to  maintain soil suitabil- 
ity. 
- Land quantity 
On the basis of the land suitability assessment AEZ identifies the potentially 
usable land area by region/country. Potential usable land area can be dimin- 
ished by land degradation. Total land is adjusted using a rough estimate of 
non-agricultural land use, namely 0.05 ha per person. Thus potentially avail- 
able agricultural land is also a function of population growth. 
- Climate 
AEZ results are highly dependent on climate. Land suitability is established 
on a climatic basis. It can be concluded that any climatic changes may 
significantly affect the land suitability evaluations and through that the poten- 
tial production values as well. 
- Air quality, ecosystem quality and resource availability are practically not con- 
sidered. 
- Development Characteristics: 
AEZ compares several different land uses, crops and levels of technology in 
evaluating production potentials and the costs of production. 
To  summarize the appropriateness of AEZ for environmental studies: (1) The model 
does not deal realistically with environmental interactions, which must be introduced exo- 
genously. (2) In calculating net biomass production, the growth function is estimated 
only from climate parameters and genetic properties of the crops. All other constraints 
which reduce the potential production and yield are estimated by expert judgement. (3) 
All the model's constraints and structural elements are static (except soil loss and produc- 
tivity loss). 
2.1.3. O t h e r  re levant  publications 
Higgins, G.M. and A.H. Kassam. 1980. The Agro-ecological Zone Inventory In: Report on 
the Second FAOIUNFPA Expert Consultation on Land Resources for Population of 
the Future. Rome:FAO. 
Kassam, A.H., J.M. Kowal and S. Sarraf. 1977. Climatic adaptability of crops. Consul- 
tants' Report, Agro-ecological Zones Project. AGLS. Rome:FAO. 
Kassam, A.H. 1977. Net biomass and yield of crops. Consultants' Report, Agro-ecological 
Zones Project. AGLS. Itome:FAO. 
Kassam, A.H. 1979. Agro-climatic suitability classification of rainfed crops. Consultants' 
Report. AGLS. Rome:FAO. 
Wood, S.R. 1980. The allocation of irrigated areas and production of agr+ecological 
zones. Consultants' Report. AGLS. Rome:FAO. 
The following studies pertain to  the estimation of population supporting capacity in 
AEZ: 
FAO/IIASA/UNFPA. 1983. Potential supporting capacities of lands in the developing 
world. Technological Report of Land Resources for Population of the Future Pro- 
ject, Rome:FAO. 
Shah, M.M. and G. Fischer. 1980. Assessment of population supporting capacities. In: 
Report on the Second FAOIUNFPA Expert Consultation on Land Resources for 
Population of the Future. Rome:FAO. 
Shah, M.M., G. Fischer, G. Higgins, A.H. Kassam and L. Naiken. 1985b. People, land and 
food-production potentials in the developing world. Publication number CP-85-11. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Food and Agriculture Organization. 1984. Land, food and people. Rome: FAO. 
2.2. Agr icu l ture  Toward 2000 ( A T  2000) 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 1981. Agriculture Toward 
2000. FAO, Economic and Social Development Series, 23. Rome. 
2.2.1. Descr ipt ion 
Agriculture Toward 2000 (AT 2000) is the result of a four year study completed in 
1981 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. An early draft of 
the work was published in July 1979 and contains an extended summary. 
The study analyzes the implications for world agriculture of population and income 
growth up to  the year 2000. It proposes a strategy for the development of world agricul- 
ture to  abolish world hunger by the end of the century. It recognizes that increased food 
production alone will not solve the hunger problem: distribution of agricultural products 
also needs improvement. 
2.2.1.1. Scale  and resolution. 
The unit of analysis is the individual country with 90 developing countries studied in 
detail (China is not included in the detailed analysis). Thirty-four developed countries 
are aggregated and studied in less detail. Analyses of the latter production, input and 
investment requirements rely mainly on existing trends. China is examined only with 
respect to possible future agricultural trade. 
2.2.1.2. Approach 
AT 2000 sketches a global framework for future world demand, production, trade 
and nutrition. National and international policy actions and options which enable agri- 
culture to contribute to overall economic and social development are considered. 
The model is normative and demand driven. Demand for food and agricultural 
export products is derived using socio-economic objectives as constraints. AT 2000 
analyzes quantitatively three scenarios for agricultural development. Instead of producing 
a forecast or projection the study describes requirements for achieving development goals. 
For each of the 90 developing countries the analysis covers a variety of crops, land classes, 
and technologies. 
Food demand is projected for 27 groups of commodities for 131 countries. For each 
of the 90 developing countries, production is analyzed for 28 crops, 6 livestock products, 6 
classes of rainfed and irrigated land, 9 levels of current inputs and 26 investment items. 
Twenty four production techniques are distinguished, based on 6 landlwater resource 
combinations (based on the AEZ study) and 4 management levels. For each management 
level a production technique represents a certain yield level, and is associated with a com- 
bination of input factors (24 in total, i.e. 6 land types x 4 management levels). 
The model first projects food demands at the national level. Then the potential agri- 
cultural production is assessed. Projections differentiate between developed and develop 
ing countries, and between crops and livestock. The estimates of country-specific produc- 
tion levels and required inputs are based largely on expert judgement of yield levels for 
each crop and land class. Both present and possible future combinations are accounted 
for. 
The AEZ study (see section 2.1) is used to analyze the land base and production 
potentials. Production targets are derived taking into account total demand, self 
sufficiency and export targets, and the projected national production. From projected 
demand and input requirements, resource requirements are calculated including area of 
land in each class, labor, and capital inputs. This gives rise to the net trading position of 
each country. World trade balance is achieved by iterative output adjustments largely by 
the developed countries. 
Three scenarios were evaluated in AT 2000: 
(1) trend: production and consumption of agricultural products is extrapolated 
from past trends between 1963 and 1975; 
(2) scenario A: an optimistic high growth scenario in which the global economy grows 
in accordance with the UN International Development Strategy (UN, 
1980); 
(3) scenario B: a moderate growth scenario in which current trends of economic growth 
improve. 
2.2.1.3. Key aeeumptione and exogenous variables 
The scenarios have six assumptions in common: 
(1) world population will grow according to the UN medium variant of population 
growth (UN, 1985) which estimates the world population in the year 2000 to be 6.2 billion 
people; 
(2) developed countries adopt an equilibrating role in world trade; hence imbalances 
are corrected mostly by production adjustments in the developed countries; 
(3) relative prices are held constant, therefore production is driven by changing 
demand not changing prices; 
(4) demand is a function of population and economic growth; 
(5) agricultural growth cannot exceed 3-4% per year in the long run (20 years), 
hence non-agricultural GDP growth must be substantial to meet projected overall GDP 
growth rates; and, 
(6) all technologies in use by the year 2000 are already known. 
In addition, scenario A assumes realization of the International Development Stra- 
tegy, developing countries improve their self sufficiency ratios in basic foods and increase 
their exports. Developed countries also continue their growth rates and maintain self 
sufficiency ratios at  the late 1970 levels. 
Population and GDP growth rates are the key exogenous variables in AT 2000. 
Values for these variables are shown in Table 2.1. The table also lists a number of study 
results such as growth in demand, production, consumption and required inputs. Factor 
increases of the variables are shown in Table 2.2. The results are presented graphically in 
Figures 2.3 to 2.9. 
2.2.1.4. Results 
Continuation of past trends leads to a situation in which per capita production levels 
in many developing countries stagnate or decline. Demand for imported food also will be 
low due to slow growth in average incomes. Consequently socio-economic conditions in 
the developing countries worsen: the number of undernourished people increases from 435 
million in 19741976 to 590 million in 2000, landlessness increases, size of landholdings 
decreases, and distribution of income becomes more unequal. Increased pressure on the 
land degrades natural resources and lowers their productivity permanently. The poorest 
countries have cereal deficits and must import food from the developed countries. 
In scenarios A and B population and per capita income growth cause demand to 
increase by 29% and 17% respectively. The difference in caloric intake between developed 
and developing countries decreases. In scenario A all developing countries have sufficient 
supplies to feed their populations adequately, provided rapid economic and production 
growth is supported by other measures such as increased employment, and improved 
income distribution. To attain the consumption and production objectives of scenarios A 
and B a set of technological achievements and institutional and policy changes is needed. 
Production is doubled in scenario A and nearly doubled in B. In both scenarios A 
and B 80% of the increased production is provided by crops and 20% by livestock. Expan- 
sion of arable land accounts for 25% of the increase, increased cropping intensity for 14% 
and higher yields for 60%. Fertilizer and commercial energy use will be 4 to 5 times higher 
in 2000 than in 1980. 
Scenario A projects a reversal of the existing pattern of agricultural trade which is 
now increasingly dominated by exports from the developed countries. Scenario B only 
modifies this pattern. Intra group trade is not studied. Under both scenarios imports in 
the developing countries increase steeply. Exports must increase as well to improve the 
agricultural trade balance, employment, and farm income. Improved market access is 
essential to reach these goals. 
Table 2.1 Growth rates in % per year (1980-2000) for exogenous variables, results and 
required inputs for three scenarios of AT 2000. 
Trend Scenario A Scenario B 
DC LDC* WORLD DC LDC WORLD DC LDC WORLD 
Ezogenoue variable8 
Population 0.7 2.0 1.7 0.7 2.0 1.7 0.7 2.0 1.7 
GDP - 4.5 - 3.8 7.0 4.4 3.2 3.6 5.7 
Reeulto 
Aggregate demand 
agric. products - 2.9 - 1.2 3.7 2.3 1.2 3.2 2.0 
Gross agric. 
production 1.5 2.8 - 1.1 3.7 2.3 1.2 3.1 2.0 
Calorie supply** - 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 
Number of under- 
nourished persons** 1.2 
Agric. prod./capita 0.4 1.0 0.6 
Required input8 
Arable land 
Irrigated land 
Fertilizers (NPK) 
Labour (man-days) 
Biocides 
Energy 
Capital inputs 
Notes: 
* LDC's = the 90 study countries, except for population growth rates and agricultural produc- 
tion per capita, which include China. 
**  For total calorie supply and number of undernourished persons, growth rates are valid for the 
period 19752000. 
2.2.2. Evaluation 
2.2.2.1. Sensitivity analysis 
AT 2000 seems to be very sensitive to changes in its key exogenous variables as is 
shown by the outcomes of the three different scenarios. Sensitivity cannot be determined 
precisely because of the large number of subjective parameters used. It is not clear which 
parameters form part of the formal model and which are incorporated subjectively. 
Table 2.2 Factor increase of exogenous variables, results and required inputs between 
1980 and 2000 for three scenarios of AT 2000. 
Trend Scenario A Scenario B 
DC LDC* WORLD DC LDC WORLD DC LDC WORLD 
Ezogenoue variable8 
Population 1.14 1.50 1.40 1.14 1.50 1.40 1.14 1.50 1.40 
GDP - 2.46 - 2.14 4.06 2.41 1.90 3.13 2.05 
Reeulte 
Aggregate demand 
agric. products - 1.80 - 1.27 2.09 1.55 1.27 1.90 1.49 
Gross agric. 
production 1.35 1.75 - 1.25 2.08 1.55 1.27 1.87 1.49 
Calorie supply** - 1.09 1.03 1.05 1.21 1.10 1.05 1.15 1.06 
Number of under- 
nourished persons** 1.36 0.60 0.90 
Agric. prod./capita 1.11 1.29 1.17 
Required inputs 
Arable land 
Irrigated land 
Fertilizers (NPK) 
Labour (man-days) 
Biocides 
Energy 
Capital inputs 
Notes: 
* LDC's = the 90 study countries, except for population growth rates and agricultural produc- 
tion per capita, which include China. 
** Factor increase between 1975 and 2000, not marked: factor increase between 1980 and 2000. 
2.2.2.2. Sources of surprise to AT 2000 
(1) Latin America has been assigned a major role in producing food for a growing 
world population. Social instability would substantially decrease food production in this 
part of the world. 
(2) Debt defaults may disturb international relationships and decrease the interna- 
tional trade which is a critical element in reaching the goals of this normative study. 
(3) Economic recession in the developed world may decrease the percentage of GDP 
allocated to aid, again a major component of the New Economic Order assumed in AT 
2000. 
Figure 2.3 Increase in aggregate demand for agricultural products 
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Figure 2.4 Increase in gross agricultural production 
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Figure 2.5 Increase in production per capita in the 90 study countries (1975=1) 
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Figure 2.6 Number of undernourished persons in the 90 study countries (1975=1) 
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Figure 2.7 Increase in irrigated area in the 90 study countries 
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Figure 2.8 Increase in total fertilizer use in the 90 study countries 
Figure 2.9 Increase in energy used in agriculture in the 90 study countries 
(4) Rapid rates of penetration of new technologies could alter the study's results. 
Penetration is assumed to  take 20 years in AT 2000. Relevance to long-term, large-scale 
environmental studies 
Pressure on the environment as a result of the proposed development is not expli- 
citly analyzed. However, the enormous increase in inputs projected in the study will 
surely affect the environment. Input requirements such as water, land, chemicals, energy 
and capital are given in the study and can provide a basis for analyzing environmental 
impacts (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and Figures 2.7 through 2.9). 
2.3. Model of International Relations in Agriculture (MOIRA) 
Linnemann, H., J. De Hoogh, M. A. Keyzer, H.D.J. Van Heemst. 1979. MOIRA 
Model of International Relations in Agriculture. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Company. 
2.3.1. Description 
MOIRA, the Greek goddess of fate, is the acronym for a global agricultural model 
developed by a group of Dutch agronomists and economists to examine world hunger. 
The authors address two main questions: 
(1) Can the world grow enough food to feed 8 billion people? 
(2) What policy actions can be taken to ameliorate world hunger? By when? 
The first question stems from the Malthusian concern with production limits. A 
theoretical model is developed to  estimate potential world food product ion. 
The second question stems from the observation that world hunger results primarily 
from insufficient purchasing power rather than insufficient production. A sectoral simula- 
tion model is developed to describe the causal processes of world hunger. It is this 
economic model which actually bears the name of MOIRA. 
2.3.1.1. Scale and resolution 
Potential world food production is estimated on the basis of 222 soil regions, varying 
in size from 2.5 to 400 million ha. These are aggregated for presentation purposes into 6 
geographical regions: 
North and Central America 
South America 
Asia 
Africa 
Australia and New Zealand 
Europe 
The evaluation has no time dimension since relations are presumed to be static. 
MOIRA is made up of 106 geographical units. Most are individual countries, how- 
ever some have been aggregated as groups. There are 103 market economies and 3 cen- 
trally planned economies. Results are frequently presented in 7 regions but their composi- 
tion is not specified. The regions are: 
Developed countries: 
North America 
European Community 
Developing countries: 
Tropical Africa 
Middle East 
Southern Asia 
Centrally Planned economies 
Projections are made up to  2010, using 1965 as the base year. Calculations are made 
for time periods of one year. 
2.3.1.2. Approach 
F w d  Production Potential: Potential world food production is estimated by deter- 
mining the availability of agricultural land and applying a theoretical maximum rate of 
photosynthesis. The photosynthetic rate depends on climatic conditions. 
Economic model: MOIRA is a mathematical model using both recursive and simul- 
taneous equations. Countries which each have two sectors (agriculture and non- 
agriculture) are linked by an equilibrium model of international trade in food. 
Production in t e r m  of consumable protein is modeled for the agricultural sector as a 
whole, while consumption is differentiated by income class and sector. 
Both production and consumption are functionally dependent on the domestic price 
of food which is influenced by government intervention in domestic markets. Effective 
demand per income class and sector a t  given prices is compared to a nutrition norm to 
judge the extent and distribution of hunger in each country. 

3. sectoral income distribution 
4. fish catch and distribution 
5. technological parameters in agriculture. 
Other structural parameters: 
1. between country income distribution 
2. consumption patterns by income class 
Weather induced variations in yields are exogenously imposed, assuming a constant 
weather pattern. The disturbance factor is region-specific, with a 7 year cycle replicating 
observed fluctuations in the period 19661972. 
In specifying the structure of centrally planned economies, MOIRA presumes produc- 
tion targets are set to  reflect consumption needs of the desired income level. As long as 
the implied agricultural growth rate does not exceed 4%, the only shortfalls are due to  
weather variation. Therefore centrally-planned economies are assumed to  be self-sufficient 
as a group. 
MOIRA is driven by 3 exogenous variables: country-specific population growth and 
non-agricultural GDP growth, summarized in Table 2.3 and regional fertilizer prices. 
Growth of non-agricultural GDP is the most important exogenous variable: it determines 
non-agricultural income and hence directly influences food consumption, migration, and 
government price policy. This variable is derived from published country-specific overall 
GDP growth rates which were subjectively revised. The revision takes into account the 
country's wealth and size of the agricultural sector. 
Table 2.3 Exogenous assumptions in MOIRA 
World 
Population 
average annual 
growth % 
2010 total 
(10e9) 
Non-agric GDP 
average growth % 
1975-85 5 .O 
1985-95 4.8 
1995-05 4.5 
Rich countries Poor countries 
Developed Developing CPE 
market econ market econ 
Source: Table 8.2 (p.245) and Table 8.5 (p.247), Linnemann et al., (1979) 
Note: CPE = Centrally Planned Economies 
2.3.1.4. Results 
The food potential model estimates a physical limit of production equivalent to 30 
times the 1965 volume. While noting that the "ecological implications of such a massive 
expansion of agricultural production remain rather uncertain", the authors conclude "at 
least in the coming decades- world food supply need not be endangered by upper limits set 
by mother nature" (Linneman et al., 1979:8). 
Nevertheless MOIRA shows that continuation of present trends will increase world 
hunger threefold between 1975 and 2010 despite a threefold increase in world production. 
Tropical Africa and Southern Asia remain the major food-deficit regions. Trends are 
toward decreased self-sufficiency among the developing nations and increased importance 
of North America as an exporter of basic foods. 
MOIRA simulates two types of policy measures to  reduce world hunger and malnu- 
trition: 
(1) redistribution of available food, 
(2) stimulation of food production in the developing countries. 
Results of the policy simulation runs are summarized below: 
Type Policy Outcome 
1 Reduction of food consump Lower food prices, decreased 
tion by the rich incentives to  agricultural pro- 
Liberalization of international 
trade 
duction, and increased total 
world hunger. 
1 Food aid and distribution to Eliminates hunger if food is 
underfed groups purchased at  market prices and 
given away. 
2 Stabilization of inter-national Stimulates production in poor 
food prices countries, reduces world 
hunger but increases food 
deficit in urban areas. 
2.3.2. Evaluation 
2.3.2.1. Sensitivity analysis 
A series of sensitivity runs were made with MOIRA. Each of them was based on the 
assumption of a 50% reduction in a specific exogenous variable or parameter. Reduction of 
the non-agricultural economic growth rate causes much lower market prices in the agri- 
cultural sector and increases world hunger by 35%. Reduction of the population growth 
rate results in a decrease of world hunger by 30%. Gradual reduction of income inequality 
outside agriculture reduces hunger by 50%. However, the impact of reduced inequality in 
the agricultural sector cannot be examined in this model. 
The authors conclude that "all simulation runs with alternative assumptions regard- 
ing exogenous variables have one thing in common: if policies remain unchanged, the 
number of people who cannot obtain sufficient food will increase" (Linneman et al., 
1979:303). 
No sensitivity analysis was carried out for the food production model. 
2.3.2.2. Structural analysis 
The distributional features in MOIRA are static: they remain fixed at the 1965 pro- 
portions. This precludes any change in relative income distribution which could be inter- 
preted as social development. MOIRA is very sensitive to the fixed disparity ratio because 
it is the target of government policy and plays a significant role in determining domestic 
prices and consequent production incentives. 
Sectoral income disparity is the outcome of market and political forces in which the 
political forces are considered to be predominant. Recognition of this is realistic and 
MOIRA's use of the disparity ratio to capture the role of government policy in the agri- 
culture sector is elegant. Each country is constrained to achieving its 1965 disparity ratios 
by interfering with domestic price levels within a country-specific budget constraint. How- 
ever maintaining a fixed disparity ratio implies: 
(a) the 1965 level was politically optimal; and, 
(b) no change occurs in the relative power of the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the society. 
The authors include their own evaluation of MOIRA's limitations and weaknesses as 
a model. Points of relevance to development-environment studies include: 
1. Neglect of interactions between: (a) environment and agricultural development, 
(b) economic development and income distribution (which may influence agricul- 
tural development strategies) and (c) demographic development and the food 
situation. 
2. Lack of differentiation of agricultural products. 
3. Weak empirical basis and artificial modeling dynamics (the centrally planned 
economies were presumed to be self sufficient and were excluded from the world 
food system). 
2.3.2.3. Sources of surprise to MOIRA 
(1) Major shifts in the relative power or income distribution of countries over time 
would change the disparity ratio and hence the target of government price policy. In 
principle this can be considered in MOIRA by altering structural constraints. 
(2) Widespread adoption of aquaculture or other less conventional food sources 
would affect the demand for agricultural production. 
(3) A change in the proportion of non-food agricultural production due for instance 
to increased production of non-food export crops or energy crops. 
(4) Restriction of world trade which would force countries to adopt a self sufficiency 
policy both in food and energy. The world market would no longer balance supply and 
demand. 
(5) Crop failures arising from events which did not occur in the 1965 to 1972 years, 
such as prolonged drought in the Northern Hemisphere. 
(6) Increased participation by the centrally-planned economies in world food trade. 
(7) Change relative productivity in the long run due to climatic shifts. 
2.3.2.4. Relevance to long-term, large-scale environmental studies 
MOIRA does not directly address the pressure that agriculture exerts on the 
environment. Most of the environmental characteristics in MOIRA are treated as static 
resources after an initial quantitative assessment. However MOIRA can shed some light 
on the conflicts. Taken in conjunction with other land base data the study can be used to 
identify potential levels of erosion and contamination. Consider a region where MOIRA 
indicates there is rural hunger and a land study shows marginal land available. We can 
assume that  land will be used and probably degraded. For instance if high levels of 
hunger prevail in the agricultural sector of arid countries it can be concluded that  
desertification is advancing rapidly. 
For the purposes of development-environment studies MOIRA has 6 main draw- 
backs: 
(1) the time horizon is only 2010; 
(2) i t  takes no account of environmental/ecological consequences, constraints, and 
feedbacks including degradation, hazards of monoculture and urban encroach- 
ment on arable land; 
(3) it takes no account of energy as an input into agriculture; 
(4) i t  does not distinguish between intensive and extensive uses of land as a means 
t o  increase agricultural production; 
(5) non-food agricultural production is treated as a fixed fraction of total agricul- 
tural output; and 
(6) fish production is treated as a constant, no allowance is made for a contribution 
from fish farming (aquaculture). 
Despite these flaws, MOIRA also has a number of contributions and insights t o  make 
t o  studies of development-environment interactions. Possibly of more use than the 
reported model results, is the information that  can be gleaned from incidental calculations 
or by inference when compared t o  other models or the real world: 
(1) The relative inherent productivity of regions is derived by comparing the broad 
soil regions. This is a more useful result than the absolute numbers of land avai- 
lability and food production. 
(2) Soil specific development costs are given in Table 2.4 and column 7 of Table A2 
(Linnemann et al., 1979:25-26). Less than 113 of the potentially arable land can 
be developed a t  less than average cost. Most of this land is in Africa and Asia. 
This suggests that  the enormous potential production envisaged from Latin 
America can only be obtained a t  very high development costs or alternatively 
high degradation if the requisite conservation investments are not made. 
(3) MOIRA stresses the importance of social and political factors in shaping 
development of the agricultural sector. Income levels are particularly important 
both in determining consumption and as targets for government policies. 
2.3.3. Data sources 
1. Soils: 
FAO/UNESCO (1974) Soil Map of the World, 1 :5,000,000. 
Stace, H. (1968). A Handbook of Australian Soil. Glenside. 
Dudal, R., R. Tavernier and D. Osmond (1966). Soil Map of Europe. FA0:Rome. 
2. Irrigation: 
Moen, H.J. and K.J. Beek, (1974), Literature study on the potential 
irrigated acreage in the world. I.L.R.I., Wageningen. 
3. Photosynthesis: 
Wit, C.T. de, (1965), Photosynthesis of leaf canopies. 
Agr. Res. Rep. 663, Wageningen. 
4. Population: 
Projections are from K.C. Zachariah and R. Cica, Population Projections 
for Bank Member Countries 197@2000 (World Bank, Development 
Economic Department, Population and Human Resources Division). 
The fast fertility decline variant was used in the standard run of MOIRA. 
5. Economic Growth Rates: 
Assumed economic growth rates are based on projections of total GDP 
derived from UN and World Bank reports. (W.Leontief, "Impact of 
Prospective Environmental h u e s  and Policies in the International 
Development Strategy" and IBRD, "Additional External Capital 
Requirements for Developing Countries"). 
These provide l@yearly overall GDP growth rates for 15 regions 
of the world with 3 variants based on different assumptions with 
respect to capacity and speed of adjustment of developing countries 
to new relations. 
2.4. Global 2000 
Council on Environmental Quality and Department of State. 1980. Global 2000 
Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-first Century. Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office. (Three Volumes.) 
2.4.1. Description 
Global 2000 was commissioned by the President of the U. S. to study the long-term 
implications of present policies, to establish a foundation for future planning, and to 
assess the current analytic capability of the U.S. government. 
Global 2000 projects trends to A. D. 2000 for population, GNP, climate, technology, 
food and agriculture, fisheries, forestry, water, energy, fuel minerals, and non-fuel 
minerals. Experts then assess the impacts on the environment of these projections. The 
environmental impacts of each of the above projections is considered in turn, forming a 
significant part of the study (Vol. 2, Chapter 13). Finally, the results are compared with 
those of other global models. 
For the purposes of the Agriculture group of the Biosphere project, we have concen- 
trated on examining the food and agriculture projections (Vol. 2, Chapter 6) and the asso- 
ciated environmental implications (Vol. 2, pp. 272-297). The basis of the food and agri- 
culture results is the USDA's Grain-Oil-Livestock (GOL) model, which is discussed in 
depth in Vol. 2, pp. 545-561. GOL is a static equilibrium model. Results generated by the 
GOL model use projections from other models for conditions in non-agricultural sectors. 
2.4.1.1. Scale and resolution 
The Technical Report (Vol. 2: 4556) discusses the scope of the research. The study 
considers the time period between 1975 and 2000. Food and agriculture projections are 
made for two points in time, 1985 and 2000. No estimations are available for intervening 
years. The study is global in scope, with a strong U. S. bias. This bias arises because the 
submodels used are agency models that were designed to assess impacts on the U. S. 
GOL uses region-specific models to estimate arable area, fertilizer use, and total food 
production and consumption. Output is reported for the regions and for assorted group 
ings (e.g. exporters, industrialized, centrally-planned, LDC's). 
2.4.1.2. Approach 
Global 2000 relied on various models that are used by different U. S. government 
agencies for their long-range forecasting. First, population and economic growth were 
forecast. These projections were used to determine demands for natural resources. These 
demands plus the direct effects of population and economic development were then used 
to calculate environmental effects. The process was not iterative, so the environmental 
effects did not influence population, the economy, nor the use of natural resources. 
The goal of the study is to determine the outcomes of present policies if these poli- 
cies were to continue unchanged for twenty years (except population growth, which is 
assumed to  slow due to of increased population control). Global 2000 assumes no innova- 
tive strategies for meeting the problems that it projects nor is there feedback from the 
problems to  policy mechanisms. 
The GOL model and methodology are discussed in Vol. 2 of the report (pp. 73-74). 
It is a conglomeration of 28 regional agricultural sector models. The 930 econometric 
equations describe grain, oilseed, and livestock demand, supply, and trade. The GOL 
model does not explicitly consider environmental issues, although they are discussed in 
the report. 
2.4.1.3. Aeeumptions 
One of the greatest strengths of the Global 2000 report is its explicitness about its 
assumptions and its frankness about the limitations implied by them. To some extent 
these assumptions are presented along with the descriptions of the models. However, 
because Global 2000 is a collection of agency models, one needs a clear statement of the 
assumptions embodied in these models. Table 14-2 (Vo1.2:470-5) lists some of the 
assumptions that were used in each of the submodels and cross-references them. 
Many overriding assumptions were imposed upon the agency models to give them 
consistency. Among them: (1) There will be no change in public policy, except for 
increased population control. (2) The rate of technological growth will be linear, with no 
major breakthroughs and no serious setbacks. (3) There will not be any social opposition 
to  new technologies. (4) Trade will continue under present arrangements, with no disrup 
tions. (5) Climate will be similar to that of the past few decades. (6) Price will reduce 
demand when supply constraints are encountered. The assumptions of the GOL model 
(listed on Vol. 2, pp. 547) are consistent with those listed above. 
2.4.1.4. Results 
According to  the study's projections, the world in A.D. 2000 will have 6.35 billion 
people, with population growing at  1.77 % per year. Per capita income will be rising at  
1.53 % per year. However, this global aggregation hides the fact that the gap between the 
rich and poor nations will increase. 
Global 2000 projects a 90% increase in food production occurring between 1970 and 
2000. This will mean a per capita increase of 15%. Intensification of agriculture (i.e. 
higher inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation, and mechanization) will account for most 
of the growth in production, although in the developing world, much of the increase will 
come from cultivating more land. For example arable land will expand only 4% globally 
but will increase by 21% in Latin America. 
Table 2.4 lists the population and per capita income growth rates that were used to  
drive the GOL model, along with rates of fertilizer use, amount of arable land and yield 
variations. These are given for Western industrialized nations and centrally planned coun- 
tries, LDC's, and for the world. For the same four groups Figures 2.10 through 2.13 show 
the projected growth in food production. 
Table 2.4 Input and projections of the GOL mode l .  
Regions Indust r ia l ized Centra l ly  LDC's World 
planned 
Y e a r  1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 
Population g r o w t h  (Z/yr)  
(V.2:78) 
Alt. I 0.57 0.52 1.25 1.21 2.50 2.37 1.79 1.77 
I1 0.48 0.34 0.99 0.94 2.36 2.04 1.63 1.48 
111 0.67 0.71 1.45 1.43 2.66 2.71 1.95 2.05 
P e r  o a p  inaome g rowth  (5/yr)  
(V.278) 
Alt. I 3.41. 2.571 2.35 2.20 2.54 2.01 2.26 1.53 
I1 4.40 3.35 3.22 3.15 3.52 3.00 3.23 2.42 
111 2.41 1.77 1.50 1.25 1.55 1.03 1.29 0.66 
F e r t l l i z e r  ( thousand rnet r io  t o n s  
N, P205,KZO as 2:l:l) 
(V.2:lOO) 39900 84000 28125 77500 11925 58750 79950 220250 
F e r t i l i z e r  kg / a r a b l e  h a  
(V.2:101) 
Arable area (million ha)  
(V.297) 
Yield v a r i a t i o n s  d u e  to olirnate G) 
(V.2:79) 
Aggrega te  of r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t l o n s  
weighted by produot ion 
Calaula ted  us ing world yield s e r i e s  
- - - - - - - - - 
*,# P e r  o a p i t a  lnaome g rowth  rates are g iven  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d s  1975- 1985 (*) a n d  1985-2000 (#). 
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Figure 2.10 World food production 
(Source: Tables 6 7 ,  6 8 ,  CEQ, Vo1.2:91-94) 
. . Tear 
t6tai + per capita 
Figure 2.11 Food production in LDCs 
(Source: Tables 6 7 , 6 8 ,  CEQ, Vo1.2:91-94) 
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Figure 2.12 Food production in western industrialized countries 
(Source: Tables 67,68, CEQ, Vo1.2:91-94) 
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Figure 2.13 Food production in centrally planned economies 
(Source: Tables 67, 68, CEQ, Vo1.2:91-94) 
Population growth alone will double water demand. Expanded agricultural and 
non-agricultural consumption will lead to regional water shortages. 
Forests, mostly tropical, will be lost at the rate of 18-20 million hectares per year. 
This means that the LDC's will lose 40% of their present forests. Needs for fuelwood will 
exceed supplies by 25%, and stocks of commercial timber will decline 50% per capita. 
With forest clearing we will lose up to 20% of extant species. 
Table 2.5 Key assumptions of the three alternative scenarios in Global 2000. 
(Source: CEQ, 1980:Vo1.2:77) 
Scenarios 
Parameters I:A I:B I1 111 
Population growth 
(%/year) 1.8 1.8 
Per capita income 
growth (%/year) 1.5 1.5 
Petroleum prices Constant Double Constant Double 
(197476 by 2000 
level) 
Weather Variation in yields Good weather Bad 
comparable to last raises yield weather 
25 years. 1 S.E. above minus 1 
1950-75 S.E. 
yield series 
Growth in yields For all scenarios, the trend of the last 20 years is 
projected to continue, but yields are raised or lowered 
by weather and by the producer prices that are 
generated under each scenario. 
2.4.2. Evaluation 
2.4.2.1. Classical sensitivity analysis 
The GOL model considers four scenarios. Key assumptions of the scenarios are sum- 
marized in Table 2.5. Alternative I uses median projections for population and per capita 
income growth rates. Yields increase a t  rates consistent with the technological advances 
of the previous 20 years. Climate is comparable to the previous 25 years. Trade arrange- 
ments do not change. There are two versions of Alternative I. First, constant energy 
prices are assumed (197476 levels). In the second version these prices double by year 
2000. 
Alternative 11, the optimistic run, uses lower population and higher income growth 
rates, favorable climatic conditions and constant energy prices. Alternative 111 is the pes- 
simistic forecast. The direction of the variables is the reverse of Alternative 11. 
The differences between the results of the alternative scenarios are not large, that  is, 
the model is not very sensitive to  the relatively small changes in parameters of the four 
scenarios. 
Results of the four runs are presented in tables (Tables 6 7  t o  6 1 1 ,  pp. 91-96 of Vol. 
2). Figures 2.10 t o  2.13 show the increase in food production over time for the world, 
LDC's, centrally-planned and western industrialized countries. 
It is useful to  examine the sensitivity of the model to  the complete set of variables to  
establish upper and lower boundaries of estimates. However it is impossible to  discern the 
sensitivity of the GOL model to  variables individually. 
2.4.2.2. Structural analysis 
The key assumption of the study, that  is no change in public policy, although useful 
for the study's purposes, is not realistic. In view of the large number of undesirable conse- 
quences tha t  are forecast, policies will change. However, i t  is beyond the scope of the 
study t o  assess the effects of potential policy shifts. 
The main structural problem is that  the agency models are only weakly connected 
and all links are unidirectional. Projections from population and income models drive 
demand, which causes environmental impacts. This structural weakness causes several 
major problems. There is no feedback, for example, between environmental components 
and income growth. Also, there is no way to  deal with competing demands on the same 
natural and economic resources. Agriculture and energy production for example are 
assumed to use the same fixed stock of water. 
Despite attempts t o  achieve consistency between models, there are many discrepan- 
cies. Submodels use different patterns of regionalization with between 5 and 28 regions in 
the world. There are also inconsistencies in the values assigned to  the same variables 
(OTA, 1982). 
2.4.2.3. Sources of surprise 
There are many ways of introducing surprises into the study. The researchers were 
aware of this and discuss i t  in a separate section along with reviewers' comments. A list 
of surprises is presented in Vo1.2, p.715. Some surprises could be incorporated in Global 
2000 by adding feedback effects on natural resources. For instance, available arable land 
could be assumed t o  decrease due t o  land depletion and pollution of aquifers in irrigated 
areas (water withdrawals for energy development would have the same effect). Another 
approach would be to  violate the assumptions of the study where they are untenable. 
Given the rising disparity between rich and poor countries, crowding, scarcity of 
resources, and increases in the real price of food, the assumption tha t  there would not be 
any major wars could easily be violated. 
2.4.2.4. Relevance to long-term, large-scale environmental studies 
The greatest contribution tha t  Global 2000 can make to studies of development- 
environment interactions is i ts  detailed projections of environmental impacts. More than 
200 pages of the report were devoted t o  these issues. Limiting the study's usefulness t o  
long-term studies are the short time horizon and the structural problems. 
2.4.2.5. Ease of use 
Results of the study are presented in a very useful format. The Summary volume 
presents a concise overview of all aspects of the study. In Volume 2, the data, both input 
parameters and results, are presented in tables and graphs. These are straightforward 
and clear. 
On the negative side, the sheer bulk makes working through the study difficult; i t  
takes time t o  "get t o  know one's way around." Compounding the problem, the index is 
mediocre. 
Finally there is no model for a person to use. That is, there is no software. All the 
various agency models were used and coordinated by a large research team which has dis- 
banded. 
2.4.3. Other relevant studies 
Global Models, World Futures, and Public Policy: a Critique (O.T.A. 1982: 3439). - 
offers a concise review. 
2.5. Food and Agricultural Program (FAP), IIASA 
Parikh, K. S. 1981. Exploring national food policies in an international setting. 
Publication number WP-81-12. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
Food and Agricultural Program. 1985. A background note for the task force meeting 
on economic strategies: hunger, equity and growth. Manuscript. International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
2.5.1. Description 
The Food and Agricultural Program (FAP) of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) had three broad objectives (Parikh, 1981): 
(1) to  evaluate the nature and dimensions of the world food situation, 
(2) to  identify the underlying factors, and 
(3) to  suggest policy alternatives a t  national, regional and global levels. 
These objectives were supplemented with the qualification that  the solutions to  the prob- 
lems should be consistent with paths leading to a sustainable, equitable and resilient 
world. In order to  accomplish these objectives, two models have been developed. One is a 
world food policy simulation model dubbed as Basic Linked System (BLS). The second is 
a technological transformation (TT) model. 
2.5.1.1. Approach 
The BLS model consists of 18 country models, 2 country-group models (EC and 
CMEA) and 14 regional group models linked together in trade, aid and capital flows in a 
general equilibrium framework. This model shows how various economic agents adjust 
their behavior in response to  policies in a relatively short run and what are the longer- 
term dynamic consequences (FAP, 1985). The policies include domestic price policies, 
quantity rationing, trade restrictions, strategic reserves, normative consumption and 
import policies, plan target realization and self-sufficiency policies as well as free market 
policies. The basic frameworks for national and international models are presented in Fig- 
ure 2.14 and Figure 2.15, respectively. Figure 2.16 shows the computation of a domestic 
equilibrium. This model provides us with descriptive rather than normative future 
scenarios with alternative policy strategies applicable to  different kinds of economies, 
planned as well as market, in the international space. 
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Figure 2.14 A typical national model 
(Source: Parikh, 1981:22) 
The TT model is a recursive linear programming model which deals with the future 
technological transformation of agriculture constrained by resource availabilities and seri- 
ous environmental consequences. The conceptual framework is shown in Figure 2.17. 
Based on this framework regional case studies have been conducted in seven different 
countries: CSSR, USSR, U.S.A., Japan, Italy, Hungary and Bangladesh. This model is 
useful for short-term regional analyses rather than national or international analyses in a 
Figure 2.15 International linkage (Source: Parikh, 1981:25) 
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relatively long run. Some conceptual frameworks for different environmental issues have 
been developed through these regional studies. These cover water pollution problems in 
Japan and Czechoslovakia, soil erosion in Iowa, U.S.A., soil compaction and energy use in 
Hungary, and energy use and biomass depletion in Bangladesh. 
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2.5.1.2. Key assumptions 
The following are some assumptions of the BLS model. They are taken from the 
Canadian country model (Hassan and Huff, 1985) which is typical of the country models. 
(1) Expected prices are based upon the current target price and lagged prices. 
(2) The land input is treated as a simple time trend. Thus, the amount of available 
land increases in most regions over time. 
(3) Labor input to agriculture is estimated by a migration function driven by the 
per capita income disparity between agriculture and non-agriculture. The total 
labor force is obtained by multiplying population by the participation rate. 
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Figure 2.17 Technological transformation of agriculture: analytical 
framework concept (Source: Parikh, 1983:4) 
(4) The level of fertilizer application is a function of expected crop prices, fertilizer 
price and technology. 
(5) Technological progress is introduced in a mechanization function both through 
embodied capital stocks and by a time variable. 
2.5.1.3. Results 
Future production levels are the most important FAP outputs for environmental 
studies. Projections of world agricultural production up to the year 2000 are obtained 
from the BLS model based upon the assumption of no new government intervention in the 
world economy (see Figure 2.18 and 2.19). No substantial changes in the policies were 
assumed for this " reference run " scenario. Table 2.6 shows the assumptions on popula- 
tion and GNP used in the production estimations. Some production and calorie consump 
tion results are presented in Table 2.7. 
Figure 2.18 World agricultural production 
(Source: Unpublished computer output, IIASA, 1985) 
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Table 2.6 Assumptions on population and GDP 
Population 
Absolute values: 
(loe9) 
World 
OECD 
LDC(w/o China) 
Factor increases: 
(base year 1980) 
World 
OECD 
LDC(w/o China) 
GDP 
Absolute values: 
(1Oe12, US dollar 1970) 
World 
OECD 
LDC(w/o China) 
Factor increases: 
(base year 1980) 
World 
OECD 
LDC(w/o China) 
Source: Unpublished computer output, IIASA, September 1985 
2.5.2. Evaluat ion 
2.5.2.1. Classical sensitivity analysis 
The BLS model is sensitive to future population and GDP levels (especially capital 
available for investments) when they are used to make projections. The population level 
and its sectoral allocation is an important determining factor of labor input in the produc- 
tion system. Population also affects the level of income per capita which is an important 
factor in the demand system. 
GDP, together with savings and capital imports, influences the level of capital stock 
in production. GDP also plays a very crucial role in the demand system. Therefore, the 
levels of these variables have significant effects on the consequences of the study. 
2.5.2.2. Struc tura l  analysis 
The structure of the BLS model makes it one of the more realistic policy analysis 
models now available. It is a general equilibrium model which is capable of year by year 
simulation. Any policy change intervening in one sector of the system will not only 
directly affect that sector but also the rest of the system. The model is capable of measur- 
ing both effects. For example, the effect of a government policy decreasing soybean 
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Table 2.7 Gross agricultural production and daily calorie consumption per capita 
Gross agricultural production 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Absolute values: 
(10e9 US dollar 1970) 
World 390 435 485 537 593 
OECD 114 125 135 142 150 
LDC(w/o China) 138 161 188 221 258 
Factor increases: 
(base year 1980) 
World 
OECD 
LDC(w/o China) 
Daily calorie consumption per capita 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
- - -- - 
Absolute values: 
(Kcal/capita/day) 
OECD 3124 3184 3242 3288 3330 3369 
LDC(w/o China) 2263 2336 241 1 2489 2574 2664 
Factor increases: 
(base year 1975) 
OECD 1 1.02 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.08 
LDC(w/o China) 1 1.03 1.07 1.06 1.10 1.18 
Source: Unpublished computer output, IIASA, September 1985 Note: The number for daily 
calorie consumption per capita in 1975 was calculated based upon the future predictions. 
production in Brazil on the income of wheat producers in the U.S. can be estimated. 
Another advantage of this model is that prices are considered as endogenous vari- 
ables. Input substitution resulting from changing relative input prices (reflecting scarcity 
of the resources) can be explained. The effect is captured when future input allocations 
are estimated. Future scarcity of energy input might lead to the substitution of other 
inputs for energy. Lnput estimates enable us in turn to determine the future output lev- 
els. They also allow a separation of the effects of changes in relative input prices and of 
technical change on input substitution. 
The T T  model, being recursive is useful when a long-term effect is of interest. How- 
ever, this model can only be used in regional analyses. 
Available land is treated as a time trend function in the BLS model. This might be 
acceptable for a short run analysis. For a long run analysis, a future constraint on land 
expansion was implicitly considered. Land is also treated as a homogeneous factor. No 
allowance was made for differing soil types and/or climatic conditions. This is not a real- 
istic assumption but was needed to  keep the model simple. 
2.5.2.3. Relevance t o  long-term, large-scale env i ronmenta l  s tud ies  
BLS mainly deals with development characteristics while TT focuses on environmen- 
tal characteristics. TT was developed mainly to consider the environmental issues which 
cannot be captured well by BLS and thus does not examine development characteristics. 
The relevance of the models to  the identified characteristics is examined below: 
Development Characteristics 
(1) Wealth: The national and sectoral (agricultural and non- agricultural) income levels 
can be explicitly obtained from BLS. GDP per capita can be also calculated. 
(2) Equity: BLS has the capacity to calculate the sectoral distribution of food to  
different income classes. Education and health are not explicitly considered as indi- 
cators. 
(3) Nutrition: BLS is capable of estimating the future food consumption by different 
income classes in calorie and commodity terms. 
(4) Self sufficiency: BLS can show the level of self-sufficiency in food. Information on 
energy use is not explicitly available. Output stability also can be captured by BLS. 
TT does not deal with this kind of national level indicator. 
Environmental Characteristics 
(1) Water quality: BLS does not take water quality into account. However, TT is capa- 
ble of estimating the quality of water used for agriculture. In the Japanese case 
study (Kitamura et al., 1984), the estimation of the overall material balance of 
nutrients, nitrogen and phosphorus, is carried out for a small region. 
(2) Water availability: The amount of water supplied through irrigation systems could 
be calculated by using the endowment matrix for some countries e.g. India (FAP, 
1985). TT could predict future water availability. An example can be found in the 
Japanese case study. The future water demand is also calculated in the study. 
(3) Land quality: BLS does not give an explicit picture of the future land quality. How- 
ever, fertilizer use and yield levels for major crops are available as indicators of 
future land use patterns. TT gives a better description of land quality. A simulation 
model developed for a case study in the USSR would be a useful vehicle for a land 
quality analysis of a small region (Hassan and Huff, 1985:63). 
(4) Land availability: In BLS, the amount of land available for future agricultural pro- 
duction is calculated by using some functional forms. For example, a simple trend 
function is used in the Canadian model. In TT the available land is also explicitly 
estimated. 
(5) Air quality: BLS does not take air quality into account. It implicitly assumes that  
a change in air quality would not be a constraint for agricultural production. In the 
USSR case study of T T ,  air temperature is included while relative humidity and 
wind velocity are noncontrollable factors in the model. 
(6) Climate: BLS treats climate as an exogenous factor to  the system. The USSR case 
study of TT considers climatic conditions as noncontrollable factors. No feedback is 
considered in either framework. 
It seems that  modification is necessary for BLS to  take account of future resource 
constraints and feedback effects from the environment. This would require a large invest- 
ment of money and time. With TT, regional environmental studies can be undertaken. A 
crucial problem would be the aggregation of the results to  obtain a global scale picture of 
environmental change. 
2.5.2.4. Ease of use and realism of scenario design 
BLS can be used for scenario design if the user is interested in the relationship 
between economic policy alternatives and their future consequences. However, most of the 
indicators are related to development characteristics. Very limited attention is given to 
environmental characteristics. T T  can be used for scenario design if one is interested in 
the future environmental consequences in a small region. 
2.6. Resources for the Future (RFF) 
Crosson, P. R. and S. Brubaker. 1982. Resource and Environmental Effects of U.S. 
Agriculture. Research paper from Resources for the Future. Washington, D.C. 
2.6.1. Description 
2.6.1.1. Scale and resolution 
The Crosson and Brubaker study analyzes how agriculture will evolve in the U.S. 
through the year 2010. Production and environmental effects are analyzed for ten produc- 
ing regions in the U.S. with attention focused on crop production. Non-U.S. production 
and consumption through 2010 is also analyzed to establish world demand for U.S. pro- 
ducts. 
2.6.1.2. Approach 
The objective of the RFF study is to determine if long-term trends in U.S. agricul- 
tural production will put pressure on the environment and on land and water resources. 
A number of issues are evaluated in the stages leading up to this analysis. To assess 
future pressures one needs the levels of resource use and resource availabilities. However 
resource use depends on choices of inputs which is influenced by agricultural technology 
and crop yields. Quantities of inputs in turn depend upon output levels which are driven 
by demand for U.S. agricultural products. 
Projections of resource use and environmental effects are derived without the aid of a 
formal model. Instead, the authors rely on trends in prices, technologies, yields and input 
use to approximate the evolution of resource use in agriculture. Knowledge of environ- 
mental effects based on existing and past usage is then used to estimate the environmen- 
tal implications of the future use projections. 
The authors present only one scenario of growth and distribution of population and 
income from which agricultural demand is derived. A single scenario is also advanced for 
agricultural supply. Parameters for this scenario are drawn in part from existing litera- 
ture with adjustments described by the authors. The single scenario approach is chosen to  
avoid a "confusing array of projections." 
2.6.1.3. Key assumptions and exogenous variables 
Each stage of the study's analysis rests upon a number of key assumptions and exo- 
genous variables. Most important for the demand analysis are assumptions about 
regional population, income growth and demand elasticities. Future trade patterns, 
exchange rates and national agricultural policies also influence the demand for each 
region's output. The stage analyzing future production choices relies heavily on 
projections of future relative prices and availabilities of inputs. For the stage of project- 
ing resource use, assumptions regarding trends in input use and concerning future 
improvement in input qualities or use techniques are important. For example, fertiliza- 
tion patterns for crops and regions may change over time and there may be discoveries of 
better fertilizers or application procedures. Finally, the evaluation of future environmen- 
tal degradation depends upon assumptions about linkages between resource uses and how 
they affect the environment. 
2.6.1.4. Resul ts  
The results of the study can be divided into two categories. First are projections 
regarding resource use and agricultural production. The second category is projections on 
environmental effects. 
Resource and production projections focus on four crop categories which together 
account for the bulk of resource use and environmental effects in the U.S. These are 
wheat, feedgrains, soybeans and cotton. Two chapters of the study are devoted to  
describing how these crops will be produced. Estimates are presented for future yield lev- 
els and for technique choices by farmers. Future relative prices of inputs are discussed as 
the factors determining input mix and productivity. 
The study presents estimates of resource use by crop and by region. Resources and 
inputs are grouped in the broad categories of cropland, fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides 
and irrigation. Use estimates are derived by combining projections of outputs, techniques 
and yields with data on availability and use trends of the resources. Land projections are 
based mostly on demand and supply considerations whereas fertilizer and pesticide projec- 
tions rely largely on marginal effectiveness of the inputs and on developments in produc- 
tion techniques. 
Environmental effects of agriculture are traced in the study from the projected 
resource uses. Future fertilizer usage is discussed with respect to  nitrate levels in drinking 
water and eutrophication of lakes and ponds. Pesticide use is evaluated in terms of threats 
to  humans from toxins. Projections for future irrigation are linked with both salinity of 
surface waters and the build up of salts on croplands. Finally, cropland conversion and 
cropping techniques are discussed in relation to soil erosion. The environmental impacts 
chapter stresses the high degree of uncertainty in ( i )  linking resource use causally to 
environmental degradation, and (ii) limiting the discussion to problems currently 
identified. 
2.6.2. Evaluat ion 
2.6.2.1. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity of the results to  changes in the assumptions is not directly discernable 
due to  the discursive nature of the presentation. It is difficult for a reader to  alter a set of 
assumptions and trace through the effects. However it is possible to describe the type of 
effects that would result. 
Altering the population, income, income elasticity and production policy assump 
tions would act to  scale the demand for agriculture and the study's results up or down 
with little effect on the interlinking stages or relationships. A change in agricultural trade 
patterns however may lead to  a major shift in demand and move the U.S. away from 
export oriented crop production. 
A change in assumptions regarding input prices, availabilities or qualities may have 
a significant effect on resource use and the environment. For example cheaper or better 
non-land inputs could lead to  land intensive expansion of production, a reversal of the 
extensive mode of expansion described in the study. The resulting new input use rates and 
techniques would change the scale and nature of environmental effects. 
Results of the study are perhaps most sensitive to assumptions regarding linkages 
between resource use and the environment. New assumptions introducing additional 
damaging effects or eliminating links could dramatically alter the results. Given the 
uncertainty about these interactions such new assumptions are not unrealistic. However 
discoveries revealing major new degradations would probably also alter the control regu- 
lations, production technologies and resource use rates. 
2.6.2.2. Sources of surpr i se  
We were also interested in the sensitivity of studies to  surprises or discontinuities in 
trends not discernable from current trends. Crosson and Brubaker forecast trends into 
the future based largely on present trends and current knowledge about possible changes. 
No attempt is made to  incorporate surprise type shocks into their study. Such shocks can 
be introduced at  each stage of the study. On the demand end, changes in consumption 
habits or a reordering of trade policies and patterns could significantly alter agricultural 
demand. The next stage's estimates for production techniques and crop yields are 
extremely sensitive to  breakthroughs in technological research. New crop varieties or fer- 
tilization techniques could reverse input use and yield trends. These trends also depend 
on input prices which are projected to increase steadily throughout the thirty year period. 
Unforeseen scarcities or market interventions can suddenly change these input prices. 
Production techniques and input use are also sensitive to  major pest or disease outbreaks. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the environmental impacts are derived in the study 
from currently identified damages. It is possible that present input usage is causing an 
undiscovered type of damage. Crosson and Brubaker mention this possibility in passing 
with respect to pesticide effects on soil micro- organisms. 
2.6.2.3. Environmental components  i n  the RFF s t u d y  
Unlike most of the other agricultural studies described in this section the RFF study 
directly addresses issues of environmental degradation resulting from agricultural develop 
ment. Environmental quality is approached through projections of both resource use and 
production technologies. For example water quality is closely related to  actual quantities 
of fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation water used in agriculture. Equally important how- 
ever is the way these inputs are used including such considerations as use rates per acre 
and the method and timing of application. By combining estimates of both quantities 
and techniques for specific crops and regions, the study draws conclusions about possible 
threats of eutrophication, nitrate levels, toxins, and salinity. 
Land quality is addressed principally through the soil erosion issue. As with water 
quality, erosion possibilities are derived from estimates of both the quantity of land that 
is cultivated and how that land is used. Salt accumulations with irrigation and possible 
damages to  soil micro-organisms from insecticides are also discussed. 
Land and water quantities are not dealt with explicitly but are implicit in the dis- 
cussion of future relative prices of inputs which in turn determine input use. Scarcities of 
energy and mineral resources are handled in the same way. Major loss of soil and water 
resources is not expected in the U.S. by 2010 given projected use rates and production 
techniques. 
Ecosystem quality is handled in part by the water and land quality themes. Atten- 
tion is drawn to the persistence of chemicals in the ecosystem and the distribution and 
concentrations of environmental damages. 
Indicators of economic development are used as exogenous inputs to the RFF study. 
Income growth and national self sufficiency enter the study to project world demand and 
supply which are then used in estimating the demand for U.S. agricultural output. The 
issues of air quality, climate change, equity, and nutrition are not addressed in the Cros- 
son and Brubaker study. 
2.6.2.4. Relevance to long-term, large-scale environmental studies 
The study is probably most useful for studies of development-environment interac- 
tions in defining an approach to identify agricultural activities relevant to  the environ- 
ment. It focuses not only on what resources are used but also on how and where they are 
used. This information is critical in evaluating the environmental impacts of agriculture. 
The interim steps leading to the environmental impact chapter identify the types of ques- 
tions that must be asked in any environmental study. Of particular value are descriptions 
of how and why various production techniques and input mixes will be selected by farm- 
ers. The regional choices of crops, inputs and techniques are also important. This analyt- 
ical procedure can be employed by others with interests in different regions or with 
differing initial assumptions of population, incomes or technical change. 
For the immediate purpose of evaluating long-term sustainability of worldwide agri- 
cultural development the study leaves many important questions unanswered. Two key 
limitations are the focus on the United States only and the selection of a single develop 
ment scenario. One cannot look up or extrapolate for global environmental effects or 
easily incorporate new scenario assumptions. Instead, the analysis must be repeated. 
Also the study does not deal with longer term effects of agriculture on the environ- 
ment. For instance, levels of contamination that may not pose problems in the year 2010 
may accumulate to significant proportions by 2030 or 2040. This may be true for 
nitrification and eutrophication levels or the effects of organophosphorus pesticides. 
Another uncertainty is the long run availability of resource inputs. Crosson and 
Brubaker find U.S. resources adequate through 2010 but what about sustainability beyond 
that year given water and land degradation? Also environmental problems elsewhere in 
the world could greatly expand demand for U.S. output. With international trade in agri- 
cultural goods the issue is one of global not regional resource availability. 
2.6.3. Reviews 
1) Batie, S. in Food Policy. 9,1:85. Feb 1984. 
A description of the study's contents and analytical approach to the problem. 
Emphasizes that "the book is designed for professionals" and not recommended for a 
"lay reader." 
2) Beattie, B. in American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 65,4:838. Nov 1983. 
A description of the objectives and contents of the study. Beattie criticizes the 
choice of rejecting a formal modeling approach. Such an approach would clarify "the 
underlying cause and effect relationships and provide a more structured framework 
for the critical reader in assessing the validity of the results." He also comments 
that the single scenario approach "implies a far greater level of precision than is war- 
ranted." 
3. C O M P A R A T I V E  E V A L U A T I O N  O F  A G R I C U L T U R A L  S T U D I E S  
In the previous section we have described six well known studies of agricultural 
development. The approaches, assumptions and results of each study were discussed 
along with brief evaluations of each study's sensitivity to  changes in assumptions. In this 
section we take the next step of comparing the six studies to  identify common features, to  
show how they differ and to  point out limitations of the studies with respect t o  their use 
in studies of long-term, large-scale environment-development interactions. 
The six studies differ radically from one another as is clear from even a cursory read- 
ing of the previous section. These differences cause some difficulty in making a compara- 
tive evaluation. However, they also serve a purpose for environmental studies. 
Specifically, if the goal is to  evaluate the potential interactions between agricultural 
development and the environment with an eye towards possible management of future 
conflicts. Individually, none of the studies directly addresses this topic. However, as a 
group, each study supplies important inputs for such an evaluation. The contribution 
each study can make is discussed in the first part of this section. 
Section 3.2 expands on the theme of differences among the studies and summarizes 
the differences as well as similarities in how the six studies are focused. Key variables 
that the studies have in common are also identified. Even though a variety of objectives 
and approaches is represented in the studies, several share critical variables and assump 
tions. 
The final part lists some of the critical omissions of the studies analyzed. Though 
taken as a group the studies are useful in addressing the broader questions of 
development-environment interactions, a number of important issues are still missing. 
3.1. Contr ibut ions of Individual  Studies  
Four fundamental questions arise in the evaluation of future agricultural and 
environmental interactions: 
1. What is our resource base for supporting future production? 
2. What is the pattern of future production and input use? 
3. Will future consumption needs be met? 
4. What effect will these production and consumption patterns have on the 
environment? 
Table 3.1 shows which studies address each of these four questions. Production 
potentials of the resource base are assessed in AEZ and in MOIRA. In general, AEZ p r e  
vides a better basis for estimating inherent productivity than does MOIRA. This is 
largely due to  a more complete data base and to more time being available for the study. 
The principal advantage offered by AEZ is its disaggregation into major crops where 
MOIRA only estimates grain equivalents. On the other hand MOIRA shows relative p r e  
ductivity of regions for the whole world while AEZ is more limited. 
Agricultural production is estimated under various assumptions in AT 2000, Global 
2000, MOIRA, FAP and RFF. AT 2000, Global 2000 and RFF also report agricultural 
input use levels. Increases in total agricultural production between 1980 and 2000 range 
from 1.43 (FAP) to  1.8 (MOIRA), a difference of approximately 25%. Increases in LDC 
production vary from 1.51 (FAP) to  2.08 (AT 2000, Scenario A), a difference of about one 
third. 
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Table 3.1 Topics addressed by individual agricultural studies 
Topics 
Studies 
AEZ AT2000 G12000 MOIRA FAP RFF 
Resource base x x 
Agricultural production x x x x x 
Consumption & nutrition x x x x 
Environmental impacts x x 
The adequacy of food consumption is addressed in AEZ, AT 2000, MOIRA and 
FAP. In general A T  2000 presents the most optimistic results in its Scenario A. This is 
principally due t o  its normative approach including assumptions of extensive aid, liberali- 
zation of trade and the absence of barriers t o  technology transfer and adoption. MOIRA 
predicts nearly three times more hunger than does A T  2000 even though its production 
projections are 20% higher as well. The difference stems both from the normative 
approach taken in A T  2000 and in the method for measuring hunger. A T  2000 simply 
looks a t  net food supply per country and world nutrition norms while MOIRA's approach 
is to  compare effective demand by income class with country specific norms. 
Environmental degradation is a feature in Global 2000 and RFF. In Global 2000 
current policies and trends are extended to predict future environmental effects. In RFF,  
changing input prices and production practices are considered as well to evaluate future 
degradation. 
The six studies are not only directed at  differing primary issues but they approach 
the topics differently. For example in A T  2000 a consumption level is imposed as an exo- 
genous constraint while in MOIRA the extent of hunger is measured after production and 
consumption are estimated. Also FAP is a general equilibrium model while Global 2000 
and MOIRA are partial equilibrium models. 
A wide variety of objectives and approaches are represented by the six studies dis- 
cussed in this paper. While these differences may reduce the value of a comparative 
evaluation, the variety gives a broader picture of the future of agricultural development 
than any single study can provide. 
3.2. Differences, Similarities and Critical Variables 
The previous section identified how the six studies differ in terms of their contribu- 
tion to  environmental studies. In this section we will expand on the differences and simi- 
larities among the studies focusing on the studies themselves. The critical variables 
required in common for the studies will also be compared. 
3.2.1. Differences and similarities 
Table 3.2 shows how the studies compare for ten descriptive characteristics. The 
characteristics are chosen to  demonstrate the variation in scope and structure of the six 
studies as opposed to  the overall focus which was discussed in the last section. The table 
is largely self-explanatory though several additional model features should be pointed out. 
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Table 3.2 Model characteristics 
Studies 
Characteristics AEZ AT2000 G12000 MOIRA FAP RFF 
Time scale - 2000 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Space scale LDC LDC Global Global Global US 
Demand Driven x x x x x 
Simulation model 
Normative approach x 
Endogenous technology x x 
Exogenous technology 3 4 * x x 
Role for trade x**  x x x 
Variable prices x x x 
Input requirements x x x x x 
Crop disaggregation x x x x 
Notes: 
AT 2000 is using a Global Technology matrix which is a discrete production function specified 
in terms of 4 levels: very low, low, high, very high. These are used in a linear interpolation for 
each land class. 
** Exogenous only. 
Table 3.3 Common variables in the agricultural studies 
1) Production technology 
2) Agricultural demand: population, income and 
income elasticities 
3) Initial production and trends 
4) Exogenous prices 
5) Government policies: trade, pricing and 
production 
First, space scale refers to  the principal level of detail of the study. All of the stu- 
dies have global components though several are basically regional studies with exogenous 
global supply or demand. Second, technology is endogenous in two studies and exogenous 
in the other four. Two of those four however consider three differing levels of agricultural 
technology. Third, all but the AEZ model assume extensive trade in agricultural comm* 
dities. However only MOIRA and FAP simulate levels of trade to  compare alternative 
policies. Both conclude that the developed world will benefit most from trade liberaliza- 
tion. In the FAP model, developed countries mainly benefit from efficiency gains and the 
agricultural output of LDCs is also increasing compared to  the reference scenario. A final 
note concerns the role of prices in the three economic models; MOIRA, FAP and RFF. In 
all three studies, variable prices affect agricultural output. In MOIRA, government inter- 
vention in markets is reflected in the model's prices. MOIRA was a direct ancestor of 
FAP, thus they are using a similar pricing mechanism. In both cases governments 
influence prices but eventually they are determined by markets. In both models prices 
play a key role in changing effective demand and they, of course, influence production lev- 
els and resource allocation. In the RFF study prices play the further role of influencing 
production technologies and thus input mix and use. 
3.2.2. Common variables  
Though the six studies differ significantly in objective and structure, several vari- 
ables and assumptions are common to most of the studies. Five types of such variables 
are listed in Table 3.3. The list represents categories of variables and is not meant to  
indicate that the variables are identical in the models or are used in the same way. For 
example, technology assumptions are made in each study but in some studies technology 
is fixed and exogenous while in others, technology varies over space and time. In all 
models though, technology plays some role. 
Agricultural demand is derived from assumptions concerning population growth, 
income growth and income elasticities of agricultural goods. Several studies go into some 
detail on population and income distribution as well as growth. Others are more aggre- 
gate in nature. Also depending on the study, demand is stated either in terms of totals or 
as output by crop, by calories or by protein. Studies assessing adequacy of consumption 
also include assumptions on nutritional norms. 
Each study defines for itself a starting point for agricultural development in terms of 
initial year production which is disaggregated in some studies by region and by crop. 
Some also go further to  identify recent production trends. These data set the stage for 
the central task of estimating growth in production. Estimating future output also 
requires attention to  the resource base agriculture relies on. Each study has a section 
evaluating land resources with AEZ and MOIRA going into particular detail. 
Table 3.4 illustrates the differences between the estimates of potential arable land 
that are used in three models. There are four reasons for the differences between the 
numbers found in the table. 
First, the regions are not comparable. That is, they do not cover the same land 
area. Global 2000 groups contiguous countries by political affiliations (e.g. Western 
Europe) and level of development (e.g. African LDC's). MOIRA breaks the world down 
into broad soil regions. The arable land in each of these regions can be summed together 
for any larger regions and continents. AEZ reports figures a t  both the country and the 
continent level. 
Secondly, the reports differ in their definitions of potentially arable land. MOIRA 
subtracts from the total land base land that is too shallow, stony, or steep, lands with 
poor soil, swamps, or lakes, land already used for urban and other non-agricultural pur- 
poses, and a fraction of the forested land. The remainder is classified as Potentially 
Arable Land (PAL). PAL is corrected for soil and water deficiencies to  give IPAL, an 
imaginary land area that can produce at  maximum rates. 
To AEZ "land suitability" is a function of climate and soil. Potentially arable land is 
what remains when "unsuitable" land and non-agricultural land is subtracted from the 
total land surface. 
In Global 2000, arable land is simply that land which is cultivated. From the table 
it can be seen that the latter definition produces estimates that are very conservative in 
comparison with the others. Land that is cultivated is a subset of that which could be 
support crops considering only climate and soil. 
Third, these discrepancies reflect different underlying assumptions. Global 2000 pro- 
jects that cultivated land will increase by only 4% by 2000. The authors reason that most 
good land is already supporting crop production. It will be more economical to  intensify 
production on existing fields than to  overcome the limitations on marginal land. 
Both the AEZ and MOIRA figures are independent of time. They are static esti- 
mates of the area of land that could potentially support crops. Economics is not con- 
sidered. Only the one or two environmental factors most directly associated with agricul- 
ture are considered. 
Global 2000 used an econometric model. Population and income growth together 
create increasing demand, which stimulates production. 
MOIRA uses a theoretical equation for calculating IPALI, which it uses as a land 
basis for estimating maximum production of grain equivalent. This is done within broad 
soil regions. 
In all studies, except AEZ, prices enter explicitly. However their roles differ consid- 
erably between models. In AT 2000 for example prices are assumed to  remain constant 
while the economic models (MOIRA, FAP and RFF) allow prices to vary and influence 
the course of agricultural development. Even in these models though, some prices (e.g. 
energy and fertilizer inputs) are introduced exogenously. 
Government policies also enter most models explicitly. Policies generally deal with 
international trade, domestic pricing and production incentives or controls. In Global 
2000 and RFF, policies are assumed to remain fixed over the study period while in 
MOIRA and FAP, several policy scenarios are analyzed. In AT 2000 the alternative 
scenarios reflect different assumptions about income growth and production responses. 
3.3. Limitat ions a n d  Omissions of t h e  Studies  
Each of the six studies has significant limitations for use in environmental studies. 
The limitations generally arise from omission of important linkages or variables. Table 
3.5 lists six sources of such limitations. 
Perhaps the most significant drawback is the failure to  incorporate environmental 
constraints. To  a greater or lesser extent all the studies share an inability to investigate 
the two main demands agriculture places on the environment, first as a resource supplier 
and secondly as a residuals sink. Accounting for resource supplies requires explicit con- 
sideration of the quantity and quality of resources such as land and water. The latter case 
requires explicit treatment of the feedback between environmental degradation and agri- 
cultural productivity. Both RFF and Global 2000 consider competing demands in the 
form of constraints on development, and note environmental degradation, but neither 
completes the loop by examining the implications for agricultural sustainability. 
Most of the studies touch on the land input to  agriculture but coverage of the total 
input package is grossly incomplete. When agricultural output is estimated to  grow by 
several orders of magnitude, the adequacy of input supplies must simultaneously be 
assessed. Most of the estimates include significant growth in irrigation, fertilizer use and 
the spread of new inputs such as hybrid seeds. Yet irrigation expansion requires sizable 
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Table 3.4 Arable land availability (in million ha) 
Notes: 
1) Singapore, Vietnam, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Philippines, India, Nepal, 
Burma, Thailand, Dem.Kampuchea, Laos, Pakistan, Brunei, Malaysia 
Europe 
North America 
Latin America 
Asia 
Southeast h i a 1 )  
Southeast Asia2) 
South Asia 
Near East 
Africa 
North Africa and 
Middle East 
Other African LDC's 
Oceania 
World 
2) Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam 
3) excluding China 
4) Sub-Saharan Africa 
GLOBAL 
2000 
165 
4 1 
207 
9 1 
183 
1539 
capital investment along with appropriate water and land characteristics. These are 
accounted for in AT 2000. Maintaining the expanded role of irrigation also necessitates 
preserving water and land from salt contamination. Greater fertilizer use requires capital 
for new plants along with mineral inputs and reasonably priced energy. Finally, an exten- 
sive research and extension infrastructure must precede a major expansion of hybrid seed 
use. 
None of the six studies explores the possibilities and the ramification of a major tech- 
nological or political change on the course of agricultural development. Yet agriculture 
has been characterized in the last several decades by rapid technical change and political 
decisions have greatly influenced agricultural trade, prices and production. Though it is 
AT 
2000 
889 
34z3) 
8 16~) 
95 
MOIRA 
PAL 
399 
546 
700 
1081 
370 
55 
172 
762 
8 7 
226 
3714 
MOIRA 
IPALI 
25 1 
288 
39 1 
582 
232 
34 
156 
314 
22 
77 
1903 
AEZ 
893 
297 
4 8 
789 
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Table 3.5 Limitations and omissions in the agricultural studies 
(1) Environmental feedbacks (omitted) 
(2) Input availability (omitted) 
(3) Major technological or political change (omitted) 
(4) Limited time horizon (limitation) 
(5) Sectoral consistency (omitted) 
(6) Homogeneous and fixed production technology 
(limitation) 
difficult to forecast precisely the nature of such major change, i t  is unrealistic not to  
expect some significant shocks. 
A fourth limitation is the relatively short time horizon of each of the studies. None 
goes beyond the year 2010. Long-term studies of development-environment interactions 
are concerned with a much longer time span to evaluate the sustainability of develop 
ment, not just short run effects. This difference in timing justifies some of the above men- 
tioned omissions of the studies. Environmental and resource constraints are not as likely 
to become binding in 20 or 30 years as in 100 years and the technological and political 
setting may remain fairly stable. However the failure to  identify evolving problems and 
potential conflicts remains a significant omission. 
Resource inputs may be unavailable due to competing sectoral demands as well as 
resulting from degradation or fixed supplies. As population, incomes and the non- 
agricultural sector grow, competition for land, water, minerals, capital, labor, energy and 
other inputs becomes more intense. Also input-output linkages between the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors may create bottlenecks in economic growth if sectoral growth 
is uneven or poorly timed. Thus the issue is not only the total availability of inputs but 
also local distributions of the inputs and outputs as well as locally competing demands. 
The studies evaluated fail to check for consistency between these competing demand and 
sectoral linkages with exception of capital and labor in FAP and AT 2000. 
A final limitation of most of the studies is that production technologies are assumed 
to be fixed and homogeneous. The only exceptions are FAP which employs a time trend 
for technological change and RFF which allows for heterogeneous and evolving technole 
gies. The simplifying assumption of homogeneity is not only inaccurate in representing 
current production but it cannot capture the types of changes necessary to  meet growing 
food demands. 
3.4. Conclusions 
To summarize, the six studies evaluated here are radically different from one 
another. Not only do they address differing primary topics but they approach the issues 
differently including economic and non-economic models, simulation and non-simulation 
methods and global and regional scales. These differences are discussed in sections 3.1 
and 3.2 above. Section 3.3 goes on to point out some of the more serious limitations of 
the six studies. These limitations, particularly the lack of environmental feedbacks and 
the 20 to  30 year time horizon appear to make the studies to  a large extent inappropriate 
for the objectives of evaluating the long-term interactions between agriculture and the 
environment - although they may be very appropriate for the purposes for which they 
were designed. However together the studies provide an extensive framework from which 
to initiate such an analysis. They supply detailed information about the resources agri- 
culture requires, the characteristics of future demand and how agriculture may grow in 
response to demands. This information will be an important input to future studies of 
long-term, large-scale interactions between socioeconomic development and the environ- 
ment. 
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Chapter 5 
A Conventional Wisdom Scenario for Global Population, 
Energy, and Agriculture 1976-2076 
Stefan Anderberg 
1. In t roduct ion  
The aim of this chapter is to synthesize a "conventional wisdom" scenario for the 
global development of population, agricultural production, and energy use between 1975 
and 2075. The scenario attempts to present a view of future developments that is as con- 
sistent as possible with the major studies reviewed in previous chapters. As such, it 
describes a surprisefree picture without any dramatic changes in the long-term trends. 
The scenario is based on the results of the assessments of long-term, largescale studies 
and projections in population, energy and agriculture presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of 
this report. Several basic assumptions are implicit in the conventional wisdom presented 
here: 
- An optimistic view of the possibilities for economic development. This implies that 
social, political, economic, technological, as well as acute environmental problems 
can be overcome. 
- The political and economic systems remain basically the same. 
- Population growth can be controlled and the global population will level off 
towards a ceiling of 10 billion people. 
- The growth of population and GDP are the main driving forces in energy and agri- 
cultural development. 
The population figures reported here are largely based on the Keyfitz study (Keyfitz 
et al., 1983). The energy figures reflect the Edmonds and Reilly Base Case Scenario 
(Edmonds and Reilly, 1985). Since no long-term future studies are available on agricul- 
ture, our "conventional wisdom" is based on on the expert opinion of the group which 
prepared the critical assessment of agricultural studies (Chapter 4). 
In our scenario presentation the world is divided into eight regions: North America, 
Latin America, Europe, Africa (including the Near East), USSR, South Asia, East Asia, 
and Oceania. For the list of countries belonging to the eight regions see Appendix 2 of 
Chapter 2. 
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the basic character of the 
conventional wisdom scenario for the world over the period 1975-2075. Section 3 provides 
a more detailed view of postulated developments in 8 regions. Finally, Section 4 contains 
a short evaluation of the scenario and discusses a number of critical assumptions behind 
it. 
2. Global Development  
2.1. Popula t ion  and Economic Growth  
The present rapid population growth in the world slows down dramatically and the 
population stabilizes a t  10 billion people by 2075 (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). This is the result 
of both political actions and changes in attitudes as a consequence of particularly rising 
standards of living and pressures on the resource base. A retardation of population growth 
is already visible before the year 2000. Among the third world regions East Asia takes the 
lead in this development and the other regions follow. Between 2000-2025 there is a radi- 
cal drop in population growth in all developing regions except in Africa, which still has an 
annual growth of 2%. By 2025-2050 the growth rates of East and South Asia are about a t  
the present European level (0.5 percent/year), while Latin America and Africa are down 
at  about 1% annual growth. By 2075 the whole world is close to  stationary populations 
and life expectancies are almost everywhere over 70. During the whole period a combina- 
tion of improving economic conditions and rigorous population control discourages large 
scale migration. The population of the four "developing regions" increases from 75% of the 
global population in 1975 to 85% in 2075. 
The hundred-year period is characterized by fairly high, stable, and continuous 
economic expansion for the whole world. Development towards increased global economic 
integration, free-trade, and division of labor continues. Growth in the poor world is higher 
than in the rich world, but not sufficient to decrease the gap between North and South; it 
widens in absolute numbers even if it decreases relatively. The rich world remains as dom- 
inating as in the 20th century. 
2.2. Energy  
In the year 2075 the world will consume about 48 TW energy. This is almost 6 
times more than in 1975 (see Figure 2.3). The per capita use is 2.4 times the 1975 level. 
Coal is assumed to  be an unconstrained fuel during the hundred-year period and it 
becomes the new leading fuel. It is as dominating as oil in 1975. This demands steady 
technological progress in coal technology and investments in new coal fields and distribu- 
tion systems. Impressive technological progress is also made in a number of other areas, 
e.g., synfuel conversion systems and various types of solar energy. 
The market share of fossil fuels is 80% in 2075, compared with 90% in 1975 (see Fig- 
ure 2.4). The share of conventional oil is very small. The use of synfuels, mainly derived 
from coal and shale oil, is important (10.8 TW, 22% of the global energy use). Gas use 
(2.8 TW, 6%) reached its highest point around 2025 and is decreasing. The forecasts of 
huge supplies of accessible deep gas are not born out. 
Nuclear and solar power are also viewed as unconstrained, but will be too expensive 
to  reach more than marginal importance. Nuclear energy (3 TW, 6%) has, after rapid 
growth before the year 2000, a more hesitant development and then growing market 
shares towards 2075. Breeders and fusion are of no importance. Hydro and solar energy 
(6.8 TW,  14%) expands more than 11 times. 
Commercial biomass energy (0.9 TW, 1.8%) is locally important, but achieves a low 
and thereafter relatively unchanged market share early in the hundred-year period. The 
use of biomass for energy is constrained by the demands for food and forestry products. 
Overall, the world's energy demand and supply patterns in 2075 require an effective 
system of international trade. The interregional trade picture changes some during the 
hundred years (see Table 2.1). By 2075 the main exporters are East Asia, USSR, and 
Africa, and the big importers are Europe, Latin America, and North America. Oceania is 
a minor exporter and South Asia is a minor importer. Half of the interregionally traded 
energy is coal. 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
N o r t h  Arer  i c a  0.4 0.13 -0.09 0.44 1.05 0.35 -0.65 0.75 
L a t i n  A r e r i c a  -0.2 -0.03 0.01 -0.22 0.54 0.06 0.48 1.03 
Europe 1 -0.16 0.08 0.5'2 -0.17 0.4 1.63 2.06 
A f r i c a  -1.4 -0.03 0.01 -1.48 -0.24 -0.55 -0.31 -1.1 
USSR -0.02 0.1 -0.01 0.0: -0.48 -0.43 -0.64 -1.55 
South A s i a  0.04 0 0 0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.24 0.25 
East  As ia  0.15 0.05 0.01 0.21 -0.94 0.19 -0.79 -1.54 
t jceania 0.03 0 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.16 -0.05 
TOTAL TRADE 1.62 0.28 0.11 2.01 1.84 1.05 2.55 5.44 
The third world regions increase their share of total energy consumption, but since 
they have higher population growth the inequity of energy use remains. Per capita con- 
sumption (Figure 2.5) is highest in North America, which with 28.5 kW per person (3 
times the 1975 level) becomes an extremely energy intensive society. Oceania has 21.3 kW 
per capita (five-fold increase) and Europe 16.5 (three-fold increase). USSR has more than 
doubled energy uee per capita and is on the 1975 North America level. The poorer regions 
have three to four times their 1975 per capita use. Latin America and East Asia are on 
the 1975 Oceania level (about 4kW). Africa uses 2.5 kW per peraon and South Asia is 
with 0.8 kW per capita still on the East Asia/Africa level of 1975. 
2.3. Agriculture 
Agricultural production per capita increases by 50%, reflecting improved nutrition in 
the poorer countries. This indicates an almost fourfold increase in total production. The 
main sources (Table 2.1) of this increase are: 
- The area of arable land is i n c r e d  by 18%. 
- Yield levels are increased by a factor of 3.3 as a result of higher yielding varieties, 
improved pest management, improved and i n c r e d  fertilizer use and irrigation, 
an increase in cropping intenaitiea (harveeta per year) by a factor of 1.25. 
- Poet harvest loeeee are reduced by SO%, i n c m i n g  the total supply by a factor of 
1.07. 
The increase of cropland area ie moetly a t  the expense of the foreated areas (Figure 
2.6). In Africa and Latin America the increase ie approximately 50% and the forested 
areas decrease by about 30%. On the global level grazing lands are reduced by 6% and 
forests by 16%. The "other lands", which cannot be ueed for agricultural production, grow 
by 13% primarily as a consequence of deaertification, erosion, and urbanization. 
Table 2.2 Development o f  major p roduc t ion  f a c t o r s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  
.......................................................................................................... 
Region Area o f  c rop land  Y i e l d  Cropping i n t e n s i t y  Fac to r  f o r  
( m i l l i o n  ha)  (HTIha) (number o f  ha rves ts lyear  1 reduced 
1375 2075 R a t i o  1375 2075 R a t i o  1975 2075 R a t i o  c rop  l o s s  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
North America 232 220 0.95 3.4 7.5 2.2 0.90 1.15 1.3 1.04 
L a t i n  America 157 242 1.54 1.7 4.5 2.6 0.61 0.80 1.3 1.07 
Europe 142 128 0.90 5.3 7.0 2.1 1.05 1.26 1.2 1.04 
A f r i c a  245 365 1.49 1 3.3 3.5 0.56 0.78 1.4 1.09 
USSR 232 267 1.15 1.5 5.0 3.3 0.85 1.05 1.2 1-06 
South Asia 211 220 1.04 1.3 4.0 5.1 1.07 1.34 1.3 1.07 
East Asia 170 204 1.20 2.2 5.5 2.5 1.07 1.34 1.3 1.07 
Oceania 4 4 48 1.10 1 2.5 2.5 0.80 1.00 1.3 1.04 
TOTAL 1433 1694 1.18 2 4.9 2.5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2.3 I r r i g a t i o n  and f e r t i l i z e r  use 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I r r i g a t i o n  F e r t i l i z e r  u s e  
m i l l i o n  ha Z o f  c r o p l a n d  kg lha  a r a b l e  l a n d  t o t a l  use (mi0 HTI 
1975 2075 R a t i o  1975 2075 R a t i o  1975 2075 R a t i o  1975 2075 R a t i o  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Nor th  America 17 17 1.00 7 8 1.14 95 145 1.53 22 32 1.45 
L a t i n  Af ier ica 12 20 1.67 8 5 0.63 29 110 3.79 5 27 5.40 
Europe 12 15 1.25 8 11 1.38 201 402 2.00 29 52 1.79 
A f r i c a  23 34 1.48 9 9 1.00 17 80 4.71 4 29 7.25 
USSR 14 19 1.36 6 7 1.17 74 145 1.96 17 39 2.29 
South As ia  47 70 1.49 22 32 1.45 16 105 6.56 3 23 7.67 
East  As ia  57 85 1.49 34 42 1.24 67 155 2.31 11 32 2.91 
Oceania 2 2 1.00 5 4 0.80 29 70 2.41 1 3 3.00 
TOTAL 104 262 1.42 13 I5 1.15 46 140 3.04 92 237 2.58 
Table 2.4 Development. o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
............................................................... 
Produc t ion  Produc t ion  per  c a p i t a  
( m i l l i o n  HT) (HT per  c a p i t a )  
1975 2075 R a t i o  1375 2075 R a t i o  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
--------------------------------------.------------------------ 
Nor th  America 709 1375 2.8 3 5.6 1.9 
L a t i n  America 163 ?53 5.7 0.5 0.95 1.9 
Europe 432 I148 2.5 1.03 1.66 1.6 
A f r i c a  137 1014 7.4 0.25 0.5 2.0 
USSR 295 1488 5.0 1.2 3.7 3.1 
South Asia 254 1227 4.2 0.35 0.5 1.4 
East  As ia  399 1601 4.0 0.3 0.5 I.? 
Oceania 44 125 2.8 2.6 4.15 1.6 
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No revolutionary new technologies are developed during the hundred-year period. 
However, research produces a continuous stream of incrementally improved technologies 
suited to  diverse environmental and economic conditions. Biotechnology plays a role in 
this, but its effect is to  stave off diminishing returns to technologies already in use, rather 
than to bring about a quantum jump in output. Because of increasing competition for 
land, these technologies tend to be land-saving with variation around the world reflecting 
differences in the land/population ratio. Accordingly, crop and animal yields rise, 
reflecting genetic improvements, greater use of fertilizer, and more intensive use of land 
made possible by increased irrigation and development of crop varieties with shorter 
growing season. Cropping intensities increase to over 1 in all regions except Africa and 
Latin America (Table 2.1). Irrigated land increases globally by 42% and the use of fertil- 
izers and biocides grow 2.8 and 2.5 times respectively (Table 2.2). The average amount of 
fertilizer per hectare is higher in 2075 than the 1975 North American use (which is only 
half of the European). Agriculture does not experience any serious energy problems 
because it is of high priority and the most expanding regions, with the exception of South 
Asia, are energy surplus regions. In 2075 agriculture still consumes only about 5% of the 
total energy production. 
The number of people depending directly on agriculture for their family income 
increases from 2.0 to  3.6 billions, but this means a decrease from 49 to  36% of the global 
population. 
Increments in total production vary widely in the different regions; from 30% in 
Europe and 90% in Oceania to  470% in Latin America and 640% in Africa. Production 
per capita grows in all the regions, in Africa and Latin America by 100% and in the USSR 
by 220%. The per capita figures show, however, that the regional differences have not 
decreased by 2075. An increasing tendency of nation states to  treat adequate food as a 
right of their citizens, liberalized trade policies and increased purchasing power mitigate 
but do not eliminate the large scale distributional problems. 
3. Development of the Regions 
3.1. Europe 
European population growth is relatively slow (Figure 2.2 and Figure 3.1). Popula- 
tion grows from 472 to 690 million (0.4%/year). Agricultural production increases by 
130%, per capita output by 60%, particularly due to  more irrigated land and higher yield- 
ing crop varieties (Tables 2.2-2.4). Fertilizer use is doubled and irrigated land increases 
by 25%. The increase in fertilizer use is less than expected because research reveals new 
ways of using fertilizer more efficiently and also increases the nitrogen fixing capacity of 
cereal crops. The cropland area decreases by 10% and grazing lands by 35% (Figure 3.2). 
Contrary to  other regions, the forested area grows by 11%. "Other lands" increase by 31% 
primarily due to  urbanization. 
Total energy use grows from 2.5 to 11.4 TW or, from 5.2 to  16.5 kW per person 
(Figure 2.5). Europe is the leading innovator region in the energy sector; all changes or 
new trends, like the transition from oil to  coal, can be noted here first. By 2075 Europe 
remains the most important energy importer, but is not as dominating as hundred years 
before. More domestic fuels are used, primarily coal. Non-fossil fuels have a market share 
of 25%, of which nuclear power accounts for 40% (Figure 3.3). 
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3.2. S o u t h  As ia  
South Asia is a region that is poorer and has more limited resources than the others. 
But in some ways, e.g., R&D and technological know-how, it has resources and capabili- 
ties far above most countries in the Third World. The reason why South Asia has so 
much lower consumption (and production) than the other regions is that i t  is the only 
homogeneously poor region. 
Population grows from 832 million in 1975 to 2091 million in 2025 and 2560 million 
in 2075 (Figure 2.2 and Figure 3.4). Agricultural production grows by 320%, per capita 
output by 40%. Virtually all the increase comes from increased yields of crops. This is 
made possible by introduction of higher-yielding, pest-resistant crop varieties and by 
more intensive use of land. Irrigated land, already high in India in 1975, expands by 50% 
and fertilizer use per hectare increases by a factor of 6.3 (Tables 2.2-2.4). There are not 
any greater land use changes (Figure 3.5). The cropland area is in 2075 46% (44% in 
1975). The fraction of arable land does not exceed 13% in any other region except Europe 
and South Asia. 
Energy consumption grows from 0.2 to  2.2 TW in total and from 0.3 to 0.8 kW per 
person (Figure 2.5). The non-fossil fuel market share is almost 35%, higher than in all 
other regions with the exception of Latin America (Figure 3.6). Notable is that the use of 
biomass for energy, despite lack of forests, is higher in absolute numbers than in Europe 
and North America. 
3.3. N o r t h  Amer ica  
Population grows from 237 million in 1975 to  324 in 2025 and 350 by 2075 (see Fig- 
ure 2.2 and Figure 3.7). Agricultural production increases 2.8 times. This is a result of 
intensification; e.g. higher inputs like 50% more fertilizer per hectare and higher yielding 
crops, not by increasing the cropland area (Tables 2.2 - 2.4). In fact the area of cropland 
declines by some 5% (Figure 3.8). Grazing lands and forests decrease somewhat, too, 
while other lands increase due to urbanization and degradation by pollution and 
desertification. 
Total energy use increases from 2.3 TW in 1975 to  10.0 in 2075 or from 9.9 to  28.5 
kW per person (Figure 2.5). The energy/GDP ratio is higher only in the USSR. The use 
of fossils and particularly oil is important during the whole period (the lowest value is 
84% in 2000) (Figure 3.9). The transition from oil takes place much later than in Europe, 
and the development of alternative energy sources is not as fast. All the non-fossils are 
relatively undeveloped by 2075. In spite of large coal exports the region is a major energy 
importer (Table 2.1). 
3.4. Latin America  
At the beginning of the hundred-year period the population grows fast from 322 rnil- 
lion in 1975 to  785 by 2025, but growth slows down from 2.8%/year before 2000 to  
1.3%/year between 2000 and 2025 (Figure 2.2 and Figure 3.10). The continent has abun- 
dant resources with possibilities for extensive expansion of economic activities. The econ- 
omy is also expanding rapidly. Agricultural land is extended dramatically and new 
energy sources, like hydro power in the Amazon area, and new oil, gas and coal fields are 
exploited. Latin America is one of the leading energy exporters by 2000. 
During the second half of the hundred-year period the resources become scarce and 
there seems to be a crisis between 2025 and 2050 when population growth is still impor- 
tant and the economy has to  change from extensive (new resources taken into production) 
to  intensive (given resources used more efficiently) expansion. The region becomes a net 
energy importer (Table 2.1). By 2075 the population stabilized at  approximately 1 billion 
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(980 million). 
The general development of Latin America is well characterized by the agricultural 
sector. The production between 1975 and 2075 is increased by 470% or 90% per capita 
(Table 2.4). The arable land is increased by 54% (Figure 3.11). Grazing lands expand by 
16% primarily due to the fact that after deforestation the lands are initially used as graz- 
ing lands before being converted into cropland. 30% of the forests disappear. In this sensi- 
tive process much land is degraded, with "other lands" increasing by 49%. Intensification 
is even more important for the growth of production. Both irrigation and fertilizer use 
increase significantly (Table 2.3). 
Total energy use grows from 0.4 to 4 TW or from 1.2 to 4.1 kW per person (Figure 
2.5). The use of non-fossil fuels is more important than in other regions reaching 35% in 
2075 (Figure 3.12). The production of hydro energy shows decreasing market shares 
towards 2075. Latin America, once a major energy exporter is by 2075 one of the leading 
interregional importers (Table 2.1). 
3.5. Africa 
Africa consists of two sub-regions, the Near East and 'Black Africa', which have 
totally different initial conditions in terms of population, resources and economic wealth. 
Both have high economic growth, but the growth in GDP per capita is higher in the 
northern part because of lower population growth and rich capital and natural resources. 
The region as a whole shows a development pattern similar to that of Latin America, 
except for the fact that Africa has even more abundant resource-base, e.g. for energy (Fig- 
ure 3.13). 
Population grows from 541 million in 1975 to 1631 in 2025 (2.2%/year) and 2010 
million by 2075 (O.4%/year between 2025 and 2075) (Figure 2.2). Though this indicates a 
radical decrease in population growth during the decades around 2025, it takes place later 
than in other regions and thus Africa has the highest relative population growth. 
Agricultural production is increased by 640% (Table 2.4). There are substantial 
increments in all factors that are important to production growth (Table 2.2). The crop 
land area is increased by 49% (Figure 3.14)) mainly derived from grazing lands, which 
decrease by 20%. Animal husbandry is intensified and moved into other areas. Land, 
presently unsuitable for grazing (e.g. lands infected by the Tse-tse fly), are opened up by 
control measures. Forests diminish by 28% and "other lands" grow by 17%. 
Energy consumption grows from 0.5 to 5.0 TW in total and from 0.8 to 2.5 kW per 
person (Figure 2.5). Until 2050 Africa is the dominating interregional exporter. About 
half of the production is exported to other regions. Most of the expansion takes place 
south of the Sahara. During the last 25-year period the resources become scarcer. Exports 
are cut by 213 (Table 2.1). The production of non-fossil energy (particularly hydro and 
solar) is expanded and from a very stable fossil share of 80%) Africa is down at 68% by 
2075 (Figure 3.15). 
3.6. USSR 
The USSR has a relatively slow growth. The population grows from 255 to 400 mil- 
lion (0.5%/year) (Figure 2.2 and Figure 3.16). There is, however, a breakthrough for 
Soviet agriculture (Tables 2.1 - 2.3). Production is multiplied 5 times (3.2 time per c a p  
ita). This is mainly a consequence of higher inputs. The cropland area is expanded by 
15%, particularly by transformation of forests and swamps. The 8% increase of "other 
lands" is a result of problems caused by extremely high inputs in agriculture, e.g., salini- 
zation and pollution of soils (Figure 3.17). 
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Energy consumption grows from 1.2 to 3.9 TW in total and from 4.5 to 9.8 kW per 
person (Figure 2.5). Energy efficiency progresses, production grows faster than consump 
tion and the USSR becomes one of the leading exporters. The use of fossils is very impor- 
tant, 83%. Nuclear power use is moderate (Figure 3.18). 
3.7. East Asia 
This is probably the most heterogeneous region. Japan is a highly developed country 
at the same level as Oceania. With 3-5% of the region's population it consumes 3435% of 
the energy. It is the most densely populated region with 3 billion people in 2075 (Figure 
2.2 and Figure 3.19). Population growth is a bit slower, 0.8%/year, than in the other 
dominantly developing regions. 
Agricultural production is augmented by 300%, 70% per capita (Table 2.4). In 2075, 
after a 20% increase in the cropland area, practically all potentially arable land is used in 
production. This is possible due to the introduction of crops adapted to salt affected soils. 
34% of the cropland is irrigated in 2075 (Table 2.3). "Other lands" grow by 6%, mainly 
caused by salinization. The forests loose 14% of their area while grazing lands are 
unchanged (Figure 3.20). 
Energy consumption grows from 1.1 to 11.2 TW in total and from 0.9 to 3.8 kW per 
person (Figure 2.5). The region becomes a leading energy exporter primarily because of 
increased exploitation of the rich fossil sources of China (Table 2.1). The fossil fuel use is 
dominant, with 82% of the market in 2075. The share of synfuels is important, 28% (Fig- 
ure 3.21). 
3.8. Oceania 
Oceania has a relatively small population (e.g. only about 1% of the East Asian). 
Population grows from 17 million to 30 million (0.6%/year) (Figure 2.2 and Figure 3.22). 
Agricultural production increases by 180% (Table 2.4). There are only minor 
changes in land use (Figure 3.23). Some dry areas are made productive by the use of more 
drought resistant crops. The "other lands" increase by 12%, mainly due to desertification. 
The use of fertilizer is lower than in any other region despite a significant increase from 29 
to 70 kg/ha (Table 2.3). 
Energy consumption grows from 0.07 to 0.64 TW in total and from 4.1 to 21.3 kW 
per person (Figure 2.5). The energy sector is dominated by the fossil fuels which have a 
market share of 84%. The coal and gas resources are rich. Solar energy is rather 
undeveloped but rapidly expanding by 2075 (Figure 3.24). 
4. Commentary 
Every scenario must, if it is to be used critically, be anchored in the experiences of 
the past and present. In this section, the assumptions and questionable points of the 
scenarios will be brought into light. I will try to discuss, clarify, and, if possible, justify 
them. 
4.1. Some major problematic points in this scenario are: 
Agriculture 
The intention behind the agricultural scenario was explicitly to portray a possible, 
but very optimistic development. There are, of course, many objections to raise against 
its credibility, which we acknowledge. Among the most severe problems to solve are the 
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lack of water and fertilizer (especially phosphates) resources. This scenario demands radi- 
cal improvement in water management, large scale desalinization and recycling of 
nutrients. 
The distribution of growth between North and South 
We would like to  see a more balanced development between North and South. How- 
ever, if we look at  present trends, there are no signs of such development taking place. To 
decrease the gap would probably presuppose a different global economic system and a 
conscious policy among countries with this goal in mind. We cannot yet discern any 
important steps in this direction. 
Is there an upper limit to growth in the industrialized world? 
It is of course very hard to imagine a society that consumes 3-4 times more energy 
than North America today, but such a scenario would have been considered as a low fore- 
cast only a few years ago. 
The fuel miz: continued dominance of fossil fuels. 
Coal is assumed to  be unlimited during the next hundred years and the only con- 
straint is the capacity of production increase that is assumed to  be 2.9% per annum. The 
coal supply assumption is among the most sensitive variables in the Edmonds and Reilly 
model. This means that even small changes in fuel prices would change the fuel mix 
significantly. Further objections could also be raised against this assumption: 
- Producing these amounts of coal would perhaps be more expensive than is 
expected in terms of energy losses as well as in terms of investment and environ- 
mental costs. 
- Alternative technologies might develop more rapidly than expected and be better 
able to compete. 
But the fact that today coal is the only fuel that can replace oil and gas is a strong 
argument for radical increases in coal use in the future. 
Feed-backs from the environment are missing 
An important objection to  this scenario is the lack of feed-backs such as severe 
environmental problems, which could demand actions that would radically alter economic 
development. These are left out primarily because the intention behind these scenarios is 
to  sketch alternative socioeconomic developments and their environmental implications 
are the task for the studies in which they will be used. But it is not easy to  include such 
feed-backs in any model. This is, for example, because: 
- We do not yet know enough about long-term environmental impacts. We cannot 
tell what the impacts will be, for example, of increasing concentrations of green- 
house gases or where, when and how they will be felt. Therefore it would not be 
plausible to  define actions that could be taken to  meet such problems. 
- History does not provide examples of international actions which have been taken 
to  solve environmental problems, and which have radically changed or restrained 
economic development. 
4.2. Some environmental implications of this scenario 
To sum up, there is no doubt that this scenario is an optimistic one as far as 
economic development is concerned. Whether it is an over- or underestimation of the 
actual course is not important as long as it can be believed possible. It is more interesting 
to investigate possible environmental consequences of a scenario of economic develop 
ment. Such an exercise is likely to  lead to  a better assessment of the range of 
environmental implications of alternative future paths of economic development. 
If development were to  take place as described in this scenario, then what would be 
the impacts on the natural environment in the future? What would be the major environ- 
mental problems? 
Concentrations of population are associated with severe environmental stresses. 
Densely populated parts of the world coincide with high energy use and often with inten- 
sive agriculture. The most critical areas are likely to  be the city agglomerations in the 
Third World which will grow rapidly over the next 50 years. These areas are also likely to 
be the focus of problematic competition for land between urban and non-urban activities. 
In connection with agriculture the most severe problems would probably then be: 
- Soil degradation, by e.g. desertification, erosion, salinization, and pollution, often 
caused by severe pressure on soil resources and inappropriate agricultural methods. 
These problems are likely to  be most severe in Latin America, Africa, and 
Oceania. 
- The use of biocides and fertilizers. Agricultural development in this scenario is 
based on radical increases in inputs such as biocides and fertilizers. The conse- 
quences of these would be a diffusion of problems such as increased rates of non- 
biodegradable chemical substances in the environment, eutrophication of lakes and 
seas, etc. 
- Competition for scarce resources, in particular for land and water. 
The stresses sketched out above would probably evolve from strictly local problems 
into regional ones. In such a way, localized eutrophication of lakes and coastal waters has 
evolved into a regional problem of environmental disruptions of whole marine ecosystems 
such as the Baltic and the North Seas. 
The environmental cost of the sixfold increase in energy use can be expected to be 
fairly high and to  a large extent connected to the high use of fossil fuels. The burning of 
fossil fuels would increase five times and the fuels used, mostly coal and shale oil, are 
likely to be far more polluting throughout their cycle of use than the fuels used today. 
Even if coal burning technology is vastly improved, there are still likely t o  be serious 
environmental problems connected to  such expansion. At the local level many new coal 
fields would have to  be developed, particularly in Siberia, China, Africa, Australia, and 
North America. These would utilize vast amounts of land and water resources which are 
already scarce in many parts of the world. At the regional level acidification of land and 
water is already an alarming problem in developed regions and is beginning to appear in 
developing regions. Globally the most important environmental impact is likely to  result 
from the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases (C02, NO,, etc.). These are 
predicted to  more than double over the next hundred years. It is possible that severe 
effects of some climate change will have been experienced by 2075. The environmental 
impacts of other fuels are likely to  be less extensive, but not necessarily less important. 
Very few rivers are likely to  escape hydro-electric expansion and twenty times more 
nuclear power would bring increased risks for accidents and proliferation of nuclear arms. 
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APPENDIX 
Supporting tables for the Conventional Wiedom ecenario 
Table A3a. Energy consumption 
Nor th  Am L a t i n  Am Europe 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
1975 
237 322 472 
A f r i c a  USSR Asia-Sou Asia-Eas Oceania Mor ld  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Populat - ion mio 
Energylcap kW 
i l i lCCoa1 TW 
6as T W 
Synfue ls  TW 
HydroCSolar TW 
Nuclear TW 
Biomass TW 
T o t a l  TW 
Popu la t ion  
Energylcap kW 
Oi lCCoal  TW 
6as T W 
Synfuels TW 
HydroCSolar TW 
Nuclear  TW 
Biomass TH 
T o t a l  1'W 
Popu la t ion  
Energylcap kW 
i l i lCCoa l  TW 
6as T W 
Synfue ls  TW 
HydroCSolar TW 
Nuclear  TC1 
B ~ o r a s s  TW 
T o t a l  TW 
Popu la t ion  
Energylcap kW 
1:1ilCCoal TW 
Gas T W 
Synfue ls  TW 
HydroCSolar TW 
Nuclear  TH 
Biomass TW 
T o t a l  TW 
Popu la t ion  
Energylcap kW 
OilCCoal TW 
6as T W 
Synfue ls  TW 
HydroCSolar TW 
Nuclear  TW 
Biomass TW 
T o t a l  TW 
------------------- 
Table A3b. Fuel  mix (2)  
............................................................................................... 
North Am L a t i n  Am Europe A f r i c a  USSR Asia-Sou Asia-Eas Oceania World 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
1975 
OilCCoal 64.1 71.4 78.3 82.1 76.9 86.3 91.0 86.2 76.0 
Gas 27.4 14.1 8.1 8.1 19.2 4.7 1.8 3.0 14.5 
Synfuels 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
HydroCSolar 5.6 14.2 10.2 8.4 3.5 8.6 6.3 8.9 7.5 
Nuclear 3.0 0.3 2.8 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.9 2.0 
Biomass 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
T o t a l  100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
i l i l a c o a l  
Gas 
Synfuels 
HydroCSolar 
Nuclear 
Blomass 
T o t a l  
O i laCoa l  
6a s  
Synfuels 
HydroCSolar 
Nuclear  
B~omass 
T o t a l  
l l i lCCoa1 60.6 49.4 52.3 47.9 50.5 51.1 55.9 57.7 53.9 
6as 11.8 6.1 12.1 11.7 14.1 0.5 6.8 11.9 9.8 
Synfuels 14.4 14.2 14.2 18.4 17.0 22.3 19.7 15.9 16.5 
HydroCSolar 7.8 23.3 13.6 14.7 14.4 18.6 12.8 8.0 13.6 
Nuclear 4.8 3.3 7.0 4.0 2.5 2.7 3.1 6.0 4.5 
Biomass 0.6 3.0 0.7 3.4 1.4 4.8 1.7 0.6 1.6 
T o t a l  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2075 
o i  lbCoa l  58.3 48.9 43.4 40.7 50.5 47.2 52.5 48.9 49.6 
Gas 5.7 6.8 9.2 7.7 5.9 3.2 1.8 7.9 5.9 
Synfuels 21.9 9.5 22.1 19.6 27.0 15.3 28.4 25.2 22.4 
HydroCSolar 7.8 23.8 14.8 23.4 12.0 20.4 11.3 9.5 14.1 
Nuclear  5.7 6.5 9.8 5.8 3.3 6.5 4.4 7.9 6.3 
B~omass 0.5 4.5 0.8 2.8 1.3 7.4 1.7 0.6 1.8 
T o t a l  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 

Chapter 6 
Surprise-Rich Scenarios for Global Population, 
Energy, and Agriculture 1975-2075 
Stefan Anderberg 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A surprising future development - what would that be? 
The answer to this question depends of course on who answers it. In this report, 
three scenarios for global socioeconomic development over 1975-2075 are presented. They 
are deliberately intended to  describe somewhat surprising or unconventional paths into 
the future and therefore be useful as alternatives to standard "conventional wisdom" pro- 
jections for the study of possible future developments. These scenarios are the result of 
efforts within IIASA's project on "Ecologically Sustainable Development of the Biosphere" 
and are based on the output of an international workshop that was held in Sweden, Janu- 
ary 1986 (Svedin and Aniansson, 1987). 
1.1. Aims of the Report 
The major aims of this report are: 
(1) To present three consistent, well elaborated, but highly unconventional 
scenarios, that describe somewhat speculative or surprising futures, and which can be 
used in different studies of long-term, large-scale interactions between socioeconomic 
development and the environment As a background and frame of reference to  these 
developmental paths, a "Conventional Wisdom Scenario" (see Chapter 5 in this volume), 
has been used. 
(2) T o  present a discussion on the whole procedure of creating these scenarios: the 
basic ideas, theories and attitudes towards historical change and development and possi- 
ble "surprises", major problems in the different scenario frameworks, possible variants, 
and numerical representations. Thus this report makes an effort to  contribute t o  a more 
general discussion on the construction, presentation and use of scenarios. 
1.2. Structure of the Report 
Section 2 entitled "Background" contains a short review of future history genres in 
the past, some modern definitions of the term "scenario", an introduction to  basic termi- 
nology, and some examples of different types of scenarios in modern futures research. 
In Section 3, "The scenario construction", the aims of scenarios in general and within 
development-environment studies in particular are focused upon and a background of the 
presented scenarios is given. 
The three scenarios are then presented in Section 4 with summaries and numerical 
representations of the various developments. Then, some further explanations are given 
for the basic assumptions, views and rationale that guided the scenario writing and the 
numerical elaborations. 
The "Summarizing Final Discussion" contains a discussion on the whole scenario 
construction process, methods, styles of presentation, and the value of the whole exercise. 
2. B A C K G R O U N D :  S C E N A R I O S  F O R  THE F U T U R E  
2.1. F u t u r e  Histories in the Literature  
Writing about the future is a literary form with old traditions. We can trace it back 
to  Sir Thomas More in the 16th century, if not even further; Plato's "The Republic" from 
the 4th century B.C. or some parts in the Bible could serve as good examples. This litera- 
ture is of course quite varied. The Swedish historian of ideas Tore Frangsmyr (1980) dis- 
cerns eight main genres of futuristic literature: 
1.) Critiques of the present: the major aim of the authors is to  criticize their own 
society or certain tendencies in their present by painting a picture of a future 
state of society. In this group we can find, for example, More, Huxley and Orwell. 
2) Plays with thought: technological wonders, travels in space or to the inner parts 
of the earth. This category comprises most of the science fiction literature. 
3) Religious prophecies: this is an extensive group of religious and mystical forms of 
predictions. 
4) Interpretations of signs in nature: refers primarily to astrology and "traditional 
practical life wisdom" (e.g. weather forecasting). But here Frangsmyr poses the 
question of whether modern warnings of environmental degradation could not 
also be sorted into this category. If so, "signs of nature" have, thus, changed from 
superstition to science. 
5) Political ideologies: these almost always refer to  the future. One could perhaps 
break out ideologically based utopias as a subgroup. 
6) Historical analogies: the future is predicted by pointing out similarities between 
the present and some historical situation. This branch is not as strong as it used 
to  be, but remains influential. 
Theoretical constructions for making predictions: this means all efforts through 
the ages to find an exact method to predict the future. It started with Raimundus 
Lucullus in the 13th century and has continued with a long string of mystics and 
mathematicians among whom the most well-known are Leibniz, who tried to find 
such a mathematical language; Swedenborg; Christian Wolff, who tried with con- 
ventional language; and Comte, who with his positivistic system aimed not only 
to predict, but to govern development. Computer models can be perceived as part 
of this tradition, a t  least as it has been used in some modern studies. 
8) Empirical efforts to describe future development through prognoses and calcula- 
tions. These are closely related with the former group. The difference is that they 
do not pretend to be able to predict the future. 
This categorization of futuristic literature is of course not indisputable. Some of the 
groups are questionable and many books and studies fall between the categories. The rea- 
son to  present this short review here is, however, to get a valuable historical perspective 
on modern future history writing. This perspective makes it clear that it is not only in our 
time that thinking about the future has been in vogue and it might help us to question 
what we are doing and to clarify intentions, thoughts and procedures and perhaps unveil 
some of our time-bound and cultural biases. It is also possible that, since this literature is 
a part of our culture, we are quite influenced by it. We might also have things to learn 
from this rich array of literature on entertaining ways of presentation, imagination and 
the view of the possible during various historical epochs. These points will be interesting 
to return to later. 
It is important to note that  the that  best future studies can do is to  explore alterna- 
tive possible future developments. By such exercises we can hope to  bring a useful per- 
spective on the present situation and the problems we are facing today and perhaps the 
problems of tomorrow. But we can never predict the future. 
2.2. What is a Scenario ? - Some Alternative Definitions 
Scenario is a term that  has become increasingly popular. In future studies Herman 
Kahn was perhaps the first to  introduce it (Wilson, 1976). He has defined scenario as "a 
hypothetical sequence constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal 
processes and decision points" (Kahn and Wiener, 1967). That  scenarios are always 
hypothetical seems not be a point of controversy, but is still important t o  emphasize. 
Through frequent use, the meaning of scenario seems to  have become increasingly 
broad and vague. Wilson (1978) first describes scenarios a s  "essentially stories", then 
defines a scenario as "an exploration of alternative futures" or "an outline of one conceiv- 
able state of affairs given certain assumptions" (Wilson, 1978:225). That  scenarios basi- 
cally are stories about the future and explorations of alternative developments are some 
points to  remember, even if, as can be seen further down, they are not guidelines for all 
scenario construction. The third statement emphasizes, however, a future state instead of 
a future path. This is a view that  seems to be common particularly in the gaming litera- 
ture (e.g., see DeLeon, 1975) and is one of two points of confusion that  seem to  be fre- 
quent in connection with scenarios in modern future studies. How is the time dimension to  
be treated ? Is a scenario a path into the future or is it a future state of the world? 
Another point of great variation between different studies is the one of content - how 
detailed should a future development be described to  be called a scenario? 
The scenario concept came into futures research via military strategic and gaming, 
but originated from theater (Becker, 1983). In theater it refers to  the screenplay with such 
components as action, catchwords, stage properties, decor, light, and sound. It has a t  
least five components: actors, actions, materials, positions in space, and a set of points in 
time. Asplund (1979) takes this as a starting-point for a general definition of a scenario: 
"A scenario coordinates these five components in such a way that  for each point 
in time is stated: (i) in which positions the actors are; (ii) in which positions 
the materials are; (iii) what actions the actors make." (Asplund, 1979:92) 
This is suggested to  be taken as a general form for scenarios. It is for the researcher 
t o  define relevant actors, actions and materials (which may in fact be anything in the 
world). An important trait of scenarios is, according to  this definition, tha t  without a 
sequence of actions and events in time, it cannot be a scenario. There should also be a cer- 
tain demand on the content that  i t  a t  least should allow for a "tolerable performance" of 
the future in the way that  is described in the scenario. This should mean that  the reader 
can easily follow the sequence of events and imagine such a development and get some feel 
for the assumptions and logic behind it. If this demand is not met, then it should not be 
called a scenario, but a "synopsis" for the future. 
Other demands on a scenario that  are put forward in the literature are primarily 
those of simplicity, intelligibility (comprehensibility), reliability, logical consistency, and 
explanations of simplified assumptions. Gershuny (1976) suggests that  i t  seems almost 
impossible to  combine them all, but they should be kept in mind. Perhaps the two most 
important are intelligibility and logical consistency. An intelligible scenario must be con- 
sistent, but the inverse is not true, because to  be intelligible, a scenario must among other 
things be psychologically plausible and socially acceptable, and these vary with time and 
culture while logical consistency does not (Asplund, 1979). To  make a scenario 
intelligible, the central trends and assumptions must be explained, argued for, anchored in 
the recent past, and related t o  historical experience. It is important to  remember that  
'the future is a continuation of the past" and that  "historical trends, properly understood, 
set close limits to  the possibilities of human action" (Hall, 1977:6 and 10). 
2.3. V a r i o u s  Forms of  Scenar ios  
Instead of looking a t  various alternative ways of defining what a scenario is, what it 
should be, and what demands one should put on scenario writing, one can look a t  what 
"scenarios" have meant in practice in modern futures research. Before starting such a 
review, a few basic concepts need to  be introduced. A useful taxonomy of scenarios is 
presented in "La methode des scenarios" (France:Datar, 1975; Hall, 1977) in which two 
basic types of approaches are advanced: 
1) Exploratory scenarios, where one starts in the present and tries t o  project various 
trends into the future. These can be either tendential, i.e. they concentrate on the 
consequences of certain trends if they should continue, or framework, in which 
the field of possible futures is delimited. 
2) Anticipatory scenarios, where one starts with painting a picture of a future situa- 
tion and then asks: how do we get there? This category is most often either nor- 
mative, i.e., how do  we reach a desirable future, or contrasted, e.g. a solar or 
uranium future society. Crisis scenarios, which are so common in war gaming 
(e.g. DeLeon, 1975, De Weerd, 1974) could also be added into this category. 
Another useful dichotomy is methodological and informal scenario writing (Asplund, 
1979). The methodological approach is where a certain method or model is used t o  assure 
that  it does not matter who constructs the scenario. The same input assumptions should 
lead to  the same output. The informal scenario writing procedure differs from situation to  
situation and from author to  author. This does not mean that  an informal scenario is 
unstructured or lacks logical consistency. It should be possible to  define criteria of quality 
for both informal and methodological scenario writing. 
Two forms are predominantly used for making the difference between alternative 
scenarios; alternative developmental trends in key factors like population, energy use and 
GDP,  and alternative developmental constructs i.e. differing assumptions about the 
dynamics of the future world (Makridakis and Wheelwright, 1978). 
2.3.1. Exploratory scenar ios  
Among studies that  use an exploratory approach, a great variety of studies can be 
found, for example: 
1. Methodological without developmental constructs (the dynamic structures of the world 
remain unchanged) 
Most computer model studies use different assumptions on key factors like popula- 
tion and economic growth as primary scenario characteristics. The developmental con- 
structs, if there are any, are built into the model. But an often hidden assumption is that  
many of the basic structures like the political, ideological, economic and environmental 
systems and often also technology, if they are not particularly focused in the study, 
remain relatively unchanged or, sometimes, have a linear development. These studies are 
most often sectoral or sometimes multi-sectoral, because i t  is hard t o  model more than 
one sector. Here we can find global energy studies like Haefele et al. (1981) or Edmonds 
and Reilly (1985), natural resource studies like "Limits t o  growth" (Meadows et  al., 1972) 
and multi-sectoral studies like Leontief (1976) or Global 2000 (CEQ, 1980). Their 
approach is definitely methodological (the scenario construction, but not necessarily the 
model building) and the output is dominantly quantitative. The scenarios constructed 
with such models are usually presented primarily with numbers and graphs and are sel- 
dom very attractive reading. This means here that they do not tell an entertaining story, 
but they can of course, if treated right, present a valuable discussion on future problems. 
But in general, computer model runs are too meager to be called more than "a synopsis", 
a sketch of the future. 
2. Methodological scenarios un'th developmental constructs 
One representative for exploratory scenario studies where a set of alternative 
developmental constructs was used to  characterize the scenarios is Interfutures (Lesourne, 
1979). In this study the scenarios are defined with the help of assumptions about 4 dimen- 
sions: 
- relations between developed countries, 
- internal dynamics in developed countries, 
- North-South relations, 
- internal dynamics in developing countries. 
With varying combinations of assumptions about these dimensions, six alternative 
scenarios are sketched in the study. The approach is both methodological, with computer 
model runs, and informal, with a discussion on the possible consequences of the various 
assumptions made. But no real stories are told in this study. The "scenarios", mostly in 
quantitative form, mainly have the function of setting a framework for discussion. They 
are compared and discussed immediately and never presented like alternative "future his- 
tories". 
3. Informal ezploratory scenarios 
Herman Kahn was certainly a very informal futuristic writer. He chose what he con- 
sidered the most important trends to  focus on, extrapolate and discuss. His style has been 
described as subjective, pointillistic, improvised and kaleidoscopical. His most important 
assumption is that  future development will resemble the past (Agel, 1973; Cole, 1977; 
Asplund, 1979). Most often he extrapolates what he considers t o  be the central trends 
into the future. For example, in "The next 200 years" (Kahn et  al., 1976) only one 
scenario is presented and discussed. What is presented is basically the most likely future 
and the most likely solutions to future problems, according to  Herman Kahn and the Hud- 
son Institute. No alternatives are given; these are left to readers and critics to  imagine. 
Even if Kahn's style is informal, the presentations and discussions are dominated by 
numbers and graphs, the traditional scientific language. 
Another type of scenario is presented in "Sverige i varlden" (Sweden in the world) 
(Huldt et al., 1979). The aim of this study was t o  examine how alternative developments 
of the international system may affect Sweden. Four, clearly distinctive, alternative 
developmental lines are explored here. They are chosen from a four-field model with two 
pair of opposites on the axes: internationalization vs. disinternationalization and conflict 
vs. cooperation, on the axes. This gives the following scenarios: 
- "Towards a new order" (internationalization + cooperation) 
- "The society of the developed nations" (internationalization + conflict) 
- "Liberum veto", i.e. an anarchic system of small nations (disinternationalization + 
conflict) 
- "The world of small units", i.e. a happy, peaceful cooperating world, based on 
small independent units (disinternationalization + cooperation) 
These scenarios are only presented verbally. They have the form of four separate 
future histories and each tries to anchor the characteristic trends in the recent past and 
discuss or present possible consequences of the sketched developments for Sweden . 
A similar approach is used in "Europe 2000" (Hall, 1977), where six alternative 
futures are sketched for Europe: 
- "Europe suppressed, or survival of the two blocs". 
- "One Europe, or Europe united by challenge" 
- "A Europe of nations" 
- "A Europe of regions, or the revolt of the regional periphery" 
- "Explosive change in Eastern Europe" 
- "A Chinese arrival on the European scene" 
These scenarios are never fully developed like stories in the above study. Their main 
function is to  sketch a field for discussion, showing a broad framework of possible, and 
varying, futures. 
2.3.2. Anticipatory scenarios 
1.  Normat ive  approaches 
The history of futuristic literature is full of normative, informal, "utopian" scenarios, 
where more or less detailed, ideal future societies are described and ways of getting there 
are pointed out. The most influential and well-known writings in this field are probably 
those of the 19th century. Among these we can find socialistic utopias like the ones of 
Fournier, Owen, Bellamy ("Looking Backward 2000-1887") and Marx and Engels ("The 
Communist Manifesto"), anarchistic utopias like the ones of Proudhon and Kropotkin, or 
more environmentally oriented pieces like William Morris: "News from Nowhere". They 
have a long row of followers, but in our century very few utopias have had any lasting 
attention. One of the exceptions is Skinner's "Walden Two". (See Kumar (1987) for a 
modern review of Utopias from different times.) 
Hazan Ozbekhan has developed a more methodological approach for constructing 
normative anticipatory scenarios. This method consists of several steps which include crit- 
ical analysis of the present system, definition of a framework of possible futures and of 
objectives, elaboration of a preferred future state, and construction of a way to  get there 
(France:Datar, 1975). It is interesting to note that  exploratory scenarios are also used for 
the preliminary analysis. 
2. Contras ted  anticipatory approaches. 
Contrasted anticipatory scenarios often seek the extremes. The titles of contrasted 
future scenarios for France, made by SESAM (France:Datar, 1975) exemplify this ten- 
dency: 
- "La France de cent millions" (France with a very high population) 
- "La France cotiere" (France dominated by the coastal regions) 
A typical contrasting scenario study is the Swedish energy future study "Sun or 
Uranium" (Loennroth et  al., 1978), where two contrasting energy futures for Sweden are 
sketched: Uranium- Sweden where 80 % of the energy in 2015 is provided by nuclear 
power, and Solar-Sweden where only renewable fuels are used. In both cases the same 
amount of energy is used in 2015. The main part of the scenario construction here is a 
quantitative exercise, e.g. how much investment or how much land will be needed for 
energy production and what will a possible fuel mix look like in these contrasting futures. 
2.4. Conclusions  
There is no established doctrine on how to  create, present or use scenarios. In the 
studies mentioned above we have seen a plethora of differing methods. 
The exploratory studies build on different trend assumptions. Most common is 
perhaps extrapolation of current trends as perceived from recent experience. This kind of 
study can be said to form today's conventional wisdom. More sophisticated is the frame- 
work approach where varying isolated trends extrapolated into the future define the limits 
of the possible future and form a base for discussion about problems in alternative futures 
(e.g. Hall, 1977; Lesourne, 1979; Huldt et al., 1979). Anticipatory studies hypothesize 
future situations that  can be desirable (based on certain goals), undesirable (e.g. a future 
crisis situation) or contrasted (painting some alternative futures to  be compared), and try 
to find reasonable ways to  get to  these future states. 
Many studies use a combination of approaches and within these categories a great 
diversity of methods can be found. They can be based on a formal methodology e.g. the 
use of computer models or some sort of tree or box model, or the approach can be more 
informal. In any case there are several demands that  should be placed on a "good" 
scenario. These include: 
(1) Provision of adequate information and explanations of the central assumptions 
that  the scenario is built upon. Questionable, weak or controversial points have to be 
brought to  light, not to be hidden. 
(2) A logical contiguity of events and continuity of actions during the progression of 
the scenario through time, and some consideration of historical experience. These are 
important to  make the scenarios as intelligible as possible. 
(3) Sufficient detail to  allow for a tolerable "performance" of the scenario. The detail 
requirement and the focus have of course to  be adjusted according t o  the purpose of the 
scenario project. A balanced and consequent use of detail should also be called for, but 
this must not prevent the scenario writer from feeling free to  make the presentation more 
interesting and vivid by introducing some variation in detail. 
In all these points an adaptation to the specific goals of a scenario project is implicit 
and this should be a major demand; a "good" scenario is one that  fills its defined function. 
This is also emphasized by Brown (1968): "The function, form and content are deter- 
mined by the specific research task a t  hand. Different levels of analysis have differing 
requirements for detail and scenario credibility." 
3. THE S C E N A R I O  C O N S T R U C T I O N  
3.1. Why Scenar ios  ? 
In Section 2 different scenario approaches, uses and demands on a scenario were 
presented. The main conclusion was that  a "good" scenario is adapted to  achieve the goals 
that  are defined within the project where the scenario technique is used. The examples 
show that  the uses differ between various projects, but there are also similarities. But why 
has scenario building been used? What are the advantages and purposes of this technique? 
There are two particularly advantageous qualities of scenarios that  are emphasized 
in the studies mentioned in the previous section: 
1) The scenario serves as a tool to  force imagination, stimulate discussion and focus 
attention a t  specific points of interest (France:Datar, 1975). 
A scenario is a perfect tool to  force policy-makers to "think big" (Pra t t ,  1974). 
This can mean to  think globally, take longer time-scales into consideration, be 
more imaginative than in every-day thinking, etc.; in short, they open wider per- 
spectives in thinking and discussion. An essential quality of a scenario is that  it 
makes the future more concrete, touchable and opens the field for a constructive 
discussion about it. In Loennroth et  al. (1978:97-98) it is stated that: 
"It is important to  try to  present a consistent whole, and the hope is that  
Uranium- and Solar-Sweden can serve as a base for discussion on what 
people desire will be possible in the future, especially since both Uranium- 
and Solar-Sweden can be viewed as representatives of different values and 
opinions that  are current in the society" (author translation) 
It is also commonly emphasized that  scenarios make it possible to  explore 
consequences of the adoption of various strategic policies, given differing trends 
that  dominate the development of the surrounding world (Lesourne, 1979). 
This is often a central objective for scenario writing in the context of gaming 
and policy exercises. Here, for example, it is important that  a scenario is writ- 
ten in such a way that: 
"(a) i t  stimulates users to  formulate strategies in relation to  i t ;  and (b) it 
assists users in the identification of the benefits and pitfalls of alternative 
strategies." (Ygdrassil e t  al., 1986:15). 
2) The scenario provides a coherent framework for analysis on how various issues 
or sectoral developments impinge on one another and interact (e.g. Lesourne, 
1979). This is important if multi-sectoral studies are to  bring new knowledge. 
Wilson (1978:227) points out: 
"history is a 'booming, buzzing confusion' of events, trends and discon- 
tinuities, ..... Scenarios have a special ability to  represent this mul- 
tifaceted, interacting flow-process, combining (when appropriate) d e m e  
graphic changes, social trends, political events, economic variables and 
technological developments." 
For environmental projects which focus on the large-scale, long-term interactions 
between development and environment, scenarios are indispensable tools. Both of the 
qualities mentioned above are essential. In the policy exercises, scenarios are needed to 
stimulate discussion, force imagination and focus attention on the long-term, large scale 
problems that  few policy-makers are disposed to  consider. For long-term studies and 
assessments, scenarios can serve as frameworks for combining the various sectoral fields. 
3.2. The Aims of the Scenarios 
One of the areas of particular attention for long-term, large scale environmental stu- 
dies concerned with "scenarios of socioeconomic development". The goals of these efforts 
are manyfold (see, e.g., Clark, 1986). Primarily, the intention is to  characterize possible 
paths of human development for the world over the next century. The scenarios presented 
in this report are aimed to  be used as inputs in various parts of future environmental p r e  
jects: 
- the environmental assessments, 
- the regional case studies, 
- the Policy Exercise. 
T o  fulfill this task, they need among other things to: 
- describe alternative coherent future developments which are possible to  use as 
frameworks in the different studies; 
- present some essential input numbers for population, energy and agricultural 
development; 
- be sufficiently interesting and entertaining to stimulate attention, imagination and 
discussion; and 
- be flexible enough to adapt to differing contexts and change according to the 
demands of various users. There must be room for further development of a scenario and 
it should never be regarded as completed. A scenario should stimulate discussion and cri- 
ticism and be open to  improvements. In this way it can be used as a research tool to bring 
forth certain kinds of knowledge about, e.g., the mechanisms of development and change. 
Secondarily, it is important for the users to gather experience of scenario writing, 
construction and presentation. 
Thirdly, the users should devote particular attention to  exploration of discontinui- 
ties and surprise, and to  constructing surprise-rich alternatives to  the smooth "conven- 
tional wisdom" standard projections. 
3.3. W h y  S u r p r i s e  Scenar ios  ? 
Most modern future studies have been based on "an evolutionary paradigm - the gra- 
dual, incremental unfolding of the world manner that can be described by surprise-free 
models, with parameters derived from a combination of time-series and cross-sectional 
analyses of the existing system" (Brooks, 1986:326). 
They usually assume that  the dynamics of the present system, as perceived from stu- 
dies of the recent past, will remain basically the same. In most studies the global 
economic, political and social structures are implicitly similar to the present. Technology, 
economy and environment, if focused, develop in a highly linear pattern. This approach 
can elucidate long-term trends and broad-scale pattern. These studies are necessary but 
insufficient, particularly, if we want to improve management of long-term interactions 
between development and environment. This is, for example, because: "....change can 
also occur in abrupt, discontinuous bursts" (Holling, 1986). 
"By leaving out the external shocks, non-linear responses, and discontinuous 
behavior so typical of social and natural systems, surprise-free analysis leaves 
us unprepared to interpret a host of not improbable eventualities" (Clark, 
1986:31). 
Clark (1986) discerns these weaknesses of the dominating futures research and the 
lack of methods to  deal with discontinuities in future development when he states that: 
"A central challenge of our Biosphere Project is to  see how far we can go in 
developing the methods, models and concepts necessary to  move beyond 
surprise-free analyses to  a more realistic treatment of the interactions between 
development and environment." (Clark, 1986:32) 
3.4. The "Surprise-Rich" Scenar ios  
The three scenarios that  are presented in this report should be viewed in the context 
of analyzing surprise-rich development paths. They are efforts to  characterize some possi- 
ble, even if highly surprising, futures. They are based on the output of a workshop that  
was held in January 1986 to  construct "surprise-rich" developments to complement 
"surprise-free" conventional wisdom. This activity was jointly hosted by IIASA and the 
Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN) and led by Professors 
Torsten Hagerstrand of University of Lund, Sweden, and Robert Kates of Brown Univer- 
sity, USA. Twenty scholars with backgrounds ranging from history to  technology assess- 
ment and ecology were brought together for a week a t  Friibergh Manor outside of Stock- 
holm. After a briefing on the "conventional wisdom" scenario, the participants jointly 
defined a set of 3 surprising or unconventional states of the world for the year 2075. The 
participants then broke into three groups, each of which attempted to  write three con- 
sistent "future histories" describing paths that the world could take from its present state 
to  the surprising end-points of 2075, while invoking as few miracles as possible. The three 
tasks that the groups tried to solve were: 
1.  The Big Shift 
The center of the world economy moves eastwards to  East and South Asia. The Western 
World stagnates in both population and economic activity. 
2. The Big Load 
A world with 20 billion people, much higher than any demographer today would expect, 
but with relatively high standards of living in terms of energy use and agricultural pr* 
duction. 
3. The Big ? 
Here the groups were allowed to construct their own surprising futures. 
These future histories focussed particularly on the development of Europe and South 
Asia. On the last day of the workshop, the groups compared their independent solutions 
to the "future history" problems and revised their treatments accordingly. The results 
have been published by FRN under the title "Surprising Futures - Notes from an Interna- 
tional Workshop on Long-term World Development" (Svedin and Aniansson, 1987), 
which here is also called the "Friibergh Book". The three "surprise-rich" scenarios that are 
presented in my report result from efforts to combine and further elaborate these future 
histories, complement them with numerical paths and to  present them in a more organ- 
ized, summarized manner. 
4. THE S C E N A R I O S  
4.1. In t roduc t ion  t o  t h e  Scenario Presentat ions 
In this chapter three surprise-rich futures for the world 1975-2075 are sketched. The 
scenarios are based on the future histories that were produced at the Friibergh workshop. 
Together with versions of "The Big Shift" and "The Big Load", "The Rurban Arcadian 
Drift", which describes a small-unit, small-scale future development derived from the 
three "Big ?" future histories (presented in the Friibergh book under "Hope Regained" and 
"History Lost"), is presented. The three scenarios are in short as follows: 
1.  The Big Shift 
South and East Asia become the center of the world. Europe and the rest of the 
Western World undergo a "noble decline" with economic and social crises. The gap in 
wealth between North (North America, Europe, USSR and Oceania) and South (Latin 
America, Africa and the rest of Asia) decreases considerably. World population stabilizes 
a t  about 8 billion. Global energy use and agricultural production per capita increase simi- 
larly to  the conventional wisdom scenario, but their distributions are entirely different. 
2. The Big Load 
Population does not stabilize and reaches 20 billion by the year 2075. Energy use is 
12 times higher and agricultural production 7.5 times higher than in 1975. This is possible 
due to radical changes in social and political systems and population distribution, and to  
revolutionary technological innovations. By 2075 more than half of the used energy is con- 
sumed in Northern regions, which have approximately the same share (25%) of the global 
population as a hundred years earlier. 
3. Rurban Arcadian Drift 
Major catastrophes result in a reduction of population, disruption of the process of 
increased global integration and a total reconstruction of the global system. The South 
develops rapidly and in the North small village societies with a high degree of self- 
reliance, low energy-use, but also a very narrow-minded, local orientation, are established. 
In this world science stagnates and nobody really cares about global problems. Popula- 
tion is by 2075 only 6.8 billion. Energy use increases 3.7 times and agricultural production 
4 times. Some 8045% of the energy use takes place in the southern regions. 
These scenarios focus, as did the workshop, particularly on Europe and South Asia. 
For each scenario the presentations below consist of an introduction, a chronological sum- 
mary (where the sequence of events, actions and development is presented), a part where 
the development of population, energy and agriculture is described more explicitly by 
numbers and graphs, a commentary on the numerical representation, and a final part 
where the essential ideas in the scenario are discussed. 
For more details, further explanation and information about the scenarios and the 
logics behind the development sketched in them than is presented here, see Svedin and 
Aniansson (1987). The Big Shift version is a combination of all four Big Shift sequences. 
The Big Load version has used "Big Load: History Sequence 2" as base, but borrowed 
integrable ideas from the other sequences as well. The Rurban Arcadian Drift uses the 
framework of "Hope Regained 1: The Rurban Arcadian Example" including some traits 
from "Hope Regained 2" and "History Lost". The chronologies are here sometimes 
slightly changed to  match the 25-year periods, but the main source of events should be 
clearly recognizable. 
The main guideline of the efforts to  give the surprise-rich scenarios numerical 
representations has been to  keep growth rates, quantities of migration, the use of various 
fuels and penetration rates and influence of new technologies in the scenarios within the 
limits of what may reasonably be considered as possible, according to  recent studies and 
present "expert opinion" (or "conventional wisdom"). Everything that  is close to or 
beyond these limits of the perceived possible has to  be specially illuminated in connection 
with the scenarios. This means that  the scenarios either designate ways to get around 
these, for example, by new inventions or socioeconomic, institutional and ideological 
changes, or that  the assumptions are explicitly stated and left open for discussion. Note 
here that  miracles are minimized in the scenarios and only a few revolutionary inventions 
are implemented, none of which are any "final solutions". 
Population, energy use and agricultural production have been chosen as key factors 
in the numerical representations of the scenarios since they probably are the most impor- 
tant  indicators of impact on the environment. From them it should be possible t o  deduce 
consistent levels of other activities of importance such as industrial activity. 
The procedure of constructing these numerical paths can be best described as an 
interactive process between the scenarios, the numbers and conventional wisdom, and also 
between construction efforts and criticism. The numbers of the Conventional Wisdom 
Scenario were used as a starting-point. The subsequent problems were: What do the 
scenarios imply for the development of population, energy and agriculture? How should 
we adapt the numerical paths of The Conventional Wisdom Scenario to  this? Conven- 
tional wisdom is based upon the assumption that  the basic structures of the world will be 
similar to  the present. The driving forces are largely economic. Here the problem is how 
changes in the political, institutional, ideological and social structures would influence 
these key factors. Once the development for these indicators was sketched, the next ques- 
tions were: Is this really reasonable, taking recent studies into account? Is there enough 
support for this in the scenario? Changes were often necessary in both the numbers and 
the scenarios. This procedure was repeated several times. Development of the basic 
indicators and the scenarios have then been worked through, been criticized and comple- 
mented with fuel mixes and key factors during a workshop with invited specialists and 
presumed users. 
This process is intended to be on-going, both with further elaboration of particular 
fields of interest for the users and, if called for, adaptations as "new" knowledge is brought 
into consideration. Since a scenario is only hypothetical and constructed for the purposes 
of a certain project, it should be open for possible changes. Changes in the overall struc- 
ture are of course more difficult to  allow since they are complicated to  introduce and 
might affect large parts of the whole construction. Such changes therefore require strong 
arguments. 
Comparisons of the distributions of population, energy use and agricultural produc- 
tion between North and South, the present industrialized and developing regions, have in 
general been calculated with the development of Europe and South Asia and the Conven- 
tional Wisdom Scenario as guide-marks for the development of other regions in North and 
South. In the Big Shift the growth of South Asia is higher than in other developing 
regions, and the growth of Europe lower than in the other industrialized regions. In the 
other scenarios the corresponding regions follow the development of the two regions more 
closely. 
The division into 25-year periods is done for practical reasons, but also with an eye 
on using the scenarios in Policy Exercises (Toth, 1988a, 1988b) with 25-year steps. 
Between each step, the participants could speculate about the coming development and 
design some policies. Used in this context, the scenarios should be somewhat more flexi- 
ble than those presented here, but the hope is that in this form they could serve as some 
kind of base for a Control Team, which could elaborate alternative developments, and 
trend breaks. 
4.2. The Big Shift 
The center of world economy shifts to  the East. South and East Asia, with more 
than half of the global population, become dominating in economic, political and scientific 
matters and also exert great cultural influence on other regions. Behind this development 
is primarily an enormous internal development with radical political actions and impor- 
tant  institutional and social innovations, but also the changed international situation 
with a weakening of the Developed World. 
In the former industrialized world, capitalist as well as socialist countries turn intro- 
vert, occupied by social and economic problems. The East-West conflict fades away. The 
present superpowers are preoccupied with internal problems. The Third World has, like 
Asia, high economic growth under influence of the Asian examples, and the gap between 
North and South decreases importantly. 
Europe is unable t o  handle the arising problems and t o  adapt t o  the new interna- 
tional situation. Population stagnates, and a lack of cooperation between different coun- 
tries and social groups leads to  chronic social and political instability and economic 
decline. 
During this period India is a very dynamic and expansive society, successful in solv- 
ing most upcoming problems. This is a consequence of both an advantageous international 
situation and some radical political actions and social innovations. A new social ideology, 
a kind of synthesis between new modernist ideas and traditional religious and social 
values, proves successful in guiding development, mobilizing the masses and keeping social 
tensions below the boiling point. 
By 2075 the world has a relatively stable population of about 8 billion people. Five 
times more energy is consumed and the agricultural output has increased 2.5 times over 
the hundred-year period, while the population has only doubled. The inequalities of 
wealth are less significant than a century earlier. 
4.2.1. Chronology 
The most important events in this scenario are summarized in Table 4.1. Factor 
increases of population, energy use and agricultural development for the World, Europe 
and South-Asia are presented in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
Economic instability and recession is hitting the developing countries hard. Several 
bankruptcies of major countries occur. Thoughts of self-reliance and threats of breaking 
with the world market become widely spread. The expected reduction of population 
growth does not take place. The crises culminate just before the turn of the century with 
problems for the banks, chaos on the stock-market, threatening collapse of the global 
monetary system and chronic famines in large regions of the Third World. 
Europe has relatively slow growth compared with the preceding 25-year period. Ris- 
ing social costs, exacerbated by an increasing percentage of retired and unproductive 
population, result in slower productivity growth and increasing social tension. A large 
part of the population is chronically unemployed. This group becomes the hearth of grow- 
ing social discontent and unrest. A series of disastrous nuclear accidents, of which the 
Phoenix catastrophe in France is the worst, puts an end to the once impressive nuclear 
programs in Europe and the rest of the world with the exception of South Asia and USSR. 
In India Rajiv Gandhi introduces a very ambitious and radical modernization pro- 
gram, which involves administration and taxation reforms, greater market orientation, 
massive RkD investments, agricultural and educational programs and social reforms par- 
ticularly directed to groups important for economic development. In contrast to most 
other countries, India actively develops its own nuclear reactors, which require less capital 
and over time become less prone to catastrophic failure. Furthermore, the ambitious fam- 
ily planning programs result in reduced population growth. 
Demands for a New Economic Order unify most developing countries against Europe 
(not including the USSR) and USA. China, Japan and USSR support these demands. In 
2001 a treaty is signed on a New Global Economic Order, including a long-term plan for 
the development of the Third World. In exchange for improved terms of trade, the 
developing countries promise to  take drastic actions to  control population growth. The 
movement of industrial production accelerates southwards. Multinational corporations 
support widespread and ambitious programs for education and agricultural development. 
In the 2010s signs of a slow-down of global population growth can be observed. There is 
an increase of innovational activities in the South, particularly in Asia. In the North there 
is increased exchange and convergence between Eastern and Western countries. 
The reform programs of India turn out to be extremely successful. Some very impor- 
tant innovations such as high-yielding millet and small electric tractors have Indian origin 
and come to be mass produced with surprising speed. The nuclear industry begins to  
export reactors to  other parts of Asia. India is also becoming an important military power 
and establishes its sphere of influence with increased control of its neighbors. Rajiv Gan- 
dhi dies in 2014. After a couple of years, Mahatma Singh establishes a new regime that 
very successfully reconciliates the various religious groups and combines Indian sacred 
traditions with continued progressive modernization programs. 
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Table 4.1 Chronological summary of the Big Shift scenario 
WORLD EUROPE SOUTH ASIA 
2075 Development of tourist 
industry 
The new order with 
Asia as center of the 
world established Agricultural exports 
2050 Large scale biomass Suburbanization 
plantations Asia leading in science 
Multinationals moving Decline 
eastwards Population and energy Stable population 
use stagnates 
Fast and stable growth High-tech emigration 
2025 Radical reduction of 
population growth Mahatma Singh 
"tradmod" synthesis 
Industrial production Exports of nuclear 
moves southwards technology 
Accelerated energy use Successes for Indian growth Internal interstate R&D 
Education/birth con- conflicts Military expansion 
trol program 
New Economic Order Stagnation 
2000 Economic crisis Increased social insta- Nuclear energy invest- 
bility ments 
Continued population R k D  investments growth and economic 
recession Phoenix nuclear catas- Social reforms 
trophy Rajiv's new deal 
Chronic unemployment 
1975 
Europe has enormous problems to  adapt to  the new situation. Economic progress is 
slow and there is continuous conflict with increasing violence between various age, ethnic 
and social groups within the states and also increasing tensions between the states. This 
social disruption leads to  gradual migration of economic activities to  Asia and particu- 
larly to India, whose British traditions, stable government and location in a flourishing 
Asia make an attractive alternative to  the economically stagnating West. 
2025-2050 
Population development is sensational. Already in the 2030's some countries of the 
former Third World are down to  zero-growth. The Western World seems to  have lost the 
leading position in science to  Asia, where India, China and Japan also have become 
important military powers. The former superpowers USA and USSR have lost their global 
ambitions and concentrate on their internal development. In 2030 a treaty of nuclear 
disarmament is signed by USA, USSR and the European countries. This removes the last 
remnants of superpower influence in Europe and gives the Soviet Union the possibility to  
concentrate on the Chinese border. Multinational corporations base their activities to  an 
increasing degree in the East and South. 
The economy of South Asia flourishes and Indian agriculture is revolutionized by 
introduction of new crops. A large, reasonably well-educated middle class is developing, 
which, though not as well off as its counterparts in some other regions of the world, pro- 
vides a stabilizing element in the Indian society. One aspect of this development is the 
increased suburbanization of Indian cities. Population densities in these suburbs are still 
higher than in the suburbs of non-Asian cities, but the severe urban problems have s u b  
sided before the turn of the century. Suburbanization is one factor contributing to  a slow 
decrease in agricultural land. Indian influence is growing considerably in Africa, where the 
"Indian way" becomes the new alternative. 
In Europe the crises and conflicts culminate. The stagnation turns into a slow 
decline in population as well as of standards of living. 
Towards the end of the hundred-year period South and East Asia can be viewed as 
the more dominating core area of the world. They are not only the dominating regions in 
economic terms, but also in political and cultural terms. USA, USSR and Europe are stag- 
nating, but still wealthy compared with other regions. Europe turns more and more into a 
museum. Population and energy use are decreasing and tourism is becoming a major 
industry in both Western and Central Europe. The numerous Chinese and Indian middle 
classes have sufficient disposable income for tourism abroad to  become popular. Their 
children often attend university in Europe. Biomass plantations with various kinds of 
fast-growing species have become a typical trait of the European landscape. 
South Asia has become a rather wealthy, modern, well-organized society, but  some 
signs of the "European disease" with relative economic stagnation, high public expendi- 
ture (e.g. for armament) and growing social unrest (because of large social and economic 
inequalities) can be observed. 
4.2.2. Population 
Global population growth levels off faster than anyone expected and the world has 
by 2075 a stable population of about 8 billion people, 718 living in the four former Third 
World regions. The population of South Asia already stabilizes in the 2030s a t  approxi- 
mately 2 billion (2.4 times the 1975 population). After 2040 Europe has a declining popu- 
lation and by 2075 its numbers are down to  the same level as a century earlier. 
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Figure 4.1 Big Shift scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for the World 
(Note: E/C = ener.use per capita, A/C = agr.prod. per capita) 
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Figure 4.2 Big Shift scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for Europe 
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Figure 4.3 Big Shift scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for South Asia 
4.2.3. Energy 
Global energy use increases five times over the hundred-year period. Energy con- 
sumption per capita is 5 kW in 2075. This is the same figure as in the conventional wis- 
dom scenario (CWS), but the distribution of use is much more even: 213 is used in the 
southern regions (compared with about 40% in the CWS, where the distribution of popu- 
lation between North and South is roughly the same). The profound economic and geopol- 
itical transformations of the world society give rise to  unprecedented patterns of energy 
production and use. For example, the Phoenix accident totally removes (even if for a 
very long transition period) nuclear power as a contending energy source in the Western 
World and forces a commitment to  development of renewable sources. By contrast, 
India's nuclear development flourishes, while biomass and solar energy, which might have 
been expected to  prosper on Indian latitudes and rural conditions, play only a modest 
role, even if solar energy begins to  compete successfully with nuclear energy as the cen- 
tury progresses. 
After stable increase for centuries, energy use in Europe reaches a maximum in the 
2020s and declines then as a result of the severe crisis and by 2075 it is a t  a level 30% 
above that of a century earlier. Despite languishing population growth, this signifies a per 
capita consumption above the 1975 level by a similar margin and does not point to  any 
long-term deterioration in living standards, it nevertheless does suggest a downward slide 
from per capita income levels, which prevail in the early 21st century. Fossil fuels dom- 
inate the market totally, particularly after the close-down of nuclear power, but the weak- 
ening economy and unreliable supplies encourage introduction of large biomass and solar 
programs. 
In South Asia energy use increases 16 times during the hundred-year period. All 
sources of energy are expanding radically. Nuclear power becomes the most important 
energy source, especially for production of electricity, but fossil fuels still constitute 
almost half of the energy supply in 2075. The typical trait for the Indian society is, how- 
ever, its low energy profile. India is still in 2075 using less than 10% of the global energy 
use. 
4.2.4. Agriculture 
Global agricultural production increases 2.5 times between 1975 and 2075 (per c a p  
ita 1.3 times). This increase is primarily the result of a relatively successful modernization 
of the agricultural sector in the Developing World, which is supported by improved terms 
of trade, fewer trade barriers, and ambitious programs for agricultural development 
implemented by governments, international agencies and multinational corporations. The 
increase comes both from an extension of cropland, which increases by 20%, and from 
intensification. Which of these is more important differs from region to  region, depending 
on available land and technological level. Fertilizer use increases by a factor of 2.5 and 
irrigated land by 30%. No revolutionary new technologies are introduced, but research 
and development establishments produce a continuous stream of improved technologies 
and genetic improvements suited to the special environmental and economic conditions of 
farmers around the world. Some of the more important of these have Asian origin. 
South Asian agriculture experiences a minor revolution during the hundred-year 
period. Total production increases five times and per capita production more than dou- 
bles. Behind this development there are amongst other things some highly successful 
government programs, which include: 
- educational programs to  raise the skill level of farmers; 
- social welfare and economic programs to  ameliorate the conditions of small farm- 
ers and make it possible for them to invest; 
- R&D-generated innovations that are readily adopted by Indian farmers, e.g. small 
electric tractors, new fast-growing bamboo; 
- an active program to increase the amount of irrigated land; 
- a program to increase fertilizer use by stabilizing prices and providing subsidies. 
By 2075, fertilizer use per hectare has increased eightfold and land under irrigation 
by 80%. Fertilizer use increases in part due to intensification of land use i.e. two or more 
crops are grown on the same land each year. The increase in irrigated land occurs despite 
a 5% decrease in total agricultural land (including pasturage) due to land pressures by the 
growing suburban population of India. 
Total agricultural production in Europe grows by a factor of 2.6. Because a large 
part of this is devoted to  relatively low value biomass for energy production, and because 
of low population growth, agricultural technology develops along a more land-extensive 
path than during the 20th century; the amount of agricultural land increases by 30%, the 
amount of irrigated land remains unchanged, and the growth of fertilizer use per hectare 
slows down drastically compared with the preceding 50-year period (despite a factor 
increase of 1.9). As in the world generally, yield growth decreases through the hundred- 
year period. 
4.2.5. Commentary 
4.2.5.1. N u m e r i c a l  r ep resen ta t ions  
The curve of global population is fashioned after a very low Keyfitz-path (Keyfitz et  
al., 1983). What makes this development possible is primarily the surprising Asian 
development. The path for South Asia is a stretched version of the global curve with a 
shorter distance in time t o  a stable population. This development would certainly be a 
surprise, but could in fact be supported by some recent "optimistic" forecasts which point 
towards possibilities for even more radical decreases of birth rates in India. The popula- 
tion of Europe increases as described in the conventional wisdom scenario and then 
declines by 16% during the second half of the hundred-year period. 
Global energy use increases during the first half of the hundred-year period faster 
than in the "conventional wisdom". This is primarily due to  the radical economic expan- 
sion in the developing countries. After 2050 global growth slows down because of the stag- 
nation in the North. In Europe energy use reaches a peak in the middle of the hundred- 
year period and decreases then by about a 113 until 2075. The energy consumption in 
South Asia follows a higher path than in any of the other scenarios with relatively con- 
stant  growth until the final 25-year period when the growth slows down a bit as the econ- 
omy is maturing. 
The fossil fuels are still the most important energy sources, but not as dominating as 
in the conventional wisdom (60% vs 80% of the market), while renewables play a more 
important role (24% vs 18%). Nuclear energy is important in Asia, having a market 
share of almost 40% in South Asia, but is abolished in most other parts of the world. 
None of the global energy figures in this scenario are very radical according t o  present 
"expert opinion", but the geographical distribution of energy use is surprising. 
Global agricultural production per capita follows about the same developmental 
path as in the "conventional wisdom" (even a little bit higher for the first fifty years) 
until 2050, but then levels off in comparison. The increase comes also primarily from 
introduction of land-saving technologies, including higher yielding crops, crops with 
shorter growing seasons, mechanization, and increased irrigation and fertilizer use. This 
development is most evident in the developing world. The role of biotechnology is res- 
trained. The average annual increase in yields, 1.7%, is less than in the second half of the 
20th century. 
In Europe, agricultural production grows considerably more than in the reference 
scenario. A large part of this increase is biomass for energy production, but European 
agriculture is also thought t o  become more export-oriented as the purchasing power of the 
urban populations in the developing regions grow. The technology develops along a more 
land-extensive path. The amount of land in agricultural production grows significantly. 
The rate of increase of fertilizer use per hectare is far less than in most parts of the world, 
especially compared with the rates of growth in the 20th century. In part this slower 
growth reflects the already high levels of fertilizer use in Europe, but i t  also indicates low 
returns t o  additional amounts. Added t o  this are the rising costs of natural gas, the main 
feedstock of modern nitrogen fertilizer production. 
The South Asian agricultural development is totally dependent on the success of the 
land-saving technologies. The 80% expansion of irrigated lands demands that  virtually all 
the remaining potentially irrigatable land in the region are taken up. The salinity prob- 
lems associated with such a high level are assumed t o  be kept under reasonably satisfac- 
tory control. The radical 7.6 factor increase of fertilizer use is also problematic because of 
the great problems of environmental concern that  are likely to  occur in connection with 
such a development; the nitrogen carried away in runoff in a monsoon climate is much 
higher than in a European climate. 
4.2.5.2. B a s i c  ideas 
The big surprise in this scenario is the changing relationships between West and 
East. There will not be an increasing gap, but rather the reverse; Asia is going t o  take 
over the core role in the world economy. 
How would such a shift be possible? 
The thought inspiring this scenario has been called "peripheral theory" (see e.g. 
Senghaas, 1985), expressing the great future prospects of China (but never India) in a 
future where richness in population means great strength and opportunity, providing 
man-power and an ever increasing demand. India is, however, like China, not a typical 
developing country and should not be compared with countries in Africa and Latin Amer- 
ica. The most obvious difference is of course the size. India is also an old high culture with 
a rich tradition in science as well as in commerce and social organization. Enormous con- 
trasts are perhaps the most characteristic trait of the Indian society. Everything can be 
found there from the most efficient industrial farming, nuclear power stations, first class 
research etc., t o  the most primitive subsistence farming, from affluence to  the millions of 
starving people in the big cities. There are not only contrasts, but also contradictions. It 
is, for example, strange that  India, the country in the world with the largest number of 
starving people, is also one of the biggest food exporters. Such sad contrasts and contrad- 
ictory facts are what suggest a great potential of future prospects for India. 
The major assumptions in this scenario are: 
1) The main driving force in this "Big Shift" consists of the internal markets of India 
and China, but there is also a considerable increase in their participation in world 
trade. 
The expansion of the domestic markets of these huge and populous countries will 
create savings and increasingly replace foreign capital, that ,  however, along with 
some foreign technology, plays an important role during a period of transition. 
2) The expansion of market forces is triggered by relaxation of government control 
over free enterprise, which will release enormous entrepreneurial energy. 
In both India and China, there is an entrepreneurial tradition and a t  least an 
embryo of a capitalist class, which is not the case in most developing countries. A 
basic assumption is, thus, that  the only possible way for Asia is some kind of 
market capitalism. But this is not thought to  be comparable with the western 
19th century liberalism. India and China have an entirely different history and 
different social systems and traditions. The market forces will to  a large extent be 
controlled and encouraged by political and social forces. Tendencies in this direc- 
tion are already visible by the gradual abandonment of centralist and paternalist 
policies during the regimes of Deng Xiao-ping and Rajiv Gandhi. 
3) The specific cultural traditions and religious institutions, which have been seen as 
reactionary forces and hindrances to  all kinds of progress, will prove t o  be very 
valuable in both mobilizing the masses, encouraging innovation and initiatives, 
and in balancing the enormous stresses which rapid development poses on society. 
In Europe religion seems t o  have played an important role during the break- 
through of capitalism (see e.g. Weber, 1968). The new ideas of the Reformation 
encouraged individualism, hard work, saving and economic success. Could any- 
thing similar happen in India? This is really a hazardous field. It would of course 
be a surprise. From a Westerner's perspective, hinduism is often perceived as one 
of the major religions of the world with the least positive attitude towards life 
and interest for the problems of this world (Aspelin, 1977). But, despite this, 
would i t  be totally unreasonable that  this religion could adapt to  give some s u p  
port t o  a new, more progress-oriented societal ideology? We have for example 
experienced how Mahatma Gandhi used traditional values and religion for mobili- 
zation of the masses. The argument could in fact be made that  most successful 
regimes and long-lasting efforts of progressive transformation of societies, a t  least 
t o  some extent, have had to  adapt t o  the specific traditional values and institu- 
tions of their particular society. This has meant both using religion and tradition 
in some sort of new interpretation as a force to  unite the people (e.g. Khomeiny 
in Iran or Quadaffi in Libya), seeking some connection and support of religion 
(e.g. like Nasser in Egypt or the Sandinists in Nicaragua) or a t  least to  some 
extent build on old institutions, values and traditions. To this last category rela- 
tively secularized societies like Japan and the USSR can be counted today. The 
Japanese example is perhaps the most obvious case. In the case of the Soviet 
Union, I refer to  the rich literature that  describes the similarities between present 
Soviet institutions and those during the ancient Tzarist regime and the important 
use of Church Slavic (the old liturgian language of the Russian-Orthodox church, 
comparable with Latin in the catholic West) in politics since the days of Josef 
Stalin (Gerner, 1980). Ronald Reagan's success with demagogic use of traditional 
American values is another example. 
The assumption is that  each society has to  some extent t o  build on its own tradi- 
tions and history. Politicians have to adapt t o  values, morals and myths. Failure 
to  adapt to  social structures, values and morals can for example be found in con- 
nection with the implementation of Western development strategies in developing 
countries and the fall of regimes perceived by the West as successful, e.g. the 
Shah regime in Iran. If India is going to  realize its potential, it must find its own 
way. 
4) T o  make the Asian upswing possible, a certain relaxation of Western penetration 
and dominance is needed. 
For the economic upswing of Japan, World War I, which isolated Britain from 
the Asian market, was a triggering factor. In this scenario, the Northern 
economic collapse, the New Global Economic Order (not to  be overestimated), 
the gradually increasing difficulties of managing internal problems in the West, 
and the improvement of domestic investment opportunities all strengthen the 
position of India in negotiating relations with multi-national corporations for 
joint ventures and opening up new markets in Asia and Africa for Indian pro- 
ducts. 
5) A very important and perhaps controversial assumption is that  growth in the 
developing world is possible even if the Western World stagnates and participates 
to  a lesser degree in world trade. 
As has already been stressed, the primary forces are the internal markets of India 
and China with their immense latent demand. This is supported by historical 
examples of most populous Western countries (France, Austria-Hungary, Ger- 
many and even the USA) which during their take-off stages applied protectionist 
policies and had relatively limited foreign trade (though of course some technol- 
ogy import). As well, their domestic markets were the main driving force in their 
often rapid and successful industrialization process. They were less dependent on 
international trade and had a much less fluctuating industrialization than small 
export-oriented countries. (Senghaas, 1985). In this scenario, the whole Third 
World will experience important and relatively stable growth. Even if trade will 
not be as important compared with our century, it will still play a great role. 
When East and South Asia a couple of decades into the 21st century will be able 
to  compete on the growing markets of Africa and Latin America, then they will 
get an extra push forward, while the Western World will face another problem. 
Can Europe really stagnate? What are the forces behind such a development? 
Even if none of us believe that  this could happen, tendencies can be perceived 
that  could prove t o  be the critical factors for Europe: 
a) The aging population. If population stagnates, which it tends to, the next 
relatively small generation will have an enormous amount of elderly people to 
support. This will of course also happen in the Third World, but not until the 
end of the hundred-year period and it may be presumed that  countries there 
will have less costly methods to take care of elderly people. 
b) Old industrial sectors in Europe, as well as in North America, have failed to  
remain competitive. What will happen if the present "future industries" get 
overwhelmed by foreign competition? If industry in Europe fails to  remain 
competitive, where will investments take place? If export of capital takes 
place, the economic recession will only be aggravated. 
c) Under circumstances of low growth rates, social stresses and competition and 
disagreement between different social groups increase enormously, as has been 
noted in the 1970s and early 1980s. Various ethnic, age and professional 
groups all see themselves as maltreated. Ethnic strife and terrorism are more 
likely to  occur. The political system is put under constant pressure from 
interest groups and there is definitely a risk that the political system, built on 
representative democracy, will be put out of order and be replaced by some 
kind of negotiation system, where the strength of various interest groups 
decides what advantages they can get. Some tendencies in this direction have 
already been discerned during recent years. 
Another important assumption is that the highly developed social infrastruc- 
ture in Europe, with large bureaucracies, will inhibit innovation and raise pol- 
itical barriers to  enhanced competitiveness. This tendency can be aggravated 
by the increasing problems of distribution. The internal problems in various 
countries will also create more international conflicts between countries in 
Europe. 
4.3. The Big Load 
Population growth does not slow down as expected and the global population 
reaches 20 billion people by 2075. However, in terms of agricultural production (7.5 times 
the 1975 production) and energy use (12 times the 1975 energy use), it is a rather wealthy 
world. This imposes tremendous stress on social and environmental systems. The world is 
held together by a political and social system based on a high degree of ethnic autonomy 
at the local level and a "New World Order" a t  the global level, providing strong interna- 
tional control in key areas of economic relations and environment. Much of the most 
dynamic leadership comes from churches and multinational business consortiums. 
Nation-states have become increasingly preoccupied with internal affairs and are reduced 
to  increasingly symbolic functions. Vigorous technological advances and innovations have 
made continuous economic expansion possible. Important migrations have taken place, 
partly encouraged by climatic change and some revolutionary innovations, which have 
opened up new areas, primarily in Central Asia, Africa and Oceania for agriculture. 
Europe is characterized by social instability and strong fluctuations in both 
economic, population and energy use development. But Europe, like the rest of the North- 
ern regions, keeps its position, far ahead of the developing world. With exception for the 
period just after the turn of the century, the economic growth is low compared with the 
20th century. 
South Asia has considerable and relatively stable economic growth during the whole 
hundred-year period. Despite substantial emigration, it is not until major innovations in 
agriculture and solar energy are spread after 2050 that there is room for radical improve- 
ment of the standards of living for the majority. 
4.3.1. Chronology 
The most important events in this scenario are summarized in Table 4.2. Factor 
increases of population, energy use and agricultural development for the World, Europe 
and South-Asia are presented in Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. 
This is a period with marked economic recession and relatively slow economic 
growth in most parts of the world. Population growth is slowing down and is not con- 
sidered an important problem. Some dramatic events occur: in the early 90s the Afri- 
kaner regime in South Africa falls and the Iranians take over Iraq, showing that  a large 
population can be a military asset. Energy conservation develops rapidly as an important 
high priority goal. 
In Western Europe unemployment is in the 1990s constant a t  15-20%. People defer 
having children, South-North migration continues. There are signs of interethnic terror- 
ism. Governments do not find ways to  handle the problems and lose much prestige and 
credibility. Tax revolts arise. Massive aid programs are successful in raising health stan- 
dards and decreasing mortality in the Third World. With the exception of Asia, the 
developing countries have severe economic problems. 
2000-2025 
Population growth does not level off as expected. The scandal in the 2010s when a 
male oral contraceptive, which has been sold in some countries in Africa and Asia for 
more than ten years, proves to have permanent rather than temporary effects in the heat 
of the tropics, makes it impossible to  continue family planning in any form in the 
Developing World. In Europe a wave of "neofertility" arises as a response to  increased 
ethnic competition and to an economic upswing beginning around 1995. Uncontrolled 
expansion of population from 2015 and onwards with absolute increases rising above any 
historical numbers. During this period many governments lose their authority and 
become increasingly preoccupied with bureaucratic functions. Ethnic groups in many 
countries take over many former governmental responsibilities, such as health care and 
elderly care. Frequent food shortages involving greater and greater areas is a growing 
problem. Water is in many parts of the world a limiting factor both for agriculture and 
settlement. 
2025-2050 
This period is characterized by an intensification of migrations into formerly not so 
densely populated areas like Canada, Siberia, Africa and Australia. From the end of the 
2020s there is enormous population growth in these areas. Energy and food production 
have increasing difficulties keeping the pace of population growth. Ethnic strife, often in 
direct connection with competition for limited resources, are part of everyday life in most 
regions. In the newly settled areas with turbulent uncontrolled settlement, a relatively 
anarchic situation develops with open conflict between various groups of settlers. These 
local but widespread interethnic conflicts culminate a t  a scale that is to  be called the 
Seven Years' War (2043-2050). 
The War culminates with widespread release of poison into water supply systems 
around the world, which stuns the world and halts the hostilities. After this "cease-fire" 
the basic problem is still unsolved: how to cope with the continuing increase and simul- 
taneously contain the conflicts of interest? 
Table 4.2 Chronological summary of the Big Load scenario 
I WORLD EUROPE SOUTH ASIA I 
Birth control program 
Revolutionary innova- 
tions 
I Treaty of Ahmedabad 
Breakthrough of green 
cropping 
2050 Seven Years War 
Widespread ethnic 
conflicts 
Squatter movements Migration to Siberia, Australia, Canada, 
Sahara Governments less im- 
portant 
2025 High, stable economic 
growth 
Increased population Neofertility wave 
growth 
Contraceptive scandal Tax revolts 
Government authority 
questioned 
Important emigration 
2000 Large scale migrations Rise of widespread in- 
South North terethnic terrorism 
Relatively stable 
Iran defeats Iraq growth 
The white regime in High, chronic unem- 
South Africa falls ploy men t 
Economic recession 
The period after the Seven Years' War is among the most dynamic in global history, 
with fortunate circumstances leading to  rapid development of all sectors and regions. The 
Peace of Ahmedabad is signed in 2051 by the leaders of ethnic societies, churches and 
multinational companies as well as residual nation-states. It constitutes a New World 
Order based on rights and duties of ethnic communities, and guarantees for a high degree 
of local ethnic autonomy. A World Government that is powerful inside a well-defined lim- 
ited sphere of what is defined to  be of global concern begins to  develop. A global taxation 
system based on a model used in India since the beginning of the century is introduced. 
The community is the primary taxpaying unit and responsible for its members. Tax 
money is redistributed between communities to  reward pacific societies and penalize 
transgressive ones. Development during the 2050s and 60s is very rapid and based on 
widespread introduction of new technologies. Photovoltaic energy is a new important 
energy innovation and also the food market is radically changed by green crop treatment. 
Green produce, i.e. grain harvested before ripening, becomes the main staple diet in large 
parts of the World. The New World Order is, however, not without problems and crises. 
Ethnic conflicts still occur, but a t  relatively tolerable levels. 
Family planning programs are implemented by the World Government. Some signs 
of reduction of population growth rates can be noticed by 2075, but competition between 
ethnic groups, though now latent, makes changes in attitudes slow. 
4.3.2. Population 
Major improvements in health standards in the Developing World, the collapse of 
family planning, the opening up of new areas, and the wave of neofertility in the North 
entail that the expected slowdown of global population growth does not occur. The 
growth rates are slowly decreasing, but the absolute increase is relatively stable. The dis- 
tribution of people between rich and poor regions stays the same (1 to  3) as in 1975. 
The population of Europe is tripled. Immigration is important for most of the 
hundred-year period and a rise of fertility sweeps across Europe after the year 2000. 
In South Asia the growth rate is relatively stable (1.5%/year), but somewhat lower 
than in the 20th century (2%/year). Despite important emigration to  Europe, Siberian, 
Australian and North American populations increase 4.5 times. 
4.3.3. Energy 
Global energy use increases 12 times during the hundred-year period and is close to 
100 TW by 2075. Energy use per capita is 2.4 times the 1975 level by 2075. This 
translates into an average global growth trend of 2.5%/year and about l%/year in per 
capita terms. All energy sources are intensively exploited. Fossil fuels dominate the fuel 
mix with 70% of the market. Several energy sources which were statistically insignificant 
in 1975 contribute major shares in 2075: synfuels 23%, biomass 4% and solar 14%. The 
41% share accounted for by these three items corresponds in 2075 to  almost the propor- 
tion which oil (now down a t  9%) enjoyed in 1975. Nuclear power is also intensively used 
in all regions (8% of the world market). Biomass and solar energy production consume 
large amounts of land. A radical development in photovoltaic technology gives an impor- 
tant contribution after 2050. Energy use is distributed more fairly than in 1975, but the 
four richest regions still consume more than 50% of the energy with only 25% of the popu- 
lation. USSR, East Asia and Africa are the dominating energy exporters, while Europe is 
still the most important importer region. 
Energy use in Europe is, despite slower growth than prior to  1975, seven times 
higher in 2075. Per capita use is more than doubled. The fossil fuels still account for 213 
of total energy use. At the end of the 20th century slow population growth coupled with 
energy conservation, retards energy consumption growth. In time, with rising population 
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Figure 4.4 Big Load scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for the World 
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Figure 4.5 Big Load scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for Europe 
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Figure 4.6 Big Load scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for South Asia 
growth and emerging new technologies, the pace of growth in energy use once again 
accelerates. After 2025, biomass-oriented location of industries becomes increasingly popu- 
lar. 
In South Asia, energy use increases 16 times after rapid growth throughout the 
hundred-year period. Per capita consumption increases by only 3.5 and in 2075 is still 
very low by international standards. The energy sector is dominated by fossil fuels and 
solar power towards the end of the hundred-year period. Biomass and nuclear power 
increase in importance. However, population pressures preclude further significant 
increases in agricultural land devoted to biomass fuel production. 
4.3.4. Agriculture 
Global agricultural production increases 7.5 times (1.5 times per capita). Agricul- 
tural development is rapid during the whole hundred-year period, with new methods and 
crops being developed and diffused. In dry areas carrying capacities are revolutionized. 
But still the hunger problem long persists and per capita production does not rise until 
near the end of the hundred-year period. With world population continuing to increase a t  
a rapid rate, land for agriculture becomes increasingly scarce. Competition for land 
between food and biomass production is also a growing problem from 2050. Consequently, 
higher crop and animal yields account for most of the increase in production. Land in 
agriculture increases by 50% and yields rise by 400%. The yield increase results from a 
combination of high investment in development of new technologies and policies which 
give farmers incentives to adopt them. Land in irrigation worldwide increases by 180% 
and fertilizer use rises by 450%. Most of these increases are in the developing countries. 
The introduction of green crop harvesting is one response to the scarcity of land and 
changes the food market radically; this procedure is spread relatively fast, particularly in 
southern regions. 
Per capita food production in Europe declines markedly as a consequence of an open- 
ing of the region's agriculture to  outside competition. The region is by 2075 a major 
importer of food, with the USSR region as the main supplier. The area of cropland 
decreases by 3096, so the doubling of output (most of it biomass for fuel) is achieved by a 
190% increase in yield. Per hectare fertilizer use rises by only 40%. Yields increase far less 
than this primarily because of a 45% expansion of irrigated land and managerial improve- 
ments which increase the efficiency of fertilizer use. The green crop harvesting does not 
experience a breakthrough here before 2075. The Europeans still prefer traditional har- 
vesting. 
On the Indian Subcontinent an intensive program of agricultural R&D results in a 
continuing stream of new, higher yielding, pest-resistant crop varieties. Combined with a 
more than doubling of the irrigated area and an ever more massive 900% increase in fertil- 
izer use, the improved varieties give a yield increase of 510% over the hundred years. 
Agriculture is recognized to be the highest priority so that  the total land in agriculture, 
despite other land pressures, stays stable and indeed increases slightly (5%). I t  is not until 
after 2050, when "green crops" and other innovations are introduced, that  production can 
really grow faster than population. By 2075, total production has risen to  6.5 times the 
1975 level, which translates to  a 40% increase in per capita production. 
4.3.5. C o m m e n t a r y  
4.3.5.1. N u m e r i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
The Big Load is definitively the scenario where the upper limits are most obviously 
challenged. The population curve is here chosen as a relatively straight line, allowing for 
decrease in geometrical growth, but showing relatively constant arithmetic growth after 
2000. This gives about the same growth rate in 2000-2075 as in the conventional wisdom 
scenario 2000-2025. Europe has higher growth in 2000-2050 than before 2000, while South 
Asia follows the global curve. 
In this scenario the growth rate of energy use is held rather constant both globally 
and regionally. The average annual growth trend of 2.5% in total energy use and about 
1% in per capita terms are rates of change which, if they did not, in their dimensions, 
imply such massive environmental and social problems, would not be so seriously out of 
line with the experience of our century. There are of course fluctuations due to  the tur- 
bulent socio-political development, but these do not have considerable influence on the 
relatively stable long-term trends. I t  should however be emphasized that  the socio- 
political restructuring is one major pre-requisite for making this development possible. 
The fossil fuels bear the main burden of this expansion and still account for 70% of 
the market in 2075, but the contributions from solar and nuclear energy have become 
more important towards the end of the hundred-year period. The use of all fuels are 
stretched towards maximum limits. This means that  especially the use of fossil fuels is 
probably not sustainable i.e. possible to  keep a t  such a level very much longer than to  
2075. The oil, the coal and the gas supplies will soon be exhausted. Oil shales and tar  
sands are likely t o  last longer. Biomass energy use is probably also beyond a sustainable 
level and already seriously competing with food production in large parts of the world. 
Notable is that  despite the radical improvements in solar energy technology, the market 
share of renewable energy is not higher than in the Big Shift, though the use is of course 
much higher in absolute terms. 
Until 2050 the agricultural sector has, despite high steady growth, problems t o  keep 
pace with population growth. With the breakthrough of green cropping and new energy 
technologies, agriculture experiences a kind of "momentum jump". The development 
sketched in this scenario involves some highly problematic points: 
- The increases of the amounts of agricultural land (50%) and irrigated land (180%) 
are far above what most analysts think possible. 
- The radical increase of fertilizer use and irrigation, that mostly take place in 
developing countries, are also touching the limits of the perceived possibilities because of 
severe environmental impacts (e.g. eutrophication and salinization) that are likely to be 
connected to them. 
It is interesting to note that under the circumstance of continued population growth, 
although lower than at present, the limits of the perceived possible will already be seri- 
ously challenged by the intensification needed to keep the present production per capita. 
The increase in per capita production comes in this scenario almost entirely from the 
revolutionary innovations that are diffused in the middle of next century. 
The problems mentioned above are likely to be first and probably most severely 
experienced in Asia, where potential arable land is already scarce, and thus virtually all of 
the continuously high increases in this scenario must come from intensification. The 
annual rate of yield increase in South Asia is 1.8%) unprecedented in history over a long 
period. The 130% increase in irrigated land and the 900% increase in fertilizer use demand 
tremendously successful technological development and management. Even if this level of 
irrigation would be possible to reach, it cannot be expected to be sustainable over long 
periods due to the erosive characteristics of the soils in the region. The development of 
fertilizer use demands large sacrifices of environmental quality for the needs of food pro- 
duction for the continuously growing population. These problems with conventional 
intensification is what suggests that the green cropping technique reaches its widest a d o p  
tion in Asia. 
The major problems of European agricultural development in "The Big Load" are 
quite different: why is the increase not higher compared with the revolutionary develop 
ment in other regions, and how will there be sufficient supply in other regions to cover 
continuously the European need of imports? What makes this development possible is pri- 
marily continued economic strength based on industry and knowledge, that assure the 
purchasing power of the Europeans and fewer trade-barriers for agricultural products. 
4.3.5.2. Basic ideas 
Most modern population studies describe paths to  a stable world population. This 
"ceiling" can be found at various levels (about 8-15 billion in the studies reviewed for the 
"conventional wisdom") and most often it is reached by the end of the study period, no 
matter what its length. But what will happen if the global population does not stabilize? 
Would continued population growth be possible despite improving standards of living? 
To reach 20 billion people by 2075 allows, however, a considerable decrease in global 
population growth (from about 2.0 to 1.2%/year). But still a rather strong argument 
seems to be needed to make this development convincing, particularly when population 
growth by 2075 does not show any sign of levelling off. The mechanisms suggested here 
are an important redistribution of population, with for example considerable migration 
into new areas of settlement (note that these do not have to be based on agriculture), a 
collapse of family planning, and ideological changes towards higher value in having chil- 
dren, which are encouraged by the increased competition between ethnic groups. These 
will a t  least partly countervail the birth reduction expected with increased wealth. 
The second difficulty in this scenario is to provide a reasonably stable global struc- 
ture compatible with such high energy use and agricultural production. The strengthening 
of global central power, balanced by an increase of local power with a strong division of 
responsibilities, is perhaps not a sensational solution. Within nation-st ates numerous 
examples can be found of a parallel strengthening of central and local power, diminishing 
the power of intermediate institutions. In centralized countries like Sweden, France and 
some socialist states like Libya, quite strong local institutions are surprisingly abundant. 
In a world with faster communications it would not be totally unreasonable to suggest 
that the nation-states could lose their present position as the most powerful and 
influential level, particularly in a future with a strong increase of internal conflicts. The 
thought is that the world government has strong power in the most essential fields to 
ensure circulation of people and goods. The system could be compared with the present 
federal republics, with small but strong states. 
This rise of local power will be both a consequence of and a solution to the problems 
with increased ethnic strife all over the world. Mass migration is of course a pre-requisite 
for this development. That ethnicity will play an important role in the future is an 
assumption based on the experience of the recent past with a renaissance of ethnic consci- 
ence and a surge of manifest ethnic conflicts all over the world. 
On the global level, multinational corporations play an important role as mediators. 
They will be the propagators for an increased global economic and political integration 
and cooperation. Also of great importance is their function as networks for fast and 
widespread diffusion of innovations. 
Since World War 2, the corporations have grown to become very important and also 
very powerful global networks that are difficult for individual governments to control and 
upon which they usually are very dependent. They have even been able to cross border- 
lines and establish linkages to an extent that nobody would perhaps have expected a few 
decades ago. I refer here primarily to their linkages to China and the SEV countries. They 
definitely play an important role of diffusing products and perhaps also technology, lifes- 
tyles and values connected with these products. These economic linkages bring power and 
influence. Through their contact networks they already today have unique possibilities to 
act as intermediaries (e.g., sometimes it can peep forth in the newspapers that some 
American business executives seem to have very close contact with leaders in Kremlin), 
and there are few signs that their influence will decrease in the future. 
That multinationals could have great prospects of playing an important role is not a 
new idea (Pearson, 1985). It has even been suggested that they might help to create a 
more equal and peaceful world. Even if some directors have shown strong interests in phi- 
lanthropical activities, there are few signs that the activities of these companies would 
help to balance the world. And this is not argued for here. What is suggested is only that 
the multinational corporations could appear as some kind of legitimate insurance and 
guarantee for transnational arrangements and their incentive for playing this role would 
largely be economic. A stable, integrated, high-growth world with large volumes of trade 
is the base for their existence. 
The energy and agricultural futures that are sketched in this scenario, are really on 
the rim of what can be viewed as possible. This also includes close to maximum rates of 
use of some energy fuels and penetration rates for innovations. These will not be possible 
to reach without very smoothly working economic and information systems. 
Implicit in this scenario, contrary to the "Big Shift", is the fact that population 
growth drives development. This is similar to the developmental theory, proposed by 
Ester Boserup (1981), which argues that poverty or lack of resources causes intensification 
of production and brings new resources and new innovations into use. This theory s u p  
ports the prospects for high economic growth in this scenario, with high population caus- 
ing an enormous pressure on the resource base. 
4.4. Rurban Arcadian Drift 
In the end of the 20th century some interrelated global catastrophes - the Greatpox 
epidemic, social chaos in many regions, collapse of the global economic system and global 
trade, famines - result in dramatic decreases in population, particularly in the North, and 
cause total restructuring of the global society. The greatest transformations take place in 
Western Europe and to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe and North America. In these 
areas, rural and small-town societies with a high degree of self-reliance emerge. These rur- 
ban societies depend almost totally on local resources, use small-scale technologies, have 
very few contacts outside the local region and are characterized by strong social linkages, 
a sense of belonging to  the local community, but also by widespread suspicion towards the 
"outer world". International trade declines to a preindustrial level in the North. The 
South is put into a favorable position with less population pressure and less competition 
for energy and other natural resources. This makes accelerated growth possible. The gap 
between North and South diminishes. The rurban ideals also become very widely diffused 
in the South. 
However, very narrow-minded, utilitarian view-points, which focus primarily on the 
local situation, dominate in most parts of the World. As well, nobody cares about global 
problems, and many fields of science stagnate. In the North, science degenerates into 
literary criticism, astrology and the study of magic. Towards the end of the hundred-year 
period there are, however, signs of adolescent uneasiness in many localities, and a certain 
"renaissance" for science occurs. 
By 2075 there are 6.8 billion people on Earth. Energy use and agricultural produc- 
tion are four times higher than a century earlier. Energy use is more evenly distributed 
than in the most recent centuries. 
4.4.1. Chronology 
The most important events in this scenario are summarized in Table 4.3. Factor 
increases of population, energy use and agricultural development for the World, Europe 
and South-Asia are presented in Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, respectively. 
1975-2000 
The end of the 20th century is a period of increasing problems of economic as well as 
social, political and environmental nature. The economic recession continues and unem- 
ployment rates are higher than ever in the industrialized world. Social tensions and ter- 
rorist activities increase. Tougher control of citizens is introduced in many countries. The 
Third World suffers even worse from economic problems and total chaos threatens. There 
is an alarming rise in death rates from AIDS in all parts of the world. 
In 1993 there is a nuclear confrontation in the Near East, which is by great effort 
kept from expanding into a global war. 
But it is not until the Greatpox shock in 1997, that  the vulnerability of modern 
society is made apparent through brutal experience. Greatpox originates from a mutated 
virus that  has been developed in laboratories and is contagious and mortal to an unpre- 
cented extent. It is diffused with enormous rapidity to  all major cities in the world. Total 
chaos burst out; people flee the big cities and leave their jobs, most activities get dis- 
rupted, international trade ceases, industrial activity decreases, and the monetary system 
collapses. Exchange trade is reintroduced, but the provisional linkages have been des- 
troyed even for the most necessary items. The industrialized countries with the most com- 
plex and complicated economic systems are hit most severely by this development. The 
advanced farming systems cannot function without the usual essential inputs like petrol, 
which no longer can be obtained because of the collapse of the distribution systems. 
Widespread famines occur, particularly in the city areas, 1998 and onwards. 
Table 4.3 Chronological summary of the Rurban Arcadia scenario 
WORLD EUROPE SOUTH ASIA 
Openings towards "the South is not any longer 
outer world" ? very far behind North 
in economic terms 
Stabilization of the 
New Order 
Energy uselcap and 
agr.prod./cap stabil- 
ized 
Radically improved Libraries close standards of living 
Astrology flourishes 
Reduced population 
Falling birthrates growth 
2025 Nation-states loose Cities disappear 
their importance Science declines Accelerated growth 
Utilitarian orientation Local self-reliance in Rurban, small-scale 
the North reconstruction Technological advance- 
ment Critique of civilisation 
Economic collapse Total chaos, famines 
2000 Trade disrupted 
GREATPOX 30% deceased 15% deceased 
Nuclear confrontation 
Near East Increased terrorism 
Economic recession Social tensions 
The Third World societies prove less vulnerable; people are more experienced t o  
cope with disasters. By the year 2000 the world seems to  have lost 1 billion people, almost 
20% of the population three years earlier. Energy use and agricultural production have 
had dramatic falls in Europe. In South Asia, society is not that shaken. Many people have 
died but this has not caused the Indians to  leave their homes or the social system to  col- 
lapse. 
2000-2025 
After a few years, the first Greatpox epidemic is over but Greatpox is t o  reappear 
twice during the next two decades. Population increases between the epidemics a t  a rela- 
tively high rate. In the industrialized world it is a period of reconstruction, but also of 
reflection and self-examination. Why has this disaster happened? How may a repetition in 
the future be avoided? Ruthless civilization critique flourishes in this period. The funda- 
ments of the whole western civilization have proved to  be insufficient. People do not 
return t o  the cities. Instead, the depopulation of the cities continues. New small-town 
societies, based on small-scale farming and industry, are created. Local self-reliance, 
small-scale, simplicity, low energy use, and decreased consumerism are the new guidelines 
and ideals. 
Science is not well regarded. It is connected with the urban way of life and the origin 
of Greatpox. Most universities and scientific institutions are closed down. The only really 
accepted research area is technology for basic production, in small-scale. 
The local communities fight hard for their autonomy and the nation-states do not 
regain their former power and importance. 
Inspiration for the building of the new rurban societies comes from southern models, 
which have proved less vulnerable to  the shock. The Third World benefits from lower 
prices for energy and other natural resources, less influence of the industrialized world, 
and less population pressure; in large areas a very dynamic development takes place. 
R&D expands, important progress is made, but as in the North it has a very utilitarian 
orientation. The traditional western way of development is rejected everywhere. 
2025-2050 
Radical restructuring in the North continues and economic growth in the South is 
very fast. Population growth decreases, in southern regions primarily due to  higher stan- 
dards of living, in northern regions due to  stringent family size regulations in the now 
dominating rurban communities, which see a stable population as an ideal. 
Energy use and agricultural production per capita have stabilized in Europe. Inter- 
national trade is still a t  a relatively low level: all basic products are provided locally. This 
has resulted in increased heterogeneity, for example, in types of energy, building materi- 
als, techniques, customs, and traditions. The rurban philosophy, however, is not an 
enemy of high technology; computers and computer models are often used both in agricul- 
ture and industry. 
Intellectual life in Europe and other northern regions is rather poor. The technologi- 
cal level is viewed t o  be adequate, when all perceived problems have been solved. Reading 
has gone out of fashion. Libraries are closed down because of book deterioration. The 
study of astrology, magic forces and literary criticism dominate the few remaining 
research and educational institutions. In the strongly developing South a very technologi- 
cally oriented culture has developed. 
Towards the end of the hundred-year period a new world system is well-established. 
Population in Europe has stagnated and so has energy use and agricultural production. In 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, industrial and agricultural growth continues on a high 
steady level. 
The pioneer spirit in the rurban communities fades away. The young generation that  
has not experienced the building of the new society resist with increasing power the heavy 
restrictions on consumption, travel and the discontinuity perceived between the self- 
fulfilling but also small universe of the Rurban world and the more dynamic world in 
southern regions. 
New social institutions are spread through Europe, linking the small communities. 
These institutions are concerned with intellectual and cultural activities, which have long 
been dormant. They have an interest in gathering information on different techniques and 
lifestyles and want the various societies to  learn from each other. They also start  to  study 
history. In the southern regions environmental problems are just being discovered, but it 
is not a high priority issue. Environmental degradation has so far been considered to  be 
the price one has to  pay for the enormous economic development, which has lifted most 
societies up from the 20th century poverty. That the local industrial activity would 
importantly influence the global environment is seen as just incredible and of no concern 
to  their society. 
4.4.2. Population 
By 2075 the world population has risen to  only 6.4 billion. Almost 90% live in the 
former Third World. Significant redistributions have occurred and great urban concentra- 
tions have disappeared. 
The population of Europe has decreased by 20%. The Greatpox epidemic hit Europe 
severely and since then population growth has been kept down by strict measures of fam- 
ily planning within the urban societies. In South Asia the population has more than dou- 
bled, but population growth is, because of increased standards of living, down a t  levels 
that  were common in secalled industrialized countries a t  the end of the 20th century. 
4.4.3. Energy 
Global energy use has increased 3.7 times. Energy use has declined in the Northern 
hemisphere, but has presently increased in the South, where now 516 of all energy is con- 
sumed. Since primarily local and regional resources are used, variation in the fuel mix is 
enormous. In many regions there has been an upswing in alternative renewable fuels, espe- 
cially various forms of biomass and solar energy. Fossil fuels are still important, particu- 
larly in the southern regions, but their use is more concentrated than ever. 
In Europe the small-town societies have achieved low consumption of energy and 
consumer products. Energy saving and durability are highly valued goals. Energy use per 
capita is 25% lower than in 1975. In Central Europe fossil fuels are still used, but in Scan- 
dinavia wood and biomass are the most important resources for not only energy but also 
chemical and even food production. 
In South Asia rapid strides have been taken in catching up with the former world 
leaders. Despite a 14-fold increase in total use, per capita consumption is only half of 
Europe's. During the first half of the hundred-year period, India benefited from the low 
international prices for oil. Later improvements in solar and biomass technologies, for 
example, have played an important role. 
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Figure 4.7 Rurban Arcadia scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for the World 
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Figure 4.8 Rurban Arcadia scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for Europe 
Figure 4.9 Rurban Arcadia scenario: factor increases of population, 
energy use and agricultural production for South Asia 
4.4.4. Agriculture 
Global agricultural production per capita has increased by 130%. The world is con- 
siderably better fed, but there are areas of exception, where the local resources are too 
scarce to give the population a sufficient diet regularly and these areas do not receive 
much support from outside. 
In Europe agriculture is based on small production units and relatively high labor 
inputs. Production per capita is almost the same as in 1975. A worldwide problem has 
been provision of fertilizers, a problem with various local solutions. An overall change is 
that of sewage systems; no society can any longer afford to waste its nutrient capital by 
releasing it into lakes and seas. 
In developing countries a general trend has been that more emphasis has been put on 
rural areas and rural development. The urban centers have lost their former economic and 
political power and cultural dynamism. 
4.4.5. Commentary 
4.4.5.1. Numerical representation 
Because of great diversity and the very imaginative development, this scenario is 
very difficult to catch in numbers, at least on the global scale and for Europe. The 20% 
population decrease in the firat Greatpox epidemic is in fact not so important compared 
with the worst plagues in history, but is nevertheless sensational. The growth rates are 
subsequently relatively low, about the present in Europe and much lower than present in 
South Asia, because of birth control in the North and higher standards of living in the 

















